The relevant geographic market area for fed cattle and the changing structure of the beef packing industry by Schultz, Margaret Marstall
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1988
The relevant geographic market area for fed cattle
and the changing structure of the beef packing
industry
Margaret Marstall Schultz
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, and the Agricultural Economics
Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schultz, Margaret Marstall, "The relevant geographic market area for fed cattle and the changing structure of the beef packing industry
" (1988). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 8802.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/8802
INFORMATION TO USERS 
The most advanced technology has been used to photo­
graph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm 
master. UMI films the original text directly fi'om the copy 
submitted. Thus, some dissertation copies are in typewriter 
face, while others may be from a computer printer. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a 
complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will 
be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyrighted material had to 
be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. 
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are re­
produced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper 
left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal 
sections with small overlaps. Each oversize page is available 
as one exposure on a standard 35 mm slide or as a 17" x 23" 
black and white photographic print for an additional charge. 
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been 
reproduced xerographically in this copy. 35 mm slides or 
6" X 9" black and white photographic prints are available for 
any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for 
an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. 
••UMI 
Accessing the World's Information since 1938 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 

Order Number 8825953 
The relevant geographic market area for fed cattle and the 
changing structure of the beef packing industry 
Schultz, Margaret Marstall, Ph.D. 
Iowa State University, 1988 
U M I  
300N.ZeebRd. 
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 

The relevant geographic market area for fed cattle 
and the changing structure of the beef packing industry 
by 
Margaret Marstall Schultz 
A Dissertation Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Major: Economics 
Approved : 
men 
F'oT the lifaduate tollege 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1 9 8 8  
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1 
PART I: RELEVANT MARKET DEFINITION 3 
Objectives 3 
Beef Sector Overview 4 
Literature Review 10 
Economic theory 10 
Antitrust law 13 
Merger guidelines 15 
Procedures 17 
Trade area 18 
Factor analysis 20 
Price time series 26 
Quantity-price time series 33 
Data 41 
Results 42 
Packers and stockyards data 42 
Trade area 42 
Factor analysis 46 
Quantity-price time series 51 
Livestock Meat Wool News data 59 
Factor analysis 59 
Price time series 63 
Summary - Part I 92 
Packers and Stockyards data 92 
Livestock Meat Wool N e w s  data (LMWN) 94 
Implications for Future Studies 96 
PART II: THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BEEF INDUSTRY 97 
Relevant Market 98 
Structure 101 
Location and number of plants 101 
Slaughter capacity 10 3 
Concentration 115 
i i i 
Vertical integration 118 
Integration: diversification and conglomerates 119 
Barriers to entry 121 
Start-up costs 122 
Operating costs 123 
Product differentiation 127 
Research and technology 130 
Market information 132 
Cattle feedlot size, structure and location 134 
Structure of beef wholesale and retail markets 136 
Summary - industry structure 137 
Conduct 140 
Mergers 140 
Pricing behavior 14 3 
Farm level 143 
Wholesale level 144 
Product differentiation 145 
Summary - industry conduct 146 
Performance 147 
Financial performance 148 
Income to sales 148 
Income to assets 151 
Current ratio 151 
Consumer loss 152 
Summary - industry performance 15 5 
Summary - Part II 156 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 158 
APPENDIX A; THE ARMA PROCESS 161 
APPENDIX B: STANDARDIZED PRICES 166 
APPENDIX C: SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 167 
ON RELEVANT MARKET FOR FED CATTLE 
REFERENCES 169 
i V 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 1. Hypothetical trade areas for four firms 19 
Figure 2. Scree Plot 24 
Figure 3. Trade area for Plants A, D, E, 0, and Q 43 
Figure 4. Trade area for plants B, C, G, and T 44 
Figure 5. Trade area for plants K, L, and P 45 
Figure 6. 1985 Steer and heifer slaughter plants 105 
(50,000+ head capacity) based on 1984 
capacity estimates 
Figure 7. Equilibrium price and quantity demanded 153 
under perfect competition and monopoly 
V 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Factor loadings from adjusted prices at 
fourteen plants explained by four 
unrotated factors for 1979 and 1980 
Table 2. Standardized scoring coefficients for 
combined years 1979 and 1980 
Table 3. Standardized scoring coefficients based 
on VARIMAX rotation of three factors for 
combined years 1979 and 1980 
Table 4. Standardized scoring coefficients based 
on V/ARIMAX rotation of two factors for 
combined years 1979 and 1980 
Table 5. Cross-elasticity coefficients between 
logged market shares for twelve plants 
and the logged adjusted price series 
for plants B, G, R, and L 
Table 6. Cross-elasticity coefficients between 
first differences of market shares for 
twelve plants and the first differences 
of adjusted price series for plants 
B, G, H, and L 
Table 7. Factor loadings from weekly reported 
prices at ten locations plants 
explained by four unrotated 
for 1980 to 1985 
factors 
Table 8. 
Table 9. 
Table 10. 
Table 11. 
Table 12. 
Table 13. 
Standardized scoring coefficients for 
ten locations from 300 weekly reported 
prices from 1980 to 1985 based on 
uARIMAX rotation of four factors 
Standardized scoring coefficients for 
ten locations from 300 weekly reported 
prices from 1980 to 1985 based on 
uARIMAX rotation of three factors 
Standardized scoring coefficients for 
t'en locations from 300 weekly reported 
prices from 1980 to 1985 based on 
vARIMAX rotation of two factors 
ARMA parameters estimated for five 
possible functional forms for 
Lancaster time series 
after one regular difference 
ARMA parameters estimated for four 
msiole functional forms for inois time series 
after one regular difference 
ARMA parameters estimated for four 
possible functional forms for 
South St. Paul time series 
after one regular difference 
'ir 
48 
49 
49 
53 
55 
6 1  
6 1  
62 
6 2  
65 
6 6 
67 
\i i 
Table 14. ARMA parameters estimated for five 68 
possible functional forms for 
Omaha time series after 
one regular difference 
Table 15. ARMA parameters estimated for three 69 
eossible functional forms for ioux City time series 
after one regular difference 
Table 16. ARMA parameters estimated for four 70 
possible functional forms for 
Iowa time series 
after one regular difference 
Table 17. ARMA parameters estimated for five 71 
possible functional forms for 
Texas-Oklahoma time series 
after one regular difference 
Table 18. ARMA parameters estimated for three 72 
eossible functional forms for olorado time series 
after one regular difference 
Table 19. ARMA parameters estimated for four 73 
possible functional forms for 
California time series 
after one regular difference 
Table 20. ARMA parameters estimated for four 74 
possible functional forms for 
Washington-Oregon-Idaho time series 
after one regular difference 
Table 21. Transfer functions showing Texas-Oklahoma 76 
time series as a function of Washinqton-
Oreqon-Idaho time series after regular first 
differences for both 
Table 22. ARMA transfer functions showing 77 
Lancaster time series as a function 
of Washington-Oregon-Idaho time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Table 23. ARMA transfer functions showing ' 78 
Lancaster time series as a function 
of Illinois time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Table 24. ARMA transfer functions showing 79 
Lancaster time series as a function 
of Texas time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Table 25. ARMA transfer functions showing 80 
Lancaster time series as a function 
of Omaha time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Table 26. ARMA transfer functions showing 81 
Lancaster time series as a function 
of California time series 
after regular first differences for both 
vii 
Table 27. ARMA transfer functions showing 82 
Omaha time series as a function 
of Washington-Oregon-Idaho time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Table 28.' ARMA transfer functions showing 83 
Omaha time series as a function 
of Texas time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Table 29. ARMA transfer functions showing 84 
Omaha time series as a function 
of Lancaster time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Table 30. ARMA transfer functions showing 85 
Illinois time series as a function 
of Washington-Oregon-Idaho time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Table 31. ARMA transfer functions showing 86 
Illinois time series as a function 
of Texas time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Table 32. ARMA transfer functions showing 87 
Illinois time series as a function 
of Omaha time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Table 33. ARMA transfer functions showing 88 
Illinois time series as a function 
of California time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Table 34. ARMA transfer functions showing 89 
California time series as a function 
of Washington-Oregon-Idaho time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Table 35. Composition of Commercial Cattle ^ 99 
Slaughter 1960-1984 (In thousand head) 
Table 36. Steer and heifer slaughter plants 104 
by capacity available in the Upper 
Midwest and Southwest 
Table 37. 1985 Estimated slaughter capacities 106 
for 55 U.S. plants with annual slaughter 
capacity greater than 50,000 head 
Table 38. 1985 Estimated slaughter capacities for 50 108 
central U.S. plants in the relevant market 
area with annual slaughter capacity greater 
than 50,000 head 
Table 39. 1985 Estimated slaughter capacities 110 
for 29 plants in the upper Midwest 
region with annual slaughter capacity 
greater than 50,000 head 
viii 
Table 40 
41 
Table 
Table 
Table 
1985 Estimated slaughter capacities 
for 23 plants in the Southwest region 
with annual slaughter capacity 
greater than 50,000 head 
Breakdown of Cattle Packers' Sales 
Dollar 1982-84 
Table 
Table 42. Total advertising expenditures of 
43 
44. 
45. 
selected manufacturing industries, 
census years 1963-1982 (millions 
of dollars) 
Six Media Advertising Expenditures 
by Leading National Advertisers: 1980-84 
Earnings Ratios for national, 
regional and local packers 
Selected financial ratios for four 
beef packers 
112 
1 2 6  
1 2 8  
1 2 8  
149 
150 
ix 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank Gene, my husband, and Josh, my 
son, who gave up so much while I pursued this dream. Also, 
a special thanks to Mom and Dad who taught me how to dream 
and more importantly, how to achieve the dream. And to all 
of my extended family, a heart-felt thanks for all of the 
emotional support during these last years. 
Of course without the constant threat of a lighted 
fire beneath my "toes" from my mentor and friend. Dr. 
Marvin Hayenga, this dissertation would not be what it is 
today. A warm thanks to all my friends at Iowa State, 
students and professors alike, for making my years in Ames 
a wonderful experience. 
Partial financial support for the research undertaken 
was provided by Packers and Stockyards Administration, and 
by the Iowa Beef Industry Council. Many thanks to those 
people, especially Dr. J. C. Williamson and Dr. Everett 
Stoddard, for giving me the chance to pursue this topic. 
1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The beef sector has undergone dramatic changes in the 
last fifty years. Basic changes after World War II in 
consumer demand for fed beef resulted in a major shift in 
the locations of producers and subsequently, packers. A 
shift from producing beef carcasses to fabricated wholesale 
beef products (i.e., boxed beef) was the next step in 
revolutionizing the slaughter industry.1 The new faces in 
the industry were characterized as the "low-cost" producers 
with shrewd management teams. The established slaughterers 
quickly found themselves at a competitive disadvantage, and 
many left the beef business. 
The beef packing industry is currently dominated by 
eight or nine firms.% In 1982, nine firms slaughtered 
eighty percent of federally inspected cattle. There has 
been a marked increase in the share of steer and heifer 
slaughter by the top four firms, going from twenty-nine 
percent in 1972 to slightly more than fifty perdent in 1983 
(AMI, 1985). In boxed beef (steers and heifers only), the 
top four firms had close to sixty-six percent of the market 
in 1982 (Nelson, 1985). 
Antitrust agencies and various other groups have shown 
considerable interest in the level of competition in the 
meat packing industry.^ Charges ranging from price-fixing 
1 This study uses the terms sector, industry, and 
segment to mean respectively narrower categories of the 
particular market. For instance, in the beef sector there 
are many industries, such as the feedlot industry or the 
meat packing industry, and within each industry are various 
segments, such as steer and heifer slaughtering companies 
(within the meat packing industry within the beef sector). 
^This study will always refer to the beef portion of 
the meat industry unless noted otherwise. 
^See the USDA study written by the Industry Analysis 
staff, Packers and Stockyards Administration, Geographic 
Markets and Prices for Fed Steers and Heifers,"a TTBl sTaff 
paper ri c i- an Lamm, Jr., oT ETTe U ia D A / L K b entitled 
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to attempts to monopolize through illegal merger activity 
(both horizontal and vertical) and bribery have been made 
against some of the top firms.^ 
In response to this interest in the meat packing 
industry, particularly in its merger activity, the first 
part of this dissertation will address the relevant market 
definition which is often crucial in analyzing a proposed 
merger. In particular, procedures will be examined which 
may be useful in delineating the appropriate geographic 
market area for fed cattle procurement, which may also be 
more generally applicable to geographic market delineation 
in other commodities or industry cases. 
The second portion of the dissertation will be devoted 
to the analysis of the organization of the beef packing 
industry, in terms of the relevant market as defined in the 
first part. The changing structure, conduct and 
performance of the beef packing industry will be analyzed 
and evaluated. 
Competition in the Domestic Cattle Industry and several 
papers 5y tlement Ward, Tor example, btructural Changes and 
Market Power in Cattle Feeding and MeacpacKinq, â l?du 
paper presented aZ TfTe Uk 1 anoma Lattle 1- eeders seminar. 
^For example, U.S. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., and 
Columbia Foods, Inc., (challenged Northwest Feeders joint 
venture with IBP), Meat Price Investigators Assn. et al., 
V.  IBP et al. (alleged price-fixing), Monfort v. Cargill 
and EXCEL (challenged EXCEL acquisition of Spencer Foods). 
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PART I: RELEVANT MARKET DEFINITION 
Objectives 
The main objective of this study is to examine 
alternative approaches to determine the relevant 
procurement markets in which beef slaughter/processing 
firms compete.5 Previous applications in the economic and 
legal literature of relevant market determination have 
resulted in a number of seemingly conflicting approaches 
and conclusions. A closer examination of the economic 
theory of relevant market determination reveals substantial 
ambiguity and corresponding difficulty in applying the 
market definition concepts to industry studies or case 
situations. 
This study examines previous literature on relevant 
market determination and proposes several alternative 
methods that might be useful in delineating geographic 
cattle procurement markets for the beef slaughter industry. 
The four main procedures build upon each other. The first 
simply delineates the area in which a plant buys cattle. 
The second approach defines a geographic market according 
to how similar prices move in the area. The third models 
any feedback occurring in price series between pairs of 
regions. The fourth defines a geographic market based upon 
price and quantity movements between regions. The 
appropriate procedure to use depends in part upon the type 
and amount of data available, and the time and resources 
available for data acquisition and analysis. 
In the following chapters, the beef sector is briefly 
described, focusing on the feedlot-packer linkage where the 
relevant market for fed cattle has been an issue in 
^The approaches described could be adapted for use 
with wholesale markets as well. 
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previous litigation. After considering, the theoretical 
evolution of relevant market determination, the case 
literature is examined. Finally, several appropriate 
statistical procedures varying in degree of difficulty are 
outlined and discussed. Procedures that may be most useful 
in subsequent industry analysis or case litigation are then 
suggested. 
Beef Sector Overview 
There are typically five distinct production stages in 
the beef sector: cow-calf operations, growing or stocker 
operations, feedlots, slaughtering and processing, and 
distribution. Although this paper focuses on the feedlot-
slaughter linkage, an initial look at the linkages in the 
rest of the beef sector may be useful. 
Cow-calf operations are highly dispersed throughout 
the U.S. Thirty states each accounted for at least 1 
percent of the 1980 U.S. calf crop. The top five states 
accounted for 37 percent of production, and beef cow herds 
under 200 head produced 70 percent of the 1978 calf crop 
(Marion, 1986, p. 124). 
Typically, calves are weaned at 400 pounds (seven to 
eight months in age). Most are then placed on pasture (or 
fed roughage) where they add 100 to 300 pounds in weight. 
Approximately 40 to 50 percent of feeder cattle produced 
come from integrated cow-calf/grower operations. The 
remaining 50 to 60 percent are either purchased directly as 
light calves by feedlots, or sold to independent growers 
called "stockers" who sell them to feedlots after carrying 
them on pasture for several months. Total integration of 
cow-calf and feedlot operations is not common in the major 
beef producing states (Marion, 1986, p. 125). 
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Stocker operations tend to locate in areas where 
forage and grain residues are available (e.g., corn stalks, 
wheat stubble) and where a large supply of feeder calves 
exist. Southern states in particular are well suited to 
this activity, and have experienced the largest increase in 
stocker cattle numbers (Petritz et al., 1981, p. 63). 
After the growing stage, the feeder cattle are 
considered to be ready for grains (Petritz et al., 1981, 
p. 64). Growing operations owned by feedlots produce 20 to 
30 percent of the feeder cattle crop (Marion, 1986, 
p. 125). Large feedlots (one-time capacity of 1,000 head 
or more) tend to be concentrated in the Southwest (e.g., 
Texas, Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska). Smaller 
feedlots are found in the Corn Belt, although they are 
declining in number and share of total volume (AMI, 1985b, 
pp. 8-9). 
Once a weight of 900 to 1200 pounds is attained, the 
fed cattle are ready for slaughter. Eighty-eight percent 
of the steer and heifer slaughter in 1983 was purchased 
directly from feedlots by slaughter firms. Six percent was 
purchased from terminal markets, and the rest from 
auctions. The ten largest packers reported 92.9 percent of 
their 1983 cattle purchases were direct from feedlots (P&SA 
Resume, 1985, pp. 12-13). 
The largest slaughter plants are located in Texas, 
Kansas, Colorado and Nebraska. This roughly coincides with 
the location of the largest feedlots. Some of the multi-
plant packers also own plants in other states (e.g., IBP in 
Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, SIPCO (now owned by the owners 
of Ual-Agri) in Iowa). 
Of all fed cattle purchases by packers, 36.9 percent 
were based on carcass weight. The rest are normally 
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purchased on a live-weight delivered basis, less a standard 
"pencil-shrink" if weighed at the feedlot. In Texas, 
Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Kansas, less than 17 percent of 
fed cattle were purchased by carcass weight. This 
contrasts with states such as Minnesota, Iowa, Colorado and 
Nebraska where 49 percent or more were purchased by carcass 
weight (P&SA Resume, 1985, pp. 32-33). The highest volume 
cattle feeding areas generally have price established on a 
live-weight basis, with the exceptions of Colorado and 
Nebraska. Nebraska, however, has a very high percentage of 
small feedlots, and Colorado's largest feeder is also its 
largest packer. 
A relatively new development in the feedlot/packer 
linkage is the use of more forward contracting. Typically, 
the packer buys most of its cattle on a spot market 
purchase, 3 to 7 days in advance of slaughter. In 
addition, many packers offer longer term forward price 
contracts based on futures prices. Other types of 
contracts beginning to be offered in some areas are basis 
contracts, where the difference between the cash and 
futures price is assured, and minimum price contracts, 
which are based on options contracts. 
The final stage is the distribution of beef product. 
Beef comes from the packer in two major forms: boxed beef 
and carcass beef. Boxed beef comprised nearly 58 percent 
of beef sold in 1982, and continues to increase in 
importance (Marion, 1986, p. 127). In addition, many 
carcasses which don't meet a packer's own requirements for 
fabrication are sold to other independent breakers for 
boxing. 
Most boxed beef is usually sold on a negotiated basis, 
although some is sold on a formula basis. The formula is 
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usually tied to a reported carcass price, such as the 
Yellow Sheet. This presents a problem, because the Yellow 
Sheet carcass price report is based on negotiated prices in 
a thinly traded market. Often the volume is very small 
and, at times, the price quote is based on no trade 
(Marion, 1986, p. 129). This appears to be a matter of 
increasing concern in the packing industry (Rhodes, 1985, 
p. 35). 
The end products move either to the food service 
industry, to intermediate processors and handlers, or to 
the retail grocery industry. Many by-products are 
exported. 
From a market structure viewpoint, the trend to a more 
concentrated industry is of concern, particularly in'the 
slaughter stage. From post World War II until the 1970s, 
the beef slaughter industry was marked by a low level of 
concentration. There were many firms competing, with no 
particular group having a significant market share. 
Nationally, the 1969 and 1978 four-firm concentration ratio 
was 30 and 32 percent, increasing to 4 5 percent in 1982 
(Committee on Small Business, 1980a, p. 15). Regional 
four-firm concentration ratios were only available for 
1979. For the High Plains region (Kansas, and parts of 
Oklahoma, Texas, Colorado, and New Mexico) the ratio was 
59.5 percent, for the Midwestern states (Nebraska, South 
Dakota, parts of Minnesota and Iowa) 59.8 percent. The 
combined nine-state area had a four-firm concentration 
ratio of 51.6 percent and for the U.S., 36.6 percent. 
(P&SA, 1982, p. 25). 
From 1972 to 1982, 239 fewer beef slaughter firms (34 
percent) were reporting to P&SA. These firms either went 
out of business, had less than $500,000 in sales (and were 
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no longer required to report), or were bought by other 
packers through horizontal merger. During the same period 
(i.e., 1972-1982), the total number of head slaughtered by 
the four largest firms rose from 7.5 million head to 11.4 
million head in spite of an overall decline in beef 
slaughter (26.1 million to 25.5 million head) (Helmuth, 
1984, p. 16). 
The trend to fewer and larger beef slaughter firms 
naturally caused concern that competition might be 
suffering in the industry. As a result, the beef slaughter 
industry was the target in a number of legal actions 
brought by producer groups, the government, and other 
packers. 
A group of cattlemen filed suit against four packers 
(IBP, MBPXL (now EXCEL), Spencer Foods, and Flavorland 
Industries) alleging that the packers were conspiring to 
depress wholesale beef prices in order to depress the price 
of fed cattle. Although Spencer Foods and Flavorland 
Industries settled out of court, the cases against the 
other two firms were not successful. 
The largest beef slaughter firm, IBP, has been 
involved in a number of cases since 1969. IBP acquired two 
packing plants in Iowa (Blue Ribbon Beef Packers). A 
consent decree was filed in March of 1970 requiring IBP to 
divest itself of the two plants, and prohibiting IBP from 
acquiring any other slaughter or processing business in 
Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota, or South Dakota for ten years. 
IBP was also involved in a bribery scandal in New York 
in its attempts to penetrate the market with boxed beef. 
The chairman of the board, Currier Holman, and IBP were 
convicted of bribery along with underworld figure Moe 
Steinman. 
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In 1977, IBP entered into an agreement with Northwest 
Feeders to buy all of the cattle fed from their lots. 
Northwest Feeders was an association of six of the largest 
cattle feeders in the Pacific Northwest region (i.e., 
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana). IBP's share of 
slaughter in the region rose from 20 percent in its first 
year of business in 1977, to 48 percent in 1979. The 
Packers and Stockyards Administration filed a motion 
against the agreement in 1978. The motion was subsequently 
dismissed. Although the agreement does not currently 
exist, IBP is still a major force in the Pacific Northwest 
market (Committee on Small Business, •1980b, p. 53). 
In 1983, EXCEL corporation proposed a merger with 
Spencer Foods. At that time, this would have been a merger 
between the second and fourth largest beef 
packer/processors. The Justice Department did not 
challenge the merger. However, Monfort of Colorado brought 
suit against EXCEL, successfully stopping the merger in 
December of 198 3. 
One of the central points in the Monfort v. EXCEL 
decision was defining the relevant geographic procurement 
market to be a twelve state area (i.e., Nebraska, South 
Dakota, Southern Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Illinois, 
Missouri, Kansas, Eastern Colorado, Texas panhandle, 
Oklahoma, and New Mexico). EXCEL argued that the relevant 
procurement market should be national in scope, or at the 
very least, the area east of the Rockies. Both sides 
presented arguments based largely on resulting 
concentration ratios, market shares, and existing product 
flow patterns. 
While the decision to stop the merger had been upheld 
in the Appellate Court, it was overturned by the Supreme 
10 
Court. The Supreme Court held that Monfort did not have 
the right to bring suit yet since it had not actually 
suffered harm from the proposed merger. 
Literature Review 
The relevant market question prefaces any industrial 
organization study and many antitrust issues. Before an 
analysis of competitive performance in any market, both the 
product and geographical extent must be defined. For 
antitrust issues, the relevant market (product and/or 
geographic) must be defined to determine the competitive 
"universe" in which judgments must be made regarding the 
significance of anticompetitive impacts of alleged illegal 
acts. 
Economic theory 
In economic theory, the structure of an industry is 
characterized by the number and relative size of 
participating firms, barriers-to-entry in the industry, and 
their perception of their influence in and effect upon 
market performance. Then, economists look for distinctive 
supply and/or classical demand schedules associated with 
various industry structures. 
Although the classification of the competitive 
character of the "industry" is well defined and accepted 
(e.g., perfectly competitive, monopolistic, etc.), the term 
"market" is generally vague. In the development of 
economic theory, market definition did not need to be 
explicit. However, when theory is applied to specific 
cases, the industry is analyzed in the context of a 
specific market. For instance, in analyzing specific 
issues in the beef processing industry, the possible 
product market definitions could range from edible proteins 
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to red meats to sirloin steaks. Any one of these market 
definitions might be appropriate in a particular case 
situation. 
The selection and definition of the appropriate market 
is crucial to both economic and legal analyses of an 
industry. In general, a smaller geographic market area 
will be more concentrated (i.e., a market is controlled by 
fewer firms) than a larger area. Similarly a more narrowly 
defined product market will be more concentrated than a 
broadly defined product market. 
Most firms in an industry compete in a cross-section 
of markets in the regular course of business. For instance 
the meat packing industry is involved in the procurement of 
live cattle, the procurement of various other inputs into 
the production process (capital, advertising, labor, etc.), 
the sale of carcasses, boxed beef, hides, offal (i.e., 
visceral by-products) and a variety of other products. The 
Department of Justice has also noted that one firm may be 
competing in several geographic market areas (U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, 1984, p. 13). The specific market definition sets 
the context for further economic or legal analysis. 
The procedures to draw the boundaries or define the 
market are rooted in economic theory. Cournot, in the late 
1800s, defined the market as the "entire territory of which 
the parts are so united by the relations of unrestricted 
commerce that prices there take the same level throughout 
with ease and rapidity" (Cournot, 1960, p. 51). Stigler 
modified the definition to include transportation costs, 
stating that a market is "the entire area within which the 
price of a commodity tends to uniformity, allowance being 
made for transport costs" (Stigler, 1970, p. 85). 
Alternatively, Mathis, Harris, and Boehlje suggested that a 
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market is "...the area encompassing all those economic 
units that exert and react to essentially the same set of 
competitive forces influencing the price and quality of a 
specific product or service" (Mathis et al., 1978, p. 601). 
These definitions recognize that firms in a given 
market will react to the same market signals. Prices 
within the spatial market will tend to be the same, 
allowing for costs of transferring the product from one 
region to the other. These include such costs as handling 
and transportation, as well as costs reflecting the 
perishability of the product itself. Firms in regions in 
which prices differ by more than transfer costs logically 
are probably not competing in the same market area. 
Assuming that transfer costs are relatively constant 
between two points, price series between two regions should 
be closely related. Correlated prices alone may not 
adequately define a market area, without further evidence 
of behavioral market linkages throughout the area. For 
example, fed cattle prices, which in part reflect changes 
in wholesale beef prices, may be highly correlated 
nationally, although packers typically buy most of their 
cattle less than 100 miles from the plant (Quail et al., 
1986, p. 15). Inferring national fed cattle markets based 
on correlated price series (possibly spuriously correlated) 
is clearly premature. 
Given that arbitrage in a geographic market area 
occurs over a period of time, one might expect to find 
areas that are surplus or deficit in product. Price 
differentials between areas in the same relevant market 
should not, by definition, exceed transfer costs, but the 
price relationships can vary by plus or minus transfer 
costs as areas shift from deficit to surplus. Thus, prices 
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may not be perfectly correlated even within the same market 
area. Beyond that area, transfer costs may be sufficiently 
high to discourage any product shipments to arbitrage 
spatial price differences. Those areas would not be 
considered to be in the same relevant market by definition, 
even though they may have spuriously correlated price 
series. 
Antitrust law 
Melding economic theory with antitrust law is another 
application of economics to reality. The term "relevant 
market" implies that there is some identifiable portion of 
a market in which a company can operate without affecting 
companies outside this area or line of commerce (Horowitz, 
1981, p. 3). Defining the relevant product market, or 
"line of commerce", as well as the geographic boundaries of 
that market, has been done in a variety of ways in the 
antitrust literature.^ 
The courts have applied different rules in different 
situations to find the appropriate line of commerce or the 
geographic boundary of the relevant market. For instance, 
in the Alcoa Case (1945), the company was involved in the 
markets for bauxite, alumina, virgin aluminum, and foil, to 
name only a few. The Court of Appeals overturned the lower 
court's decision based upon differing market definitions. 
It held that Alcoa monopolized the virgin aluminum market, 
as opposed to the lower court's usage of the market 
including secondary ingot. Both decisions were based on 
arbitrary market definitions, with little attention paid to 
the economic implications of using one definition over the 
^For instance, the Journal of Reprints for Antitrust 
Law and Economics 14, Nol 2~, discusses various theories and 
analytic techniques of product and geographic market 
definition. 
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other (Singer, 1968, p. 43). Subsequent cases began to 
employ economic concepts in the definition of the relevant 
product markets. The Cellophane Case (U.S. v. duPont) and 
Brown Shoe Case (Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 1962) were 
landmark cases which used price elasticities in determining 
the relevant market (Neale and Goyder, 1980, p. 195). 
Although most cases dealing with the relevant market 
issue generally focus on the "line of commerce" or product 
market, few decisions have hinged on the geographic 
definition. In the Philadelphia Bank Case, the Supreme 
Court held that the appropriate geographic market is "not 
where the parties to the merger do business or even where 
they, compete, but where, within the area of competitive 
overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will be 
direct and immediate" (Singer, 1968, p. 254). 
The courts have also considered potential competition 
and its effect on competition within the geographic market 
boundary (e.g., U.S. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. (1973), U.S. 
V.  Marine Bancorporation (1974)). This idea suggests that 
those industries on the "competitive fringe" should be 
included in the market area as well as third parties who 
could be affected by the action in question (Singer, 1968, 
p. 2 58). 
No hard and fast rule for defining a geographic market 
area was ever applied, as evidenced by Brown Shoe (1962), 
the El Paso case (1964), and U.S. v. Pabst Brewing Co. 
(1966). Mr. Justice Harlan, in a separate but concurring 
opinion in F.T.C. v. Procter and Gamble (1967), called for 
a more refined analysis in dealing with more complex 
mergers instead of "what has almost become a kind of res 
ipsa loquitur approach" (i.e., the "matter is self-spoken) 
(Steltzer, 1976, p. 185). In other words, the courts had 
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used no clear cut guide, but relied on the facts to resolve 
the issues of the case. 
Merger guidelines 
Identifying the relevant market for antitrust purposes 
is a two-fold process. First, the appropriate product 
market must be delineated. Then the geographic boundaries 
for the product market must be drawn. 
The Department of Justice has drawn up guidelines 
designed "... to indicate when the Department is likely to 
challenge mergers..." (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1984, p. 2).^ 
The relevant market is identified as a "group of products 
and a geographic area in which it is sold such that a 
hypothetical, profit-maximizing firm, not subject to price 
regulation, that was the only present and future seller of 
those products in that area would impose a 'small but 
significant and nontransitory ' increase in price above 
prevailing or likely future levels" (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
1984, p. 4). 
As a first approximation, the Department will continue 
to add substitute products to the relevant market as long 
as a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in 
the price of the product will result in a significant 
number of buyers shifting purchases to the other products. 
Traditionally, the Department has used an arbitrary 
increase of five percent in the price of the product (U.S. 
Dept. of Justice, 1984, p. 7).^ In the case of monopsony, 
^The Federal Trade Commission uses the Department of 
Justice guidelines and has no guidelines of its own. 
®Beef packers typically operate on much thinner 
margins than the traditional five percent change in price 
used. A five percent change in the price of tneir input 
may represent a thirty percent change in their profit 
margin per head. Perhaps a more reasonable first 
approximation in this case would be a five percent change 
in margin for the packer. 
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the Department would add substitute products to the market 
if a five percent increase in price offered for a product 
resulted in a significant number of substitute products 
entering the market. 
Other factors used in determining product 
substitutability include: 
1. substitutes as evidenced by the firm's customers, 
2. similarities in usage, design, physical 
composition, etc., 
3. similarities or differences in price movements 
over periods of years and 
4. sellers' perceptions that products are or are not 
substitutes. 
If price discrimination is possible, then the 
Department will consider a narrower product market 
definition oriented to the groups subject to the 
discrimination. 
For the geographic market, the guidelines are very 
similar. The Department notes that "(a) geographic market 
may be as small as a part of a city or as large as the 
entire world. Also, a single firm may operate in a number 
of economically discrete geographic markets" (U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, 1984, p. 13). 
Modifying the guidelines for spatial substitution, the 
Department again uses a "small but significant and 
nontransitory increase in price" at the location of the 
merging firm. Then it assesses how many more firms 
(outside the preliminary market area) could make 
significant sales in that area. For the monopsonist case, 
a decrease in price offered in the preliminary market area 
would be used to assess the number of competitor to make 
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significant purchases in that market area (U.S. Dept. of 
Justice, 1984, p. 13). 
Other factors to be weighed by the Department in 
assessing spatial substitutability include; 
1) evidence of the firm's customers shifting 
purchases to sellers at different locations, 
2) similarities or differences in price movements 
over periods of years, 
3) transportation costs, 
4) costs of local distribution and 
5) excess capacity by firms outside the provisional 
(i.e., first hypothetical) market. 
Procedures 
Antitrust decision making with respect to relevant 
market definition clearly needs more guidance in defining 
markets than has been available through court decisions or 
economic theory. Since the Packers and Stockyards 
Administration's primary interest was in defining the 
relevant geographic market for fed cattle, the following 
discussion will deal exclusively with alternative 
approaches to the delineation of the geographic procurement 
market for fed cattle. As a bridge between theory and 
application, the following approaches appear potentially 
useful in defining the appropriate geographic market areas: 
1. the trade area procedure, 
2. the factor analysis procedure, 
3. the price time series procedure and 
4. the cross-elasticity procedure. 
Each of these will be considered, along with factors that 
might affect their applicability in the beef industry or 
other industries with similar characteristics. 
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A major problem in determining the relevant market for 
economic analysis or antitrust purposes is identifying the 
appropriate geographic market. If two firms (i.e., 
"economic units") producing the same product are in the 
same market area, by definition, they are causing or 
reacting to the same set of competitive forces determining 
the price of a product. Two firms would be in different 
geographic market areas, ceteris paribus, if the prices 
they faced were independently determined, or if prices 
differed by more than transportation charges, tariffs, or 
other costs imposed by forces outside the market. But 
there may be situations where there is a "gray area" 
between clear interdependence and clear independence. 
Procedures must be carefully developed to determine whether 
the elimination of a plant or firm will have a significant 
impact on competition within a market area. 
Trade area 
Since the relevant geographic market area encompasses 
all buyers and sellers in the market, a first approximation 
to the market area will be the trade areas of the firms in 
question (Stigler and Sherwin, 1985, p. 555). This area 
can be estimated using only the origin and destination of 
the units bought (Elzinga and Hogarty, 1973). This is done 
by circumscribing all sellers with which a plant does 
business on a map. The data requirements here are minimal. 
One only needs the location of all lots purchased within 
some time frame. This can be obtained by noting in plant 
records the locations of cattle purchased. A first 
approximation for preliminary analyses may be more easily 
obtained by interviewing plant livestock purchasing 
managers, and asking them to circumscribe the area of their. 
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primary purchasing activity, and identifying their primary 
competitors for cattle in that geographic area. 
Figure 1 illustrates the trade areas for four firms 
denoted by capital letters. All suppliers of each firm are 
included in each respective trade area. Firms A and B 
share some of the same suppliers. This is an example of 
actual competition between the firms. Firm C shares no 
suppliers with Firm A but is competing with Firm B. It is 
conceivable that if Firm B were to close operations, 
allowing prices to fall, both Firms A and C might become 
actual competitors (i.e., have common suppliers). This is 
an example of potential competition. Distinguishing 
between non-competing and potentially competing firms is a 
matter of estimating the probability that they will 
compete, a difficult task. 
Figure 1. Hypothetical trade areas for four firms 
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While conceptually simple, there are some problems 
with a trade area approach. The procedure can require a 
substantial amount of data acquisition and mapping which 
can become burdensome very quickly. The significance of 
particular competitors in partially overlapping areas may 
also be very difficult to judge. 
The trade area analysis procedure shows only where the 
supplies are moving. Consequently, if two firms are buying 
from the same suppliers, they are active competitors, and 
trade flows would identify that type of competition. But 
this procedure cannot identify potential competitors in the 
short run because no transaction has occurred. 
Potential competitors may influence prices merely by 
their ability to penetrate the area if prices change 
(Dobson at al., 1982, p. 955). This is the underlying 
premise behind Baumol's theory of contestable markets 
(Baumol et al., 1982, p. 12). Yet the reasonable way to 
identify potential competitors has not been adequately 
considered in the economic literature. One possible 
procedure that may be appropriate for procurement markets 
is considered later. 
Factor analysis 
One relatively simple way to show that two market 
areas are not in the same "relevant" market would be to 
show that the price movements in those areas were not 
consistent with the arbitrage process within a market. 
While prices might move together for reasons other than 
responding to the competitive interplay between firms, the 
absence of very similar price behavior ought to be 
tentative evidence that they are not in the same market, 
unless oligopsonistic conspiracies or other artificial 
means are used to restrict competition. 
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One way to identify the groupings of very similar 
price behavior is through the use of factor analysis. 
Factor analysis is a statistical tool more commonly used in 
sociology or psychology. An example of the use of factor 
analysis in these disciplines would be to sort population 
characteristics (e.g., hair color, income levels, IQ 
scores, etc.) according to common patterns. The analogous 
problem for the fed cattle market is to sort price series 
from various locations into groups of locations such that 
the series in each group displays common behavior patterns 
which are related to their competitive interplay. 
Mathematically, the factor model can be stated as: 
(1) Pj = + GjgFg + ... + ajmFm + 
where 
Pj is the j-th variable (i.e., price series from 
region j) (j = l,2,...,n), 
ajp is the factor loading of Pj on the p-th factor 
(p — 1,2,#.*,m, m^n), 
Fp is the p-th common factor, and 
ttjUj is the residual error term. 
Theoretically, the total number of factors could vary 
from one to the total number of price series in the model.^ 
However, one objective is to obtain the most powerful 
(i.e., most explanatory) model with the fewest factors. In 
terms of the fed cattle market, the analysis should 
identify the fewest groups of firms that behave 
significantly alike, after adjusting for the common 
correlation. 
^Since the factors are independent or orthogonal, the 
maximum number to span the space would be equal to the 
number of series in the sample. 
22 
One of the properties of the factor loadings is that 
their sums of squares for a particular variable j will be 
that variable's standardized variance. Letting sj equal 
the standardized variance of the j-th variable, 
(2) s? = a+ aj2 + ••• + a+ aj = 1 . 
If P- is standardized, then its variance is s^ = 1. 
J g  J 
(3) E aimBum = r iu = correlation between standardized 
m = l J ' 
B and P . 
So J 
(4a) 2 ai = variance of P. explained by first s 
m = l J J 
factors. 
n 9 (4b) = total variance of all P variables 
j — 1 
explained by factor m. 
S s n 9 
(5) ï. - Z Z ai_ = sum of variances of all 
m = l m = l j = l 
standardized variables explained by first s 
factors. 
Each factor "explains" a portion of the variance of 
each series being analyzed; is the portion of the 
variance of P ^ explained by the factor m. 
Several meanings can be attached to the factor 
loadings. The definition important to this analysis is 
that the loadings provide a basis for combining the 
variables into groups. Similar loading patterns for two 
variables (e.g., large, negative values) on factor m 
indicate common response to the factor. Defining the 
factor involves describing the common trait(s) of the 
variables which caused similar loading patterns. 
Ultimately, it is the analyst's responsibility to 
define the factors. After studying the variables and the 
patterns of the loadings on each factor, the analyst may 
hypothesize a meaning for each factor. Other statistical 
models may then be explored to test the validity of the 
factor definitions (or hypotheses). 
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The factor loadings are not unique to a certain set of 
variables. Using "rotation" techniques, (i.e., using 
different set of factor loadings) different values can be 
found for the factors. Put another way, the factors may be 
"located" in a number of different positions. Different 
loading patterns may be uncovered, which would suggest 
different, possibly more meaningful ways to group the 
variables. 
Some statistical and non-statistical methods may be 
used to limit the appropriate number of factors in the 
model. When the number of observations is small relative 
to the number of variables (e.g., 30 observations on each 
of 10 price series), maximum likelihood procedures may be 
used to test for the maximum number of factors to retain. 
The statistical tests used to justify model(s) 
obtained are based upon the variance explained by the 
incremental addition of another factor as well as the 
overall ability of the model to reproduce the original 
correlation structure of the price series. Other 
nonstatistical methods can be used in situations with a 
large number of observations per price series. For 
example, the scree test plots the total variance explained 
by each factor (or eigenvalues) by the maximum allowable 
number of factors.10 The plot of eigenvalues in order of 
descending value resembles the scree (i.e., rocks) at the 
bottom of a cliff (see Figure 2). The first drop in value 
will be large. Subsequent drops will be relatively 
smaller. The number of factors to retain will be the 
actual number of eigenvalues which do not lie on the same 
l^An eigenvalue is a characteristic root of an 
equation. The characteristic roots of a matrix are called 
eigenvectors. 
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plotted line with smaller eigenvalues (Gorsuch, 1974, p. 
141) . 
Using all price series in the sample, the factor 
analysis process identifies common "factors" with which 
price series are strongly or weakly correlated. Each price 
series may then be grouped with other price series that 
behave similarly (i.e., have similar factor loading 
patterns). Alternatively, scoring coefficients computed 
Eigenvalues^ 
. 5 
.4 
.3 
. 2 
. 1 
1 2 3 4 5 
Factors 
Figure 2. Scree Plot 
for each factor can identify the price series which are 
most strongly related to it. Each factor identifies those 
price series with some common underlying characteristic. 
In the fed cattle market, each price series will 
likely be highly correlated with one common factor. This 
factor may be interpreted as the common influence of many 
exogenous variables on the series of prices (e.g., supply 
conditions, wholesale prices, national income trends, 
etc.). Also, each price series may be associated with 
other factors which might be interpreted as the local 
competitive influences common to some group of price 
series. 
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From these factor patterns (correlations between the 
price series and the factor itself), the researcher can 
sort the price series according to the relative magnitude 
and direction of the correlation. Although statistical 
tests exist to determine the minimum "significant" 
correlation, these tests are sensitive to the number of 
observations, and may lead to erroneous conclusions if the 
number is very small or very large. (For a more complete 
discussion, see Gorsuch, 1974, pp. 184-188.) 
Leads and lags which may produce artificially low 
correlations between the individual price time series can 
be effectively handled using this procedure (Doll and 
Chin, 1970, p. 592). After the common factor is 
identified, subsequent factors may show more distinct 
differences in the way two price series are related, as 
evidenced by differing signs of the factor patterns. For 
example, Doll and Chin in their analysis of the shrimping 
industry suggest the second component incorporated the 
lagged price relationship between raw material and retail 
prices; the latter positively related and the former 
negatively related to the factor. 
The factor analysis can yield two pieces of 
information for the relevant market determination. First, 
it may identify the exogenous factor (e.g., wholesale beef 
prices for the fed cattle market) which may contribute to 
correlation between price series in the sample. The 
information from any subsequent factors will identify price 
series whose behaviors, outside the common factor, are very 
similar. Factor analysis then can identify price series 
with distinctly different behaviors, even if they seem to 
be correlated through strong but exogenous factors. 
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Although the actual calculations involved in factor 
analysis may be complex, there are many good computer 
programs available to run this analysis. They are 
generally very easy to use and the output is easy to read. 
This method may be very useful when a quick answer is 
needed with only limited information available. 
Price time series information for the fed cattle 
industry gathered at terminal and state markets is readily 
available from USDA publications. This information lends 
itself to factor analysis. Using this information in 
conjunction with other information (e.g., trade areas of 
firms involved, perceptions of competition by industry 
members, etc.), the analyst should be able to come up with 
a useful definition of the relevant geographic market in 
situations where data or funds are not available for more 
comprehensive analyses. 
Price time series 
Causality tests may be used when adequate price time 
series are available. If the best information is obtained 
from a complete (i.e., 100%) sample, with all contributing 
factors accounted for, then it follows that the more 
complete the sample, the better the information. If one 
has two samples X and Y, and if by using both samples, one 
obtains a better prediction of behavior in Y than if one 
used only information in Y, then X "causes" Y (Slade, 1986, 
p. 294). (For a more complete discussion of causality tests 
see Uri and Rifkin, 1985 and Geweke et al., 1983.) 
Problems arise when the analysis shows only that the 
price series are correlated. Two price series may be 
correlated due to a common seasonal pattern, or due to 
similar reaction to changes in general supply or demand 
conditions that are not related to spatial market 
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arbitrage. Since many beef plants in geographically 
separate markets may respond in roughly parallel fashion to 
changes in pork supply, feedlot placements six months 
earlier, etc., the correlation between price movements 
could be inflated upward due to these common causal 
factors which less sophisticated analyses might mistakenly 
attribute to geographic market arbitrage. 
Similarly, two price series may appear to be 
uncorrelated. For example, a response lag of one or more 
periods will show two series to be uncorrelated in each 
period when there may be arbitrage occurring between the 
series. This may be a particular problem in the fed cattle 
market since plant records often may not clearly 
distinguish between the transaction date when the price was 
established and the delivery or slaughter date. Also, the 
time lag before arbitrage occurs may be sufficiently short, 
and the response sufficiently large that the plants may be 
competitors even though a simultaneous or one-day lagged 
relationship would not appear to be significant. 
Procedures to develop forecast models with time series 
variables were introduced by Box and Jenkins (see Appendix 
A). Regardless of a model's complexity, the process 
invovles four basic building stages; identification, 
fitting, checking, and forecasting. The identification 
stage hypothesizes one or more possible models. After 
fitting (stage two) and checking each model (stage three) 
if the model(s) are deemed adequate, then forecast(s) are 
made (stage four). Otherwise, new models are identified, 
fit, checked, etc. 
The identification stage begins by plotting the time 
series. A preliminary visual inspection of the time series 
may suggest wiiether some degree of stationarity exists. 
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Intuitively, stationarity exists when the parameters of 
interest are basically unchanging throughout the 
population. More formally, if the sample of observations 
(or time series) exhibits a constant mean, constant 
variance and covariance constant over time, it is 
considered stationary. 
Most time series in raw form will not be stationary. 
Frequently, time series exhibit trend and seasonality over 
time. Individual time series observations often will be 
correlated with past observations. Similarly, visual 
inspection may show that the time series' variance over 
time is either increasing or decreasing. The non-
stationary time series may be transformed to a new time 
series where the new series exhibits at least some of the 
desired stationary traits. For example, if Y^ is the non-
stationary series, a series P{- can be formed where; 
(6) Pt = f(Yt) 
The precise form that fCY^-) takes depends on the 
stationarity problem of Yj-. The most common problem, 
trend, is usually corrected by a first difference of the 
series. Higher order differencing, and log or power 
transformations may also be necessary to produce a series 
without trend and with constant variance. 
However, there is still the possibility that the 
transformed series is correlated with itself. By analyzing 
the patterns of correlation in the autocorrelation function 
(ACF) and partial autocorrelation function (PACF) a better 
transformation of Y^ may be made. This involves adding 
either rr^oving-a_verage and/or a_uto-r;_egressive (ARMA) terms 
to the transformation of Y. P^- may now be expressed as a 
function of its past values: 
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(7) cpp(B)Pt = &q(B)at 
where 
P|. is the "transformed" series at time t, 
&q(B) is a polynomial of order q of Moving Average 
parameters and can be written 
(1 — 0^8 — •9'2B^ — ••• - &qBA ) , 
(Pp(B) is a polynomial of order p of Auto-Regressive 
parameters and can be written 
(1 - cpjB - cp2B2 - ... - (ppBP ) and 
at is the random shock at time t. 
If the model is "inuertible", (7) can be written as: 
(8) Pt = *^(8) -
9p(B) 
When the model is adequate, the residuals (the 
difference between forecast and actual values of P) will be 
identically and independently distributed, with a mean of 
zero and a constant variance. 
The past values of a time series may impact other time 
series. The Box-Jenkins procedures for the one-variable 
time series forecast can be extended to two-variable (or 
more) time series models. The transfer function is an 
extension of the ARMA procedure, using the information from 
two time series to predict future values of one of the 
series. The general form of a single input transfer 
function is 
(9) Yt = v(B) * BC * Xt + Nt 
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where 
IS the "output" or response series, 
Xt is the "input" or explanatory series, 
v(B) is the transfer function, 
is the lag of c periods by which the two series 
are related and 
is the noise series. 
To identify the appropriate form of the entire 
function (i.e., order of the autoregressive and moving 
average parameters for the input series, as well as 
transfer function parameters relating the two series), 
equation (8) is estimated for the input series producing 
x(B) 
(10) Xt = at = Yx(B) * at 
9p,x(B) 
where 
Yx(B) are the ARMA parameters for the (invertibie) 
series Xt and 
at is the random shock for the series at time t. 
After estimating the ARMA model for the input series, 
the output series (Yt) may be expressed as a function 
(v(B)) of the input series (Xt) at some lag B^ and a 
residual noise series Nt (See equation (9)). 
The noise series Nt is not necessarily random. An 
ARMA model for the noise series may also be estimated in 
the general form: 
(12) Nt = H'n(B) * at 
where 
Tp(B) are the ARMA parameters for the noise series and 
at is the random shock for the series at time t. 
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The sample cross-correlation function between the 
prewhitened input series (11) and the filtered output 
series can be used to identify the form of the transfer 
function (i.e., significant cross-correlations indicate the 
need for parameters in the transfer function model. Also, 
the lag c at which the two series are related is 
incorporated into the model with the backshift operator B 
of order c. As with most statistical model building 
techniques, the technique is iterative and subjective 
rather than specifically prescribed.). Once the general 
form of the model has been identified, the parameters for 
the entire model can then be estimated simultaneously 
(Jenkins, 1979, p. 43). 
After the model is checked and possibly refitted, the 
resulting transfer function predicts Y with information 
used not only from past observations on Y but with 
information from the time series X. 
If two series are influenced by the same process, then 
information from one series should be helpful in the model 
estimation of the other series. Slade used this hypothesis 
to test market integration in the petroleum industry 
(Slade, 1986, p. 294). Adapting her procedure by using 
newly transformed time series, the following is an 
alternative to the Box-Jenkins approach for this test of 
causality : 
(14) Pi,t = Oi(B)*ai,t , 
(15) P2,t = 02(B)*a2,t' 
(16) Pi,t = 03(B)*ai^t + 6i,2(B)*a2,t + ^ l,t , 
(17) P2,t = 04(B)*a2,t + 62,l(B)*ai,t + N2,t , 
where : 
Pj^t is the price series from region i at time t, 
aipt is the observed difference between price and 
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predicted price, 
(B) is a back shift operator on time, 
& ( B )  
is the set of ARMA parameters for series k, 
cp(B) 
is the set of transfer function parameters for 
output series i with respect to input series j 
and 
Nipt is the pre-iAihitened noise series (i.e., from 
equation (12)) for region i, with zero mean and 
constant variance. 
Equations (14) and (15) are estimated using pooled 
time series techniques. The next two equations (16) and 
(17) are estimated using least squares procedures for the 
pooled time series. If the coefficient 6 is significant, 
and if the two series are independent, then the additional 
series provides useful explanatory information to the 
other, and a causal relationship is inferred. 
An exogenous term is included in the Slade model to 
allow for internal or external commonalities which might 
otherwise give rise to misleading correlations between 
right-hand variables in equations (16) and (17) and lead to 
erroneous conclusions about the market area. However, in 
some industries, the appropriate exogenous term may not be 
obvious and the "net" market arbitrage linkage between 
firms may be higher than it should be. Ravallion notes 
that the bi-variate time series model (i.e., the transfer 
function) suggested earlier will avoid the need for this 
exogenous term, since each price series has been filtered 
so that the residual cross-correlations are normally 
distributed about a zero mean (Ravallion, 1986, p. 102). 
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Thus, the transfer function approach outlined above may 
generally be preferred to the Slade approach. 
If two series are not causally determined, then the 
transfer function should not improve the predictive power 
of the univariate ARMA function. Since parameters for the 
transfer function are usually estimated using a maximum 
likelihood method, tests other than the standard F-test are 
more appropriate in determining the overall performance of 
the newly estimated model. Akaike's information criterion 
and Schwartz's Bayesian information criterion measures are 
generally available from commercial software packages 
(e.g., SAS) to test the significance of the additional 
series. These criteria are to be minimized. The 
difference between the information criterion produced from 
two different transfer functions has statistical properties 
similar to a log likelihood ratio. If the difference is 
large enough, then the model with the lower information 
criterion is the significantly better model. 
Quantity-price time series 
If the available information includes price and 
quantity movements, proper delineation of the geographic 
market area should be based on the concept of spatial 
arbitrage (Dobson et al., 1982, p. 970). For example, if 
prices offered within a region increase (allowing for 
transportation costs), inputs from outside the region will 
migrate toward the higher priced region. The decrease in 
quantity in the adjacent region will drive prices up in 
that region. Adjustments will continue until equilibrium 
i s  a g a i n  e s t a b l i s h e d  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  r e g i o n s . T h i s  
l^Often appropriate data is not available to estimate 
the cross-elasticity measure (Stigler and Sherwin, 1985, p. 
7). Most studies identify the area where prices are highly 
correlated or simultaneously determined (e.g., Stigler and 
Sherwin, 1985; Uri and Rifkin, 1985; Horowitz, 1981). 
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response (i.e., change in quantity in region A with respect 
to change in price from region B) illustrates spatial 
arbitrage. The failure to consider some notion of the 
cross-elasticities of demand (or supply) between regions 
can over- or under-estimate market size (Werden, 1984). 
Papandreou and Wheeler, among others, outlined a 
procedure where market delineation could be based on 
cross-demand schedules between firms (i.e., dQ^/dRj). 
This procedure defines the market according to demand 
substitutability between products. If two products are in 
separate markets, the firms producing those products are 
also in separate markets. For example, if the price of one 
good increases, the quantity sold of that good will 
decrease and the quantity of substitute goods sold (price 
held constant) will increase. When the cross-demand 
schedule is not significantly positive (i.e., zero or 
negative), the products fall into separate markets. 
The cross-demand analysis may be extended to also 
account for substitutability over space and to define 
relevant geographic markets. If the price of a product in 
region A increases (prices in other regions held constant), 
the quantity demanded of that good should decrease. If the 
same product in region B is a spatial substitute, then 
quantity demanded from region B by region A will increase. 
Products from different market areas will not have 
significantly positive cross-demand schedules. 
There is analogous logic for procurement markets in 
developing cross-supply schedules. In a market not 
characterized by oligopsonistic methods of competition, 
firms react to each other anonymously through market 
signals. These market signals provide the evidence (i.e.. 
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the associated price and quantity purchased by each firm) 
needed to determine market boundaries.1% 
Given that aggregate cattle supply is fixed but mobile 
between regions, an increase in price offered by firms in 
region A results in an increase in quantity purchased from 
competing regions.Outside the relevant procurement 
market, there would be an insignificant change in the share 
of supply purchased from that region when relative prices 
paid by plants changed. For the firms to be in separate 
geographic procurement markets (given that their products 
are identical except for location), the cross-elasticity 
coefficient must be zero or positive. 
Ideally, the data required would be price and 
movements of cattle purchased within geographic segments 
(possibly ZIP codes, counties, mailing addresses, etc., 
listed in plant records) by the plants that are the focus 
of a case investigation as well as any possible 
competitors. Then the cross-elasticities could be 
estimated to identify the strength of the relationships 
between plants. 
In estimating the cross-elasticities, relative price 
and quantity changes should be used. Using relative prices 
more clearly captures the change in price in a particular 
region. If these changes are positively correlated between 
regions, then prices in those regions are not independently 
l^When the industry becomes more oliqopsonistic, the 
firms begin to recognize their interdependence and react 
accordingly. This behavior is much harder to detect. 
Stackelburg suggested a game solution, in which reaction 
functions are estimated for oligopsonists (Henderson and 
Quandt, 1980, p. 206). Prices can be shown to be 
determined by the firm's reaction to its competitors in 
terms of changes in quantity purchased. 
l^price is reported either through firm's books or 
through prices reported at a terminal market. For the 
followinq procedure, prices are associated with the region 
of the buyer. 
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determined. However, if nominal prices are used, the 
correlation between regions is much stronger, regardless 
whether the regions are actually in the same market area or 
not. All quantities should be expressed as a proportion of 
total purchases by plants in a region per period, similarly 
capturing the change in quantity rather than the absolute 
value of the quantity supplied. Feedlot placements made 
four to six months earlier generally determine the daily 
cattle supply function, or the lots available for sale. In 
the short run significant shifts in quantity (and overall 
price levels) can occur as producers market heavier or 
lighter cattle in response to current prices, price 
expectations, and other factors not related to the 
competition between packing plants. The quantity purchased 
by each firm in each geographic region should be expressed 
as a percentage of total marketings from that region, so 
the competitive interplay among firms can be examined more 
clearly. 
Two different approaches to estimating relative price-
quantity relationships could be considered, with the best 
choice dependent upon the type of data readily available, 
the budget available, etc. A more disaggregate analysis 
would utilize relative (or real) price and quantity data 
from arbitrarily small areas (e.g., crop reporting 
districts, six-county areas, etc.) such that at least 
thirty to sixty daily price and quantity observations could 
be established. Market shares in the region for each firm 
would be computed, and their response to changes in prices 
from other areas would be estimated. Although this region 
oriented approach would provide a clear picture of which 
small areas had a significant competitive overlap for the 
firms being analyzed, the data requirements may be 
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difficult to satisfy in many cases. Every district would 
be required to have sufficient consecutive trading days to 
enable time series analysis. Making each small area 
arbitrarily larger to get an adequate number of 
transactions may defeat the purpose of the geographic 
market definition analysis entirely. 
An alternative approach would involve using the firm's 
trade area as the basic region, and examine the response of 
the firm's market share in its trade area to changes in the 
relative prices of that firm and other firms that might be 
competitors in the same relevant market. The significance 
of the aggregate cross-elasticity could then be used to 
test whether firms are in the same geographic market. 
In each approach, first differences or a logarithm of 
each series should be taken to produce series of price 
changes over time. Similarly, a differenced (or log) 
market share series would allow estimation of the absolute 
(or the elasticity of) price/market share responses.15 
Given daily non-zero price and quantity data over a 
sufficient time period, a standard econometric model could 
be fit which arbitrarily adjusts for seasonality, trend, 
and lag structures for the model variables. However, th.e 
specification of the appropriate functional forms is quite 
difficult, and often results in too many estimated 
parameters with poor statistical properties (Jenkins, 1979, 
p. 89). The following is a general mathematical 
representation of the model; 
l^The procedure described here draws heavily on the 
example described by Jenkins in Practical Experiences with 
Modelling and Forecasting Time Series, pp. dl-b/. 
l^Using first differences or logarithms has certain 
limitations. Zeroes are a problem and will occur with 
missing observations. For the above model, each plant will 
need price observations for each region for thirty to sixty 
consecutive business days. 
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(18) Qi = g'Pj + Ei 
i, j = l,?,3,...,n ; jOi 
where 
Qi is the market share at plant i, 
Pj is the adjusted price at plant j, 
3 is the linear parameter estimating the 
relationship between the prices at plant j 
and the market share at plant i. 
£ is the random error term associated with the market 
share at plant i. 
Alternatively, transfer functions may be estimated 
(e.g., Q/\ =f(P/\), Q/\ zffPg),..., Q/\ =f(Pf/|), for M 
different plants) describing how one plant's market share 
is influenced by the price series at each potentially 
competing plant. After subsequent checking, refitting, 
etc., final form for the transfer functions may be found, 
with a minimum number of parameters to estimate. These 
transfer functions provide bench marks to evaluate 
subsequent models incorporating other price time series. 
Estimating a transfer function with more than one 
input price series (i.e., from more than one location) may 
be a problem due to contemporaneous correlation of the 
series. Price changes in some areas may be nearly 
identical from day to day. If the input variables (in this 
case price series) are correlated, the results from the 
multiple input/single output transfer function may not be 
reliable. 
One way to deal with this problem is through the use 
of principal components or factor analysis. This technique 
"sorts" the price series according to how similarly they 
behave. It then computes the linear weights for each price 
series in a "factor". A linear transformation of the most 
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each factor over the combined area. This process should 
yield one or more series transformations which may be used 
in the transfer function. Refitting appropriate ARMA 
parameters to the newly transformed "series", new transfer 
functions are estimated as described previously (Jenkins, 
1979, p. 43). These functions will show how the market 
share series is related to its own price series as well as 
other transformed "series". 
The data requirements for the multivariate transfer 
function model are considerable. At a minimum, for the 
beef industry, they include: 
1. price data from each plant, standardized for 
quality, covering the same thirty to sixty 
consecutive days, 
2. origin and quantity purchased by the plant in 
each lot over the same time period and 
3. purchase date (preferably, though slaughter date 
may have to suffice if better records aren't 
available) . 
Each firm's market share series can then be related to 
a transformed price series through a matrix of multivariate 
transfer functions of the general form: 
(19) Qi,t = Yi,A*PA,t + Yl,B*PB,t + •••+ Yi,E*PE,t + ^ 2 , t 
Q2,t = Y2,A*PA,t + Y2,B*PB,t + •••+ Y2,E*PE,t + ^ 2,1 
QM,t = YM,A*PA,t + YM,B*PB,t + •••+ YM,E*PE,t + ^ 'M,t 
where : 
is the market share series for firm i over its 
trade area. 
Yip A is the set of transfer function parameters for 
firm i with respect to price series A and 
is the pre-whitened noise series for firm i. 
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The above matrix may be estimated as a system 
(Jenkins, 1979, p. 119). The resulting parameters will 
describe the underlying lag structure defining the price 
and market share relationships, in addition to the 
appropriate moving-average and auto-regressive parameters. 
The procedure to check the final model is as follows; 
1. Compare the various models (e.g., univariate, 
transfer functions, multivariate transfer 
functions) with appropriate tests to determine 
the significance of parameters (e.g., using 
t-statistics) and adequacy of the model (e.g., 
using AIC and SBC statistics) and 
2. Check for parsimonious model (i.e., smaller 
number of statistically significant parameters is 
preferable, all other things equal). 
Most studies of relevant geographic market areas prior 
to this have not incorporated other explanatory series, 
(e.g., quantity series), since corresponding quantity data 
were not readily available. A more definitive study should 
also look at the resulting cross-elasticity coefficients to 
determine the actual competitive area. By fitting the 
above series as individual transfer functions, and finally 
as a system of transfer functions, estimates of all cross-
elasticities can be obtained (Jenkins, 1979, pp. 86-87). 
Whether the data available allow the analyst to use 
the price time series or the quantity-price time series 
methods, the analyst will typically select several 
estimated models which are considered best on some of the 
statistical criteria listed earlier (but usually not all). 
One model may have smallest variance, while another will 
have fewest significant parameters, and yet another will 
have lowest AIC and SBC criteria. The analyst typically 
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will use more than one level of statistical significance to 
determine which models are inadequate, though the levels of 
significance required remain a matter of professional 
judgement. The results can then be used with the economic 
expert's knowledge of industry and market behavior to make 
a final judgement about which plants were significant 
competitors for fed cattle during the period under study 
and should be grouped in the same relevant market. 
Data 
Two sets of data were used in the following estimation 
procedures. The first data set, supplied by the Packers 
and Stockyards Administration of the USDA, contained 
detailed lot and price information from nineteen plants 
throughout the Midwest. The USDA data set covered thirteen 
months from February 1979 to March 1980. From each plant, 
daily observations were collected from the first and last 
months. One week of daily observations was collected from 
each of the remaining months. (See Geographic Markets and 
Prices for Fed Steers and Heifers by P&SA for detailed 
description of the data set.) 
On twelve plants, good uniform information existed on 
purchase price, transportation costs, slaughter date, kill 
lot information, quality information, etc. However, many 
lots had either no purchase date or had unreliable dates 
recorded (e.g., plant G had recorded Sunday slaughter dates 
but actually did not slaughter on Sunday). 
The sample was not broadly based; the entire area was 
confined to the Midwest and Great Plains. Hypotheses could 
not be tested regarding areas along west coast or east of 
the Mississippi. The focus also seemed directed to the 
Great Plains area, since most of the complete information 
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came from there. Finally, the inclusion of variables in 
some plants but not in others, as well as the uneven 
sampling scheme was very hard to deal with and almost 
always meant a loss of observations. 
The second data set contained average weekly price 
quotes from ten reporting sites as reported in Livestock 
Meat Wool News. The Livestock Meat Wool News (LMWN) data 
set was collected from weekly USDA publications from 
January 1980 to September 1985. They represent average 
weekly reported prices for choice steers, 1100 to 1300 
pounds, from ten locations throughout the continental 
United States. Although the trade area and quantity-price 
time series procedures could not be used with this 
information, the other two procedures worked well. 
Results 
Packers and stockyards data 
Trade area The trade areas for twelve plants were 
outlined using the data supplied by the Packers and 
Stockyards Administration (P&SA) (see Figures 3-5). Origin 
information was available only for lots located in Kansas, 
or in parts of Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. 
Plants were grouped by the most obviously overlapped trade 
areas. 
Trade area maps were drawn by plotting the area in 
which cattle were bought (over all time periods) by each 
plant. Trade areas for plants K, L, and P in the Texas 
panhandle overlapped, while plants B, C, G, and T covered 
Kansas and parts of Colorado and the Oklahoma panhandle. 
Plants A, D, E, 0 and Q covered a common ground among all 
groups (i.e., K, L, P and B, C, G, T). These three 
regions are shown in Figures 3-5. 
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LEGEND: 
Lettered: Area in which specific plants trade. 
Shaded: Area in which plants A, D, E. 0 and Q trade 
Blank: No trade reported by plants A, D, E, 0 or Q 
Figure 3. Trade area for Plants A, D, E ,  0, and Q 
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IJ 
LEGEND; 
Lettered: Area in which specific plants trade. 
Shaded: Area in which plants B. C, G and T trade 
Blank: No trade reported by plants B, C, G or T 
Figure 4. Trade area for plants B, C, G, and T 
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LEGEND: 
Lettered 
Shaded : 
Blank : 
Area in which specific plants trade. 
Area in which plants K, L and P trade 
No trade reported by plants K, L or P 
Figure 5. Trade area for plants K, L, and P 
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The precise location and ownership of each plant in 
the USDA data set was not disclosed, so letters are 
utilized for plant identification in the analysis. 
However, given the trade area information on some of the 
plants as well as their approximate volume of business, 
some preliminary observations can still be made. Plants in 
the last group (i.e., B, C, G, and T) tended to be larger 
than plants in the other two groups. No one group was 
totally isolated from the other two, which may indicate 
that the all three areas are in the same geographic market. 
Allowable mergers between any two plants would then depend 
on the relative sizes of the plants involved and the 
probable impact on the other firms in the market. 
The trade areas identify areas in which plants 
directly compete for cattle. However, they cannot identify 
those plants which compete indirectly (e.g., having common 
direct competitors but not actually buying from the same 
region) nor can they identify the relative strength of such 
indirect competition. 
F actor analysis Factor analysis (or principal 
components) is a statistical procedure used to identify 
groups with common traits in the larger sample population. 
This procedure was used to group the price time series 
according to how similarly they behaved. For the P&SA data 
set, adjusted price series (as described in Appendix B) 
were collected from each plant. The analysis was run for 
each thirty day period separately, and combined (even 
though the series were a year apart), allowing the number 
of factors to vary from two to four (see Tables 1-4). 
The scores reported in Table 1 represent the variance 
in price which is attributable to each component or factor. 
For example, in Table 1, year 1979, factor one accounts for 
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Table 1. Factor loadings from adjusted prices at 
fourteen plants explained by four unrotated 
factors for 1979 and 1980 
Year 1979 
Plant Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
A .958 .003 .004 .030 
B .744 .039 .046 .091 
C .890 .000 .001 .071 
D .952 .002 . 000 .011 
E .845 .027 .053 .005 
G .481 . 328 .126 .009 
H .155 .773 .010 .007 
I .805 . 068 .082 .013 
K .800 .004 .014 . 000 
L .928 .000 .010 .020 
0 .873 .016 .056 .042 
P .729 .010 .120 .044 
Q .891 .002 .025 .003 
T .765 .023 .017 .134 
Total 10.822 1. 299 .565 .486 
Year 1980 
Plant Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
A .835 .076 . 034 . 001 
B . 501 .021 .161 . 256 
C .623 . 000 .006 .084 
D .801 .032 . 000 .013 
E . 800 .079 . 000 . 000 
G .703 .003 . 023 .021 
H . 312 . 597 .004 . 000 
I .684 .128 . 063 . 015 
K .929 .025 .007 . 000 
L . 305 . 004 - . 572 .076 
0 .918 .000 . 000 .002 
P .817 .010 .003 .037 
Q .845 .050 .022 . 039 
T .454 . 335 .044 .088 
Total 9.531 1. 355 . 945 .637 
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Table 1. continued 
Combined years 1979 and 1980 
Plant Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
A .974 .003 .007 .001 
B . 868 .016 .014 .000 
. C .948 . 000 .000 .000 
D .972 .002 .005 . 000 
E .958 .000 . 000 . Oil 
G .529 .463 .003 .000 
H .807 .003 .047 .119 
I .942 .005 .015 . 000 
K . 954 .004 . 000 .001 
L . 724 .00 3 . 231 .030 
0 .966 .003- .002 .002 
P .922 . 000 . 000 .004 
Q .960 .000 .001 .001 
T - 884 .000 • .000 .072 
Total 12.415 . 507 . 329 . 245 
Table 2. Standardized scoring coefficients for combined 
years 1979 and 1980 
Combined years 1979 and 1980 
Plant Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
A .034 .280 -.150 -.047 
B .118 -.112 .333 -.250 
C .045 .116 -.031 .011 
D . 145 .119 -.179 -.025 
E .352 -.235 -.162 . 009 
G -.353 -.167 -.161 1. 288 
H -.720 1.376 -.087 -.076 
I .146 .238 -.295 -.058 
K .188 — .047 -.006 - .086 
L -.574 -.189 1.509 -.085 
0 .203 -.146 .090 -.092 
P .235 -.183 -.025 .017 
Q -.027 . 197 -.001 .019 
T .746 -.762 -.278 .038 
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Table 3. Standardized scoring coefficients based on 
VARIMAX rotation of three factors for combined 
years 1979 and 1980 
Combined years 1979 and 1980 
Plant Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
A .224 -.087 -.035 
B -.005 . 367 -.254 
C .113 -.040 .016 
D .119 -.154 -.022 
E .111 -.015 -.009 
G -.592 -.206 7.281 
H .404 -.538 .002 
I . 289 -.287 -.051 
K .109 .052 -.091 
L -.649 1.311 -.072 
0 .047 . 167 -.102 
P .051 .073 .004 
Q .111 -.046 . 029 
T .053 . 080 -.013 
Table 4. Standardized scoring coefficients based on 
VARIMAX rotation of two factors for combined 
years 1979 and 1980 
Combined years 1979 and 1980 
Plant Factor 1 Factor 2 
A .118 - . 064 
B .176 -.195 
C .082 .009 
D .110 -.046 
E . 093 -.012 
G -.525 1.237 
H .118 -.080 
I .132 -.095 
K .126 -.083 
L .014 .129 
0 .123 -.075 
P .078 .015 
Q .077 .021 
T .084 -.001 
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95.8 percent of the variance in the price series from plant 
A. In contrast, factor one explains only 15.5 percent of 
variance in prices of plant H. Although all series in the 
combined years seem to be related to factor one, plants G, 
H, L and possibly B and T may be more strongly related to 
other factors, at least in isolated years. 
The first table suggests two to three factors are 
appropriate; plants G and H with factors one and two, plant 
L with factors one and three, and nearly all plants having 
some commonality with the first factor. The first factor 
could be interpreted as the underlying price for fed cattle 
with the additional factors accounting for somewhat 
different behavior. 
Allowing the number of factors to vary does not change 
the unrotated values for Table 1. However, when using a 
rotation technique (Tables 2-4), the values obtained will 
change depending upon the original factors retained. This 
means that one can obtain more than one factor pattern to 
adequately fit the data. By rotating factors, or using 
linear transformations of the old plant factor patterns, 
one can obtain new, and hopefully more clearly defined 
factor patterns. 
Tables 2 to 4 contain the standardized scoring 
coefficients obtained for each plant after rotation. The 
factor may be expressed as a linear combination of the 
price series. For example, using the rotated scores in 
Table 2, combined years, plant A's price is weakly but 
positively related to factors one and two, and negatively 
related to factors three and four. Plant G's price in the 
same table, is very positively related to factor four, and 
negatively related to the other three factors. 
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Only results from the combined years for the P&SA data 
are presented due to the insignificant number of observa­
tions in the separate years. In Table 2, prices of plants 
G, H, L, and possibly Q are negatively related to factor 
one. Prices at plants G, H, and L also have positive 
coefficients for factors two through four respectively. 
The coefficients for the remaining plants tend to be small 
and positive, or negative. 
Restricting the number of factors to three in Table 3 
seems to provide the same information, with plants G and L 
again very negatively related to factor one and positively 
related to the last two factors, and the remaining plants 
with negative or very small, positive coefficients. The 
only exception is plant B, with a very weak negative 
coefficient for factor one and a relatively large positive 
coefficient for factor two. Only plant G is distinguished 
in Table 4, where two factors are rotated. 
The data were inadequate to form any meaningful 
conclusions. However, if these same results had been 
derived from a significantly better set of data, one would 
probably have concluded that virtually all of the plants 
sampled in the USDA study in the High Plains area were in 
the same relevant market. Only three plants appeared to 
have different behavior than the rest of the plants, with 
two of these plants located on the outer fringes of the 
sample area. The other plant (i.e., plant L) was small. 
Due to these problems, factor analysis was used only as a 
preliminary discrimination tool to find relatively less 
correlated series. 
Quantity-price time series Only the P&SA data 
could be used for this model, since both price and quantity 
data were needed. The number of observations in the data 
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set was not adequate to estimate a multivariate transfer 
function as described in the previous section. In order to 
obtain some semblance of an elasticity measure between 
price and quantity, this model was modified to use 
generalized least squares procedures on pooled time series 
from pairs of plants (i.e., equation (10.1)), assuming the 
daily observations had no trend and constant variance. 
After grouping the plants roughly according to the results 
from the factor analysis, the cross elasticity coefficients 
were obtained (see Tables 5-6). 
Detailed information on the plant as well as the 
cattle's feedlot origin was available in twelve of the 
original nineteen plants. These twelve plants were the 
only ones used in the following analysis. Detailed carcass 
information (i.e., quality grade, yield grade, weight 
range) was also included. A variable for percent 
fabricated was included, but was only an estimate calcu­
lated by the USDA. 
Prices were standardized using the procedure in 
Appendix B by adding (or subtracting) the expected 
difference between the price of an arbitrary "ideal" lot 
(i.e., steers, purchased on a live weight basis in which 80 
percent were fabricated) and the predicted price for the 
actual lot. This approach works reasonably well as long as 
the ideal lot (e.g., steers, 80% fabricated) can be 
obtained in all plants. 
Once adjusted prices were obtained for every lot, time 
series were developed separately for every plant and for 
every state of origin. Also, time series were developed by 
purchase date and by slaughter date. The time series was 
based on the average adjusted price per plant (or region) 
by either slaughter date or purchase date. Although 
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Table 5. Cross-elasticity coefficients between logged 
market shares for twelve plants and the logged 
adjusted price series for plants B, G, H, and L 
Plant B Plant G Plant H Plant L 
Plant A 
t^vgluea ( 
F c 
Plant B 
tsvalue 
r2 
F 
Plant C 
tsvalue f ( 
Plant D 
tsvalue ( 
Plant E 
tsvalue ( 
Plant G 
tsvalue (. 
Plant K 
tsvalue (. 
Plant L 
tsvalue 
r2 (. 
Plant G 
t%value 
r2 (. 
n. a 
-2.43 -5.50 - .64 -1.37 
- .57) (-1.03) (- .20) (- .82) 
. 13 . 18 .11 . 16 
d n. a. n. a. n. a. 
n. a. 
11.10 -2.06 2.77 
1.02) (- .25) ( .34) 
.10 .02 .03 
n. a. n. a. n. a. 
-1.43 .25 -1.96 
-8.18 * (- .05) ( .13) (-1.70) 
-4.79) . 37 . 37 . 50 
.79 1.02 1.00 1. 35 
2.15 
-2. 50 1.59 - .38 
.11, - .43 ( .70) (- .27) 
.03) .03 .06 .02 
. 02 n. a. n. a. n. a. 
n. a. 
-9.79 * -3.16 1.02 
1.12^ (-1.82) (-1.21 ( .51) 
.23) . 23 .12 ,02 
. 00 n. a. n. a. n. a. 
n. a. 
1.67 - .09 
•4.02^ ( .42 (- .03) 
• .83) .01 . 00 
.05 n. a . n. a . 
n. a . 
- .81 -1.81 -1.12 
5.57^ - .14 (- .54) (- .49) 
•1.05) .47 .48 .48 
. 52 1.00 1.02 1.02 
1. 10 
-6.49 -4.14 
.32^ (-1.61) (-1.17) 
.64) . 28 . 21 
.01 n. a. n. a. 
n. a. 
-7.52 -8.73 * .51 
4. 74 (- .75) (-2.12) ( .14) 
.50) . 14 . 36 . 10 
. 12 n. a. 3.51 n. a. 
?tsstatistic for significance of the coefficient. 
statistic for overall model adequacy. 
ÇF statistic between full and reduced models. 
"One or both models were not adequate to calculate 
the F stat istic. 
*P < .10. 
Table 5 (continued) 
5 4  
Plant P 
tsvalue 
r2 
F 
Plant Q 
jt-ratio 
r2 
F 
Plant T 
tsvalue 
r2 
F 
Plant B Plant G Plant H Plant L 
n. a. 
2 2 . 6 8 ^  
( 2.85)* 
. 54 
2.63 
-3.42 
n. a. 
-6.70^ 
(- :âî' 
n. a. 
4.90 
'  : i r  
n. a. 
( -2.82 
- .27) 
.07 
n. a. 
-2 . 37 
( - .23) 
.00 
n . a. 
11 .40 
( 1 .52 
.34 
1 .67 
2 . 14 ( .34) 
.07 
n. a 
n. a. 
, 4.92 . 
( 1.02) 
. 27 
n. a. 
, 2.75 
( .58 
.09 
n . a. 
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Table 6. Cross-elasticity coefficients between first 
differences of market shares for twelve plants 
and the first differences of adjusted price 
series for plants B, G, H, and L 
Plant B Plant G Plant H Plant L 
Plant A 
t^yglue^ 3 (- :i4) .02 - .00^ ( -  . 6 6 )  .05 
F c n . a . " n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Plant B 
tsvalue 
R2 
( isi) 
.06 
(- i57) 
.04 
( *27) 
.02 
F n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Plant C 
tsvalue 
R2 
F 
- .05^ 
(-2.80) 
.47 
8. 74 
( :94) 
.11 
n. a . 
( i28) 
.05 
n . a . 
( !21) 
.05 
n. a . 
Plant D 
tsvalue 
R2 
, -01 , 
( .80) 
. 06 
(- !55) 
.07 
( :i6) 
.05 
- .00 
F n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Plant E 
tsvalue 
R2 
F 
( i73) 
. 28 
1.16 
- .05 * 
(-1.89) 
.42 
1.70 1. 16 
, -00, 
( 1.08) 
1 ! 27 
Plant G 
tsvalue 
R2 
. .07 
( 1.23) 
.17 
(- ! 18) 
. 08 
- . 00 
(- .38) 
.09 
F n . a. n. a. n. a. 
Plant K 
t«value 
R2 
(- i22) 
. 00 
- . 04 
(-2.21) 
.28 
. 00 
( .44) 
.01 
.00 
( .55) 
.02 
F n. a. n. a. n . a . n . a. 
Plant L 
t«value 
R2 
.03 
( 1.08) 
.12 
, .01 
( .45) 
.09 
( :35) 
.08 
F n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Plant 0 
tsvalue 
R2 
( 1.22) 
. 17 
.05 
( 1.19) 
.13 
- .02 
(- .80) 
. 08 
- .01 
(-1.53) 
.19 
F n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Ptsstatistic for significance of the coefficient. 
statistic for overall model adequacy. 
SF statistic between full and reduced models. 
"One or both models w e r e  not adequate to calculate the 
F statistic. 
*P < .10. 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Plant B Plant G Plant H Plant L 
Plant P - .00 - .00 - .02 - .02 
t=value (- .09) (- .01) (- .53) (-1.56) 
R2 .00 .00 .02 .17 
F n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Plant Q .05 - .19 , .02 .01 
t=value ( .87) (-2.10) ( .46) ( .78) 
r2 .31 .46 .28 .30 
F 1.17 1.73 1.04 1.13 
Plant T - .06 .02 .06 .01 
t=value (- .09) ( .35) ( 1.18) ( 1.16) 
R2 .00 .01 .10 .10 
F" n # 3 # n # 3 # n«3« n * 9 # 
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purchase dates would have been preferred, only the 
slaughter date series was used due to thinly and sometimes 
unreliably reported purchase dates. 
All plants did not have the same number of daily 
observations. This was in part due to some plants working 
six days per week while others worked five or less. When 
all Saturdays were eliminated, most plants had the same 
number of observations. 
The time series to be used in the Box-Jenkins 
procedure should have at least thirty equally spaced 
observations per series (e.g., minimum requirement for 
SAS). Also, since a cross-section of time series from the 
plants was to be used, contemporaneous observations were 
needed from each plant. Although the observations were 
contemporaneous, there were at most twenty-one consecutive 
observations from any plant. 
The quantity time series also needed to be developed. 
Since the sample was not 100 percent in each area, a 
plant's absolute market share in a geographic area could 
not be inferred from the data. Instead, relative market 
share was used as the quantity variable. A market share 
series for every plant was defined using an average daily 
share for each plant over its trade area. 
The market share variable as well as the price series 
are defined in terms of the trade area for a particular 
plant. This should be kept in mind especially where price 
and quantity movements between regions, rather than 
specific plant sites, are of interest. 
Ordinary least squares regressions on differenced and 
log transformations of the market share and time series 
were run for combined years, using equation (10.1). 
Although the level of prices between the two years did 
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differ, the day-to-day changes in prices were very similar. 
Using the transformed market share and price series (i.e., 
first differences and log transformations), pair-wise 
regressions were run for all plants with the price series 
from plants B, G, H and L. Tests for the significance of 
the additional transformed price series were performed with 
F-tests. The coefficients between market share in region i 
and price in another region were recorded, with their 
reported t-statistic. The for each model is reported as 
well as the F-ratio testing the hypothesis that the sum of 
squared errors for the model with price is significantly 
lower than the sum of squared errors without. These 
results are summarized in Tables 5-6. 
The following observations can be made about Tables 
5-6, containing cross-elasticity coefficients and 
statistics for all pairs of plants with plants B, G, H, and 
L and Figures 2-4 : 
1. Significantly negative cross-elasticity 
coefficients were found between plants B and C, 
plants G and E, G and K, G and Q, and plants H 
and 0. These plants exhibited a decrease in 
market share when price increased at plant B, G, 
or H respectively. This would be expected to 
occur if the plants are competing. 
2. One significant positive cross-elasticity 
coefficient was found between plants B and Q. 
Plant Q responded with an increase in market 
share when faced with an increase in bid price 
from plant B. This may indicate that plants B and 
Q are not directly competing. 
3. Pair-wise regressions were more significant for 
plants B and C, 8 and Q and plants H and 0, based 
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upon an F-test at the 90 percent significance 
level. 
Although the data had many deficiencies for this 
analysis, one cannot reject the hypothesis that most of the 
plants in the sample were competing in the same relevant 
market. The only two plants which may not be competing 
(i.e., plants B and Q had significant t-ratio) also happen 
to be quite spatially separated (based on the patterns of 
their trade areas). Given more confidence in the data, 
this might indicate that a hypothetical merger between 
plants B and Q would probably not harm competition in the 
relevant market area. Any other merger would be between 
plants in the relevant market area and would have to be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 
Livestock Meat Wool News data 
Factor analysis The results of the Livestock Meat 
Wool News (LMWN) analysis begin in Table 7, where seven of 
the ten locations are related to the first factor with more 
than 98 percent of their variances explained by this 
factor.It is interesting to note that the three 
remaining locations are in the east and on the west coasts 
(i.e., Lancaster, PA; California; Washington-Oregon-Idaho). 
Of the three, the Washington-Oregon-Idaho location had the 
strongest link to factor one (97.7 percent). It is also 
the only one of the three to have plants owned and operated 
by the largest packer in the nation, IBP. This area may 
have lower transfer costs to the Midwest than other areas, 
or IBP may be quickly adjusting their purchasing behavior 
in that area versus the central U.S. to arbitrage market 
The close linkage might have been substantially 
weaker if daily price series had been used in the analysis. 
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price differentials that occur, leading to the more similar 
price behavior. 
Table 8 summarizes the scoring coefficients for four 
rotated factors. Looking at the pattern of negative and 
positive values, factor two seems to divide the locations 
into North-and-East and South-and-West. Three of the four 
locations with negative values for factor one are also 
located on the west coast or in the east. 
Restricting the number of factors to three in Table 9 
sharpens the patterns beginning in Table 8. Factor two 
still divides the locations regionally and factor one more 
clearly identifies the three peripheral areas in the East 
and on the West coast. Factor three further divides the 
regions, setting apart Lancaster, PA and to a lesser extent 
Illinois from the North-and-East locations and California 
from the South-and-West locations. 
When only two factors are allowed (Table 10), the 
plants are related negatively to factor one if they are in 
the South and West grouping and negatively to factor two 
otherwise. The magnitude of the scoring coefficients is 
larger as the plant location moves away from the "dividing 
line" between the two regions. 
Economic interpretations to the factors can only be 
tentative without additional evidence. Our preliminary 
findings suggest that the California and East Coast market 
areas may not be competing in the same relevant market as 
the other eight areas. This suggests that mergers between 
plants in the High Plains-Midwest area and plants in the 
California area, for example, may be allowable under 
antitrust provisions on the basis of competition in cattle 
procurement markets. Although price behavior may differ 
between the regions, the difference may reflect exogenous 
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Table 7. Factor loadings from weekly reported prices at 
ten locations plants explained by four 
unrotated factors for 1980 to 1985 
Location Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Lancaster .918 -.193 .340 -.045 
Illinois .984 -.128 -.038 .024 
Omaha .991 T.087 -.072 .018 
Sioux City .983 -.104 -.114 .033 
So. St. Paul .989 — .081 -.053 .066 
I owa .993 -.060 -.065 .010 
California .938 . 291 . 149 .094 
T exas-Oklahoma .983 .131 -.047 -.088 
Colorado .986 .072 -.087 -.089 
Washington-Oregon 
-Idaho 
.976 .165 .021 -.022 
Total .165 .217 .175 .033 
Table 8. Standardized scoring coefficients for ten 
locations from 300 weekly reported prices from 
1980 to 1985 based on VARI MAX rotation of four 
factors 
Location Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Lancaster -.893 -.477 2.031 1.084 
Illinois .488 -.404 .087 - .708 
Omaha .524 -.286 -.129 - .523 
Sioux City .735 -.359 -.313 - .924 
So. St. Paul . 547 -.181 -.177 -1.926 
Iowa .435 -.192 -.138 - .276 
California -.795 1.372 -.135 -2.779 
T exas-Oklahoma -.182 . 380 -.217 2 . 662 
Colorado .066 ,132 -.266 2.691 
Washington-Oregon 
-Idaho 
-.355 .650 -.143 .698 
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Table 9. Standardized scoring coefficients for ten 
locations from 300 weekly reported prices from 
1980 to 1985 based on VARIMAX rotation of three 
factors 
Location Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Lancaster - .820 - .413 1.928 
Illinois .437 - .438 . 149 
Omaha .487 - .313 - .081 
Sioux City .670 - .406 - .229 
So. St. Paul .410 - .277 - .015 
Iowa .415 - .207 - .111 
California - .993 1.234 .083 
T exas-Oklahoma .007 .510 - .435 
Colorado .257 .264 - .484 
Washington-Oregon — .306 .684 - .203 
Table 10. Standardized scoring coefficients for ten 
locations from 300 weekly reported prices from 
1980 to 1985 based on VARIMAX rotation of two 
factors 
Location Factor 1 Factor 2 
Lancaster .672 - .591 
Illinois .474 - .365 
Omaha . 349 - .227 
Sioux City .401 - .285 
So. St. Paul .329 - .206 
Iowa .264 - .133 
Cali fornia - .829 1.053 
Texas-Oklahoma - .331 .515 
Colorado - .147 .315 
Washington-Oregon - .436 .630 
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conditions such as weather, rather than different 
competitive conditions. It may also reflect endogenous 
factors, such as seasonal feedlot production patterns or 
local labor conditions (e.g., strikes). However, these 
interpretations would have to be validated by further 
examination of the price series and its behavior with other 
explanatory series. 
Price time series Using price time series direc­
tly in regression analysis may lead to problems due 
to autocorrelation or non-stationary series. As discussed 
previously, Box-Jenkins techniques in fitting ARMA 
parameters to these series may sometimes be used to correct 
these problems. More elaborate ARMA transfer functions 
(e.g., equation (9), or systems like equations (14) - (17) 
or matrix (19)) can then be used to model feedback between 
plants or regions. 
The Box-Jenkins techniques could not be used with the 
P&SA data due to the small number of consecutive observa­
tions (i.e., usually not more than twenty). Most standard 
statistical packages which handle these techniques (e.g., 
SAS) require a minimum of thirty consecutive observations. 
However, the LMWN data contained three hundred consecutive 
weekly observations across ten locations. The initial 
estimated ARMA parameters from equation (8) are summarized 
in Tables 11-20. 
Each table contains the estimated parameters resulting 
from hypothesizing different models by overfitting and 
under fitting each time series. The appropriate function 
used will be one that generally fits the following 
criteria; 
1. has significant parameters 
( Autoregressi ve parameters of order p ; cpp(B) and 
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Moving average parameters of order q ; •&q(B) ), 
2. has smallest error variance, 
3. has small value for the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Schwartz's Bayesian Criterion (SBC), 
4. has significant Box-Pierce value (i.e. a 
portmanteau test statistic, composed of the sum of the 
squared autocorrelations multiplied by the sample size 
(Judge et al., 1982, p. 694). If the series has no 
autocorrelation, then computed values should be 
statistically close to zero.), and 
5. has small number of parameters to estimate. 
Obviously one ARMA function will probably not be best 
in all categories. Usually the choice is narrowed to one 
or two models. Two of the better choices are marked with 
an asterisk in each table. 
Although the actual lag of the autoregressive and 
moving average parameters varies somewhat by location, 
there seems to be a pattern in the autoregressive terms. 
Longer lagged terms are probably indicative of exogenous 
variables, such as cattle placements on feed, pork prices, 
etc., while shorter lags probably reflect immediate cattle 
market conditions. 
^^ All coefficients with lags greater than twelve were 
negative, and tended to be between .1 and .2. Current 
daily price changes were inversely related to price changes 
from three to six months before, depending upon location. 
A three month lag appeared for Texas-Oklahoma. Four month 
lags appeared for all of the remaining locations except 
Lancaster and California. This parameter is probably 
capturing changes in feedlot placements three to four 
months ago, which would depress prices later. 
The shorter lagged autoregressive terms tended to be 
positive, except for California and Lancaster. Prices 
seemed to move in the same direction over very short 
periods (i.e., two weeks). Lancaster prices were 
positively related at five or more weeks. California had a 
very significant and negative term at lag three. This may 
be evidence of somewhat independent pricing behavior in the 
California area, and in the Lancaster area, more dependent 
pricing on other areas than in its own area. 
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Table 11. ARMA parameter estimates for five possible 
functional forms for Lancaster time series 
after one regular difference 
Parameter 
Estimates 
FUNCTIONS 
1 2 3 4a 5a 
^1 .198 . 3.47 
. 224 
3.84 * 
.227 
3.94 * 
.226 
3.93 * 
. 225 
3.90 * 
cp2 . 100 
1.71 
95 .158 
2.74 * 
.151 
2.64 * 
.131 
2.27 * 
.125 
2.18 * 
98 • . 142 
• 2.41 * 
.098 
1.73 
920 - .148 
- 2.48 * -
• .127 
• 2.11 * -
.141 
• 2.39 * 
924 .132 
• 2.21* 
Test 
Statistics 
a 
AIC 
SBC 
2c 
X d. f. 
Prob 
1 . 74 
1015.41 
1019.11 
76. 14 
41 
.  001 
1.69 
1008.63 
1019.73 
45.35 
39 
. 224 
1.67 
1005.42 
1016.52 
39.91 
39 
.429 
1.65 
1002.94 
1017.74 
34.64 
38 
.  6 2 6  
1.64 
1001.92 
1020.42 
31.46 
37 
. 726 
BTop choices among functions listed, according to 
criteria in text. 
bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
•^Box-Pierce %^ • 
*Significant at 95% level. 
Table 12. ARMA parameter estimates for four possible 
functional forms for Illinois time series 
after one regular difference 
Parameter 
Estimates 
FUNCTIONS 
1 2 3 4a 5a 
^1 
- 3 
.177 . 
.10 Z 3 
. 205 
.51 * 
- .214 
- 3.67 * 
- . 199 
- 3.39 * 3 
. 184 
.13 * 
cp2 
2. 
. 167 
83 * 
. 154 
2.64 * 
. 160 
2.77 * 2 
.150 
.61 * 
916 
- 1 
.112 
.91 
(P20 - . 194 
- 3.21 * 
- . 192 
- 3.22 * Z 3 
. 187 
.15 * 
923 - . 170 
- 2.83 * Z 2 
. 167 
.79 * 
Test 
Statistics 
1 . 167 1 . 140 1.106 1.080 1 .071 
AIC 895 . 808 889 .812 881.582 875.569 873 .95 
SBC 899 . 509 897 .212 892.684 890.371 892 .452 
84 
41 
.13 56 
40 
. 26 43.54 
39 
35. 97 
38 
32 
37 
. 70 
Prob. .00 .046 .284 .563 .671 
BTop choices among functions listed, according to 
criteria in text. 
bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce %^• 
*Significant at 9 5% level. 
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Table 13. ARMA parameter estimates for four possible 
functional forms for South St. Paul time 
series after one regular difference 
Parameters 
Estimated 
FUNCTIONS 
la 2 3a 4 
^1 -.127 , 
- 2.16 
- . 112 
- 1.91 -  1 .  
127 
15 * 
- .113 
- 1.91 
cp2 . 144 
2.49 * 
. 137 
2.38 * 1 .  
143 
48 * 
.136 
2.37 * 
916 - . 103 
- 1.73 
- . 095 
- 1.60 
920 - .218 
- 3.56 * 
- .216 
- 3.54 * 3! 
216 
54 * 
- . 214 
- 3.52 * 
923 
- 1. 
106 
72 
- .098 
- 1.59 
Test 
Statistics 
1.238 1.230 1. 230 1. 224 
AIC 915.342 914.384 914. 343 913.815 
SBC 926.444 929.186 929. 145 932.317 
30. 69 
39 
25.71 
38 
25. 
38 
69 22. 66 
37 
Prob. .826 .936 .936 .969 
BTop choices among functions listed, according to 
criteria in text. 
bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
•^Box-Pierce %^ • 
^Significant at 95?o level. 
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Table 14. ARMA parameter estimates for five possible 
functional forms for Omaha time series after 
one regular difference 
Parameters 
Estimated 
FUNCTIONS 
la 2 3 4a 5a 
•8" 2 ~ 
zl 
141. 
39 b 
- 2 
.135 
.31 * 
- .137 
- 2.26 * -
- .130 
- 2.10 * 
- .125 
- 2.09 * 
cp2 
2'. 
129 
19 * 2 
. 128 
.18 * 
.133 
2.26 * 
. 122 
2.10 * 
. 121 
2.09 * 
916 
- 1 
.120 
.98 
- .121 
- 2.03 * 
- .117 
- 1.97 
920 163 68 * 
• . 165 
• 2.71 * 
- .159 
- 2.63 * 
923 - .117 
- 1.90 
- . 104 
- 1.71 
Test 
Statistics 
1.299 1.313 1.314 1.285 1.277 
AIC 940.755 932.902 933.184 927.518 926.564 
SBC 929.654 944.003 944.285 942.320 945.067 
36.40 44.61 40.03 31.96 20.65 
d.f. 39 39 39 38 37 
Prob. .589 .248 .424 .744 .799 
BTop choices among functions listed, according to 
criteria in text. 
bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
•^Box-Pierce • 
*Significant at 9 5% level. 
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Table 15. ARMA parameter estimates for three possible 
functional forms for Sioux City time series 
after one regular difference 
Parameters 
Estimated 
FUNCTIONS 
1 28 3a 
^1 - .110, 
- 1.86 b 
- .113 
- 1.91 
- . 103 
- 1.75 
cp2 .132 
.28 * 
.122 
2.11 * 
.123 
2.14 * 
916 - .154 
- 2.60 * 
- . 144 
- 2.45 * 
CP20 - . 177 
- 2.90 * 
- .171 
- 2.80 * 
- . 174 
- 2.88 * 
(P23 - . 143 
- 2.33 * 
- .132 
- 2.16 * 
Test 
Statistics 
1.461 1.455 1.437 
AIC 965.889 964.566 961.879 
SBC 980.691 9 7 9 . 3 6 8  980.381 
Prob. 
35.17 
38 
. 601 
34.07 
3 8  
. 652 
2 8 . 4 2  
3 7 
. 843 
^Top choices among functions listed, according to 
criteria in text. 
bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce %^• 
*Significant at 95% level. 
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Table 16. ARMA parameter estimates for four possible 
functional forms for Iowa time series after one 
regular difference 
Parameters 
Estimated 
• FUNCTIONS 
la 23 3 4 
^1 - .246 , 
- 4.19 * b 
- .217 
- 3.79 * 
.241 
4.10 * 
- .238 
- 4.04 * 
cp2 .118 
1.94 
. 109 
1.81 
.115 
1.90 
916 - .156 
- 2.59 * 
.150 
2.49 * 
920 - .139 
- 2.23 * 
- .153 
- 2.47 * 
. 140 
2.25 * 
- . 142 
- 2.28 * 
923 - . 109 
- 1.75 
Test 
Statistics 
1.245 1.233 1.223 1.236 
AIC 917.029 914.110 912.826 915.942 
SBC 928.131 925.212 927.628 930.744 
32.97 30.78 24.96 28.49 
d.f. 39 39 38 38 
Prob. .741 .823 .949 .868 
BTop choices among functions listed, according to 
criteria in text. 
bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce %^• 
*Significant at 95% level. 
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Table 17. ARMA parameter estimates for five possible 
functional forms for Texas-Oklahoma time series 
after one regular difference 
Parameters 
Estimated 
FUNCTIONS 
1 2 33 4a 5 
ei _o *
 
GO 
- .277 
- 4,75 * 
- .275 
- 4.72 * -
- . 269 
- 4.63 * 
- .277 
- 4.75 • 
cp2 .101 .110 . 102 .091 
1.68 1.82 1.71 1.50 
c p  1  2  - . 1 2 1  -  . 1 2 1  
- 2.01 * - 2.00 * 
CPU ; ,;106 - ;.10e 
<P20 : 
I  e s t  
Statistics 
1.311 1.304 1.290 1.282 1.286 
AIC 930.548 929.836 927.789 926.754 927.795 
SBC 934.249 937.237 938.891 941.555 942.597 
43.87 36.99 36.27 33.77 31.26 
d.f. 41 40 39 38 38 
Prob. .351 .606 .595 .666 .772 
^Top choices among functions listed, according to 
criteria in text. 
bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
'^Box-Pierce %^ • 
*Significant at 95% level. 
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Table 18. ARMA parameter estimates for three possible 
functional forms for Colorado time series 
after one regular difference 
Parameters 
Estimated 
FUNCTIONS 
1 23 38 
^1 - .220 . 
~ 3.78 * b 
- .226 
- 3.88 * 
- . 225 
- 3.86 * 
cp2 .119 
1.99 
. 107 
1.79 
, 103 
1.74 
916 - . 108 
- 1.80 
920 - . 143 
- 2.31 * 
- .150 
- 2.43 * 
Test 
Statistics 
02 1.432 1.411 1.401 
AIC 957.855 954.523 953.254 
SBC 965.256 965.625 968.056 
"d^f. 
P rob. 
35.58 
40 
.669 
29.19 
39 
.874 
26.03 
38 
. 930 
BTop choices among functions listed, according to 
criteria in text. 
bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
CBox-Pierce x^• 
^Significant at 95?o level. 
73 
Table 19. ARMA parameter estimates for four possible 
functional forms for California time series 
after one regular difference 
Parameters 
Estimated 
FUNCTIONS 
1 2a 3 4a 
^1 - .190 . 
- 3.31 * b 
- . 191 
- 3.32 * 
- .175 
- 3.02 * - 2 
.173 
.98 * 
93 - . 198 
- 3.43 * 
- . 190 
- 3.30 * 
- . 208 
- 3.59 * - 3 
. 200 
.49 * 
920 - .112 
- 1.83 - 2 
.139 
.23 * 
923 - .115 
- 1.84 - 2 
. 141 
. 25 * 
1 est 
Statistics 
1.533 1.521 1.521 1 . 501 
AIC 978.262 976.910 976.910 973 .910 
SBC 985.663 988.011 988.011 988 . 711 
y 2 C 
d.f. 
Prob. 
39.24 
40 
. 504 
31.10 
39 
. 812 
35.55 
39 
. 628 
25 
38 
.44 
. 941 
BTop choices among functions listed, according to 
criteria in text. 
bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
"^Box-Pierce %^ . 
^Significant at 9 5% level. 
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Table 20. ARMA parameter estimates for four possible 
functional forms for Washington-Oregon-Idaho 
time series after one regular difference 
Parameters 
Estimated 
FUNCTIONS 
1 2 3a 4a 
^1 - .211 . 
- 3.71 * b 
- .237 
- 4.06 * 
.231 
3.95 * 
- .233 
- 3.98 * 
cp2 .129 
2.17 * 
.126 
2.13 * 
. 120 
2.20 * 
(P7 .094 
1.62 
.094 
1.62 
917 - . 144 
1.88 
- .120 
- 1.98 
Test 
Statistics 
1.151 
AIC 891.521 
SBC 895.221 
52.28 
d.f. 41 
Prob. .112 
1.137 
888.807 
896.208 
39.-59 
40 
.488 
1.270 
887.253 
898.354 
37.44 
39 
. 541 
1 . 1 2 1  
886.599 
901.401 
31.02 
38 
. 782 
^Top choices among functions listed, according to 
criteria in text. 
bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce %^• 
*Significant at 9 5% level. 
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Transfer functions (i.e., equation (9)) were then 
estimated, using the procedures outlined in the previous 
section. Pair-wise estimation of all possible combinations 
would have required hundreds of models. Instead, the 
functions were estimated for a smaller subset, arbitrarily 
chosen to cover the widest possible area, and are 
summarized in Tables 21-34. Each of these functions were 
systematically over and underfit, with the goal of finding 
the best possible set of parameters with which to estimate 
the output price series. The criteria used are similar to 
those used for the ARMA series in Tables 11-20, with the 
additional requirement that the chi-square value from the 
cross-correlation of the output residuals with the input 
series also be statistically significant. In most of the 
tables, the two functions which meet the criteria the best 
are marked with asterisks. 
Tables 22-26 summarize a family of transfer functions 
showing the extent to which price series from different 
locations affect the price series in Lancaster. The 
western locations and Texas (Tables 22,24,26) seemed to add 
less information to the ARMA time series results (Table 11) 
than did Illinois or Omaha, both in terms of the smaller 
variance, and smaller AIC and SBC statistics. The 
estimated variance for the univariate model was in the 
(1.64, 1.74) range, while the estimated variances for the 
transfer functions were 1.1 or less. The AIC and SBC 
criteria decline by roughly 25 to 30%. Based on the 
changes in overall variance and AIC and SBC statistics, 
each location does significantly improve the ARMA time 
series for Lancaster. Lancaster could not be used as an 
input to any other location since the cross-correlation 
Function showed that it lagged all other series by two or 
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Table 21. Transfer functions showing Texas-Oklahoma time 
series as a function of Washington-Oregon-Idaho 
time series after regular first differences 
for both 
Parameters 1 2 
Estimated 
v(B) n Transfer function parameter estimates 
V ( B ) ' d (numerator and denominator) 
numerator 
constant 
.888 
24.45 
.881 
25.17 * 
VI, n - .073 
- 2.04 * 
- .077 
- 2.22 * 
&(B), cp(B), Filter parameter estimates 
^1 .136 
2.31 * 
.206 
3.52 * 
(P3 - .196 
- 3.41 * 
(P5 - .131 
- 2.24 * 
(P12 - .154 
- .2.52 * 
- .147 
- 2.44 * 
Test 
Statistics 
o' .428 .411 
AIC 597.161 586.648 
SBC 611.949 608.831 
Autocorrelation of residuals 
Prob. 
43.37 
40 
. 329 
32.27 
38 
.731 
Cross-correlation of residuals 
"d.f. 
Prob. 
24.74 
40 
. 972 
25.42 
40 
.965 
^t-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce %^• 
*Significant at 95?ô level. 
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Table 22. ARMA transfer functions showing Lancaster 
time series as a function of Washington-Oregon-
Idaho time series after regular first 
differences for both 
Parameters 
Estimated 
1 2 
Transfer function parameter estimates 
(numerator and denominator) 
numerator 
constant 
.530 
11.43 *a 
.528 
11.47 * 
V2,d .229 
3.17 * 
V20,d - . 147 
- 2.23 * 
*(B), cp(B), Filter parameter estimates 
^1 .456 8.42 * 
95 . 184 
3.12 * 
(P8 . 101 
1.71 
CP19 - .178 
- 2.98 * 
- .175 
- 2.97 * 
lest 
Statistics 
1.100 1.092 
AIC 824.180 823.248 
SBC 845.968 848.666 
Autocorrelation or resiauais 
yZb 
d. f. 
Prob. 
30.74 
39 
.825 
29.09 
38 
.850 
uross-correiation or residuals 
"d.f. 
Prob. 
24.64 
39 
.964 
24.84 
39 
.962 
Bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce %^. 
^Significant at 95?• level. 
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Table 23. ARMA transfer functions showing Lancaster time 
series as a function of Illinois time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Parameters 
Estimated 
1 2 3 
Transfer function parameter estimates 
(numerator and denominator) 
Constant 
numerator 
.694 
13.20 
.692 
13.97 * 
.633 
15.12 * 
c
 
1—
1 
•
>
 
. 122 
2.13 * 
.119 
2.14 * 
V2,d . 188 
2.66 * 
.220 
3.27 * 
. 156 
2.56 * 
V20,d - . 088 
- 1.57 
& ( B ) ,  cp(B) Filter parameter estimates 
^1 .503 9.55 * 
.488 
9.52 * 
.492 
9.61 * 
95 . 182 
3.06 * 
.147 
2.57 * 
. 147 
2.56 * 
919 - .167 
- 2.79 * 
- . 168 
- 2.88 * 
- . 154 
- 2.65 * 
1  e s t  
Statistics 
. 917 .923 .935 
AIC 774.473 825.065 8 2 7 . 9 3  
SBC 799.891 847.228 8 4 6 . 3 9 8  
A u t o c o r r e l a t i o n  o r  r e s i a u a i s  
y Z b  
d.f. 
Prob. 
33.85 
39 
. 704 
33.81 
39 
.705 
33.14 
39 
.733 
t r o s s - c o r r e i a t i o n  o r  r e s i a u a i s  
" d . f .  
Prob. 
30.98 
38 
. 783 
36.51 
39 
. 584 
42.05 
40 
. 382 
®t-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce %^• 
*Significant at 9 5% level. 
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Table 24. ARMA transfer functions showing Lancaster 
time series as a function of Texas time series 
after regular firsc differences for both 
Parameters 1 2 3 
iransrer function parameter estimates 
(numerator and denominator) 
Constant 
numerator 
.495 .496 
11.03 11.16 * 
.563 
10.61 * 
^1, n . 108 
1.89 
V2,d . 253 
3.55 * 
. 243 
3.38 * 
.283 
3.58 * 
V20,d - . 181 
- 2.76 * 
- . 193 
- 2.93 * 
- .179 
- 2.70 * 
•»• ( b ), CP ( b ) , t- liter parameter estimates 
^1 .413 
7.43 * 
.412 
7.38 * 
. 396 
6.97 .* 
95 . 174 
2.94 * 
.178 
3.38 * 
.159 
2.66 * 
98 . 117 
1.99 
.136 
2.29 * 
919 - . 162 
- 2.70 * 
- . 160 
- 2.68 * 
- . 144 
- 2.37 * 
924 - .104 
- 1.65 
1  est statistics 
o' 1.106 1. 094 1.076 
AIC 825.793 823.764 820.977 
SBC 847.580 849.764 853.658 
A u t o c o r r e l a t i o n  o r  r e s i a u a i s  
yZb 
d.f. 
Prob. 
38.79 
39 
. 480 
36.52 
38 
.538 
34,49 
37 
. 587 
U r o s s - c o r r e i a t i o n  o r  r e s i d u a l s  
"d.f. 
Prob. 
31.57 
39 
. 795 
29.98 
39 
.850 
27.53 
38 
.895 
Bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce %^• 
*Significant at 95?ô level. 
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Table 25. ARMA transfer functions showing Lancaster 
time series as a function of Omaha time series 
after regular first differences for both 
rarameters I 2 3 4 5 
T ransfer 
(numerator 
function parameter 
and denominator) 
estimates 
const 
num. 
.598 .596 
14.52 *a 14.66 * 
.651 
13.64 * 
. 646 
13.72 
.652 
* 14.00 * 
^1, n . 153 
2.46 * 
' .112 
2.17 * 
. 108 
2.09 * 
. 104 
2.02 * 
V2,d - . 104 
- 1.82 
.145 
2.34 * 
.215 
3.21 * 
.206 
3.06 * 
. 205 
3.07 * 
V20,d 
. 
- . 124 
- 2.19 * 
- . 101 
- 1.83 
- . 118 
- 2.15 * 
- .113 
- 2.06 * 
#(B), Cpi.Wy'f 2 J. C G r p3I*dni3lZ3X* GSCJ.mGtGS 
^1 .498 9.41 * 
.505 
9.55 * 
.492 
9.30 * 
. 500 
9.43 * 
. 506 
9.58 * 
95 . 209 
3.55 * 
.212 
3.63 * 
. 209 
3.55 * 
. 212 
3.62 * 
. 191 
3.22 * 
98 . 128 
2.17 * 
. 123 
2.08 * 
.136 
2.29 * 
919 - .176 
- 2.95 * 
- .180 
- 3.05 * 
- .179 
- 3.00 * 
- . 183 
- 3.09 * 
- .158 
- 2.61 * 
924 - .122 
- 1.94 
l e s t  s t a t i s t i c s  
0 ^  
AIC 
SBC 
.931 
777.720 
799.507 
.919 
775.036 
800.455 
.918 
774.784 
800 . 202 
.907 
772.405 
801.454 
. 898 
770.579 
803.260 
A u t o c o r r e l a t i o n  o r  r e s i d u a l s  
X 2 b  
d. f. 
Prob. 
38.79 
39 
.479 
35.69 
38 
. 577 
38.57 
39 
.489 
35.87 
38 
. 568 
29.60 
37 
. 801 
u r o s s - c o r r e i a t i o n  o r  r e s i o u a i s  
X ^ 
d.f. 
Prob, 
31.88 
39 
. 784 
31.71 
39 
. 790 
26.79 
38 
. 913 
27 . 06 
38 
. 907 
26.39 
38 
. 922 
Bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce %^• 
*Significant at 9 5% level. 
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Table 26. ARMA transfer functions showing Lancaster 
time series as a function of California time 
series after regular first differences for both 
Harameters 12 3 4 
Iransrer runction parameter 
(numerator and denominator) 
estimates 
Constant . 544 .549 .580 .554 
numerator 12.48 *a 12.66 * 11.29 * 12.78 * 
VI,n .079 
1.60 
V3,d . 288 
4.42 * 
.275 
4.27 * 
.290 
4.75 * 
. 277 
4.27 * 
V20,d - .132 
- 2.01 * 
- .133 
- 2.04 * 
- . 167 
- 2.65 * 
- .132 
- 2.01 * 
# ( b ) ,  c p ( b ) ,  F i l t e r  p a r a m e t e r  e s t i m a t e s  
^1 .464 8.60 * 
.446 
8.15 * 
. 399 
7.12 * 
.444 
8.07 * 
95 .236 
4.02 * 
.231 
3.95 * 
.241 
4.10 * 
. 217 
3.69 * 
916 . 123 
2.08 * 
.131 
2.20 * 
.127 
2.15 * 
919 - . 144 
- 2.41 * 
- .139 
- 2,33 * 
- .114 
- 1.85 
923 . 086 
1.42 
924 - . 104 
- 1,66 
1  e s t  s t a t i s t i c s  
0  
AIC 
SBC 
1.086 
820.839 
842.626 
1. 074 
818.545 
843.964 
1. 085 
822.358 
851.408 
1.067 
817.691 
846,741 
A u t o c o r r e l a t i o n  o r  r e s i a u a i s  
y Z b  
d.f. 
P r o b .  
30.76 
39 
.824 
24.22 
38 
.960 
27.08 
38 
.906 
22,70 
37 
, 969 
L r o s s - c o r r e i a t i o n  o r  r e s i d u a l s  
"d.f. 
P r o b .  
42.80 
39 
. 311 
44.71 
39 
.235 
43.93 
38 
.235 
44,65 
39 
, 246 
Bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce %^• 
•Significant at 9 5% level. 
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Table 27. ARMA transfer functions showing Omaha 
time series as a function of Washinqton-
Oreqon-Idaho time series after regular first 
differences for both 
Parameters 1 2 
Transfer function parameter estimates 
(numerator and denominator) 
Constant 
numerator 
.803 
20.99 
.803 
21.49 * 
^1, n - .122 
- 3.20 * 
- .131 
- 3.52 * 
V 2 0 , d  - .091 
-  2 . 4 4  *  
- .091 
- 2.55 * 
& ( B ) ,  co(B), Filter parameter estimates 
^1 .292 
4.78 * 
. 313 
5.36 * 
• (P2 - .032 
- .51 
(PIO - .163 
- 2.61 * 
920 - . 104 
- .163 
- .130 
- 2.04 * 
l e s t  
Statistics 
. 4 5 1  .441 
AIC 575.471 568.986 
SBC 597.259 590.774 
A u t o c o r r e l a t i o n  o r  r e s i d u a l s  
yZb 
d.f. 
Prob. 
3 9 . 3 6  
39 
.454 
34.64 
39 
.669 
Uross-correiation or residuals 
" d . f .  
Prob. 
28.25 
39 
.899 
29.52 
39 
.864 
Bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce %^• 
•Significant at 95% level. 
83 
Table 28. ARMA transfer functions showing Omaha 
time series as a function of Texas time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Parameters 1 2 3 4 
Transfer function parameter 
(numerator and denominator) 
estimates 
Constant 
numerator 
.875 
30.88 *a 
.878 
31.09 * 
.876 
31.35 * 
.884 
31.44 * 
V2,d .094 
3.00 * 
.093 
3.04 * 
.093 
3.00 * 
. 092 
3.04 * 
V20,d — .063 
- 2.09 * 
- .064 
- 2.17 * 
- .061 
- 2.07 * 
.064 
- 2.18 * 
e(B), co(B), Filter parameter estimates 
^1 .138 
2.24 * 
.136 
2.22 * 
.140 
2.28 * 
.140 
2.29 * 
cp4 - .118 
- 1.93 
(PIO - . 114 
- 1.83 
- . 127 
- 2.03 
- .116 
- 1.87 
(P15 - .130 
- 2.05 * 
- .131 
- 2.05 * 
- .134 
- 2.12 * 
- .135 
- 3.12 * 
920 - .094 
- 1.49 
- . 109 
- 1.73 
l e s t  
Statistics 
o' . 300 . 299 . 297 . 296 
AIC 461.80 460.666 459.621 458.909 
SBC 483.587 482.453 485.04 484.327 
A u t o c o r r e l a t i o n  or r e s i d u a l s  
yZb 
d.f. 
Prob. 
33.39 
39 
. 723 
36.65 
39 
. 578 
34.02 
38 
. 654 
31. 50 
38 
. 763 
tross-correiation or residuals 
*d.f. 
Prob. 
25.85 
39 
.948 
26.32 
39 
.940 
26.44 
39 
.938 
25.74 
39 
. 949 
^t-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
'^Box-Pierce %^ • 
^Significant at 95?o level. 
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Table 29. ARMA transfer functions showing Omaha time 
series as a function of Lancaster time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Parameters 
Estimated 
1 2 3 4 
Transfer function parameter 
(numerator and denominator) 
estimates 
Constant 
numerator 
.732 ^ 
20.65 
.716 
20.24 * 
.715 
20.40 * 
.712 
20.17 * 
V3,d .218 
4.64 * 
.203 
4.30 * 
.212 
4.39 * 
.207 
4.34 * 
&(B), c p ( B ) ,  Filter parameter estimates 
^1 .065 
1.08 
.072 
1.19 
(P2 .068 
- 1.14 
914 - .100 
- 1.66 
(P17 - .121 
- 1.99 
- .126 
- 2.07 
- .130 
- 2.14 
920 - .077 
- 1.25 
- . 069 
- 1.14 
Test 
Statistics 
AIC 
SBC 
. 579 
683.456 
701.908 
. 571 
677.977 
692.738 
. 573 
680.332 
698.784 
. 574 
678.775 
689.846 
Autocorrelation of residuals 
y2|b 
d. f. 
Prob. 
35.39 
39 
.635 
31. 31 
40 
.836 
30.90 
39 
. 819 
32.51 
41 
.825 
Cross-correlation of residuals 
"d.f. 
Prob. 
50.96 
40 
.115 
50.25 
40 
.128 
52.30 
40 
.092 
51. 26 
40 
.109 
Bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce %^• 
^Significant at 9 5% level. 
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Table 30. ARMA transfer functions showing Illinois time 
series as a function of Washington-Oregon-Idaho 
time series after regular first differences for 
both 
Parameters 
Estimated 
1 2 3 4 
Transfer function parameter 
(numerator and denominator) 
estimates 
Constant 
numerator 
.735 
20.37 
.737 
20.39 * 
. 760 
22.61 * 
.782 
23.40 * 
c
 
1—I ?
 - .067 
- 1.76 
- .062 
- 1.63 
V2,d . 149 
3.44 * 
.151 
3.45 * 
.174 
4.30 * 
. 144 
3.55 * 
vi7,d - .057 
- 1.46 
- .056 
- 1.39 
- . 058 
- 1.47 
& ( B ) ,  co(B), Filter parameter estimates 
^1 . 173 
2.81 * 
.176 
2.91 * 
. 188 
3.11 * 
. 165 
2.81 * 
92 - .040 
- .65 
920 - . 161 
- 2.55 * 
- .159 
- 2.53 * 
- . 149 
- 2.40 * 
- .153 
- 2.53 * 
Test 
Statistics 
AIC 
SBC 
.411 
556.272 
581.765 
.410 
554.695 
576.547 
.412 
555.489 
573.698 
.433 
597.973 
612 . 748 
Autocorrelation 0 f residuals 
y Z b  
d.f. 
Prob. 
25.45 
39 
.954 
25.22 
40 
.967 
24. 54 
40 
.974 
28 .85 
40 
.905 
Cross-correlation of residuals 
Prob. 
29.83 
38 
. 825 
28.94 
38 
. 855 
32.88 
39 
. 744 
34.55 
40 
.714 
Bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce 
*Significant at 9 5% level. 
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Table 31. ARMA transfer functions showing Illinois 
time series as a function of Texas time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Parameters 1 2 3 4 
Estimated 
v(B) p, Transfer function parameter estimates 
V ( B ) ' y (numerator and denominator) 
Constant 
numerator 
.807 
29.07 *a 
.807 
28.89 * 
.796 
30.53 * 29 
.811 
.06 * 
V 2 , d  .113 
3.33 * 
.109 
3.20 * 
. 109 
3.36 * 3 
.112 
.37 * 
V 2 0 , d  - . 048 
- 1.45 
- .049 
- 1.46 - 1 
.052 
. 58 
a(B), w(B), Filter parameter estimates 
^1 .027 
.45 
cp2 .117 .118 .111 
1.92 2 
.121 
.02 * 
920 - . 110 
- 1.75 
- . 108 
- 1.74 
- .114 
- 1.90 
Test 
Statistics 
0  
AIC 
SBC 
.270 
431.93 
453.717 
. 269 
430.126 
448.282 
. 277 
4 6 5 . 5 0 2  
480.277 
431 
445 
. 2 7 0  
.162 
.687 
Autocorrelation of residuals 
yZb 
d. f. 
Prob . 
2 9 . 1 6  
39 
.874-
29.46 
40 
.890 
30. 87 
40 
.850 
31 
41 
.40 
. 860 
Cross-correlation of residuals 
* d . f .  
Prob. 
35.97 
39 
.609 
36.09 
39 
.603 
40.67 
30 
.441 
37 
29 
.45 
. 541 
^t-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce %^• 
^Significant at 95?o level. 
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Table 32. ARMA transfer functions showing Illinois 
time series as a function of Omaha time series 
after regular first differences for both 
Parameters 
Estimated 
1 2 3 4 
VÏBÎ;5 
Transfer function parameter 
(numerator and denominator) 
estimates 
Constant 
numerator 
.824 
33.03 
.855 
34.40 * 
.854 
34.51 * 
.863 
36.92 * 
"^1, n — . 046 
- 1.85 
- .036 
- 1.38 
- .031 
- 1.19 
V2,d . 068 
2.43 * 
.054 
1.96 
.058 
2.10 * 
.069 
2.68 * 
V20,d - .039 
- 1.59 
&(B), c p ( B ) ,  Filter parameter estimates 
•&1 . 185 
2.96 * 
.211 
3.47 * 
. 211 
3.48 * 
. 217 
3.60 * 
92 - .168 
- 2.69 * 
- .132 
- 2.14 * 
- .126 
- 2.06 * 
- .110 
- 1.84 
(P12 - .060 
- 1.00 
Test 
Statistics 
0^ 
A I C  
S B C  
.210 
362.699 
384.486 
. 228 
409.829 
431.992 
. 228 
408.821 
427.289 
. 228 
408.263 
423.038 
Autocorrelation of residuals 
yZb 
d.f. 
Prob. 
32.88 
40 
. 780 
32.36 
39 
. 765 
3 3.10 
40 
. 772 
33.05 
40 
. 774 
Cross-correlation of residuals 
â!f. 
Prob. 
41.80 
38 
. 309 
39.92 
39 
.429 
40.52 
39 
.403 
42.18 
40 
. 377 
Bt-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
^Box-Pierce %^• 
^Significant at 95?o level. 
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Table 33. ARMA transfer functions showing Illinois 
time series as a function of California time 
series after regular first differences for both 
raramecers I Z 
Estimated 
Iransrer function parameter estimates 
(numerator and denominator) 
Constant 
numerator 
.643 
18.10 
.637 
19.00 * 
^1, n - .083 
- 2.31 * 
- .071 
- 2.13 * 
V3,d . 223 
4.29 * 
. 199 
4.03 * 
V20,d - .004 
- .08 
#(b), cp( b), h liter parameter estimates 
»1 .050 
.80 
cp2 - .001 
- .03 
917 - .152 
- 2.44 * 
- . 183 
- 3.10 * 
920 - .157 
- 2.53 * 
- .170 
- 2.88 * 
924 - . 145 
- 2.33 * 
- .109 
- 1.85 
Test Statistics 
0  
AIC 
SBC 
.451 
575.471 
597.259 
.441 
568.986 
590.774 
Autocorrelation or residuals 
yZb 
d. f. 
Prob. 
39.36 
39 
.454 
34.64 
39 
.669 
uross-correiation or resiauais 
" I f .  
Prob. 
28.25 
39 
.899 
29.52 
39 
.864 
®t-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
t'Box-Pierce 
^Significant at 95?• level. 
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Table 3A. ARMA transfer functions showing California time 
series as a function of Washington-Oregon-Idaho 
time series after regular first differences for 
both 
Parameters 
Estimated 
1 2 3 4 
Transfer function parameter 
(numerator and denominator) 
estimates 
Constant 
numerator 
.731 
15.58 
. 772 
18.69 * 
. 735 
15.61 * 
. 736 
16.13 * 
c
 
1—
1 >
 - .079 
- 1.71 
- .078 
- 1.71 
- .076 
- 1.72 
V20,d - . 105 
- 2.00 * 
- . 102 
- 1.93 
- .099 
- 1.88 
- .117 
- 2.37 * 
&(B), cp(B) , Filter parameter estimates 
^1 . 207 3.43 * 
.218 
3.64 * 
.205 
3.40 * 
.152 
2.49 * 
92 . 200 
- 3.43 * 
(P3 - .280 
- 4.73 * 
- .272 
- 4.61 * 
- .277 
- 4.66 * 
- . 258 
- 4.44 * 
923 - .099 
- 1.59 
- .098 
- 1.61 
Test 
Statistics 
AIC 
SBC 
. 698 
697 . 570 
719.357 
.703 
698.511 
716.667 
. 702 
698.133 
716.289 
.677 
6 88.680 
710.468 
Autocorrelation of residuals 
yZb 
d.f. 
Prob. 
41.83 
39 
. 349 
43.95 
39 
.270 
48.40 
40 
.170 
34.66 
39 
. 668 
Cross-correlation of residuals 
*d.f. 
Prob. 
32.15 
39 
. 773 
36.94 
40 
.609 
33.23 
39 
. 730 
32.22 
39 
. 771 
®t-like statistic estimated for each parameter. 
bSox-Pierce %^• 
^Significant at 9 5% level. 
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three periods. This suggests that Lancaster's price series 
is probably dependent on the price series in other areas, 
but it does not affect other price series. 
Texas-Oklahoma (Table 21) was weakly affected by 
price changes in the Washington area. The ARMA parameters 
for the Washington series (Table 20) appear slightly in the 
transfer function (i.e., but no others), while the 
filter from the Texas series (Table 17) remains stronger 
(i.e., •S-2 , cpj which is similar to cp2» and ^^g). There 
were substantial reductions in the variance (from about 1.3 
to about .4) and AIC and SBC statistics (roughly 33?a) from 
the basic ARMA structure (Table 17). Price changes in 
Texas-Oklahoma are probably somewhat dependent on prices in 
the Washington area. 
Umaha seemed to be significantly affected by the Texas 
series (Table 28). The Texas price series increased the 
explained variance by nearly fifty percent more than either 
the California or Washington price series.(Tables 27 and 
29). The univariate ARMA variance was about 1.3, while the 
transfer function with Washington was about .4, with Texas 
about .3, and with California about 5.7. Other statistics 
performed well also. The transfer function with Washington 
retained more of the Washington character in the filter and 
had smaller variance, AIC and SBC statistics (30% lower) 
than did the transfer function with California. This may 
be in part due to the fact that IBP operates large plants 
in Washington and Omaha (and Texas), but not in California. 
Clearly, Omaha is linked with the Texas-Oklahoma area more 
strongly than with the Washington area, and least strongly 
with the California area. 
The transfer function for Illinois (Tables 30-33) was 
also significantly improved by the addition of -the Texas 
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series as well as the Omaha series, with much smaller 
variance (.2 to .4 for transfer functions from 1.1 for the 
univariate ARMA model in Table 12), and AIC and SBC 
criteria (30 to 40 percent lower). Also, the addition of 
the Washington series performed marginally better than the 
California series, particularly with respect to smaller 
variance, AIC, SBC, and significant chi-square value for 
the cross-correlation function. This may indicate that 
price changes in Illinois may not be as sensitive to price 
changes in the California or the Washington areas but are 
more dependent on the price changes in Texas and Omaha. 
The last model shows that California's price series 
seems to be affected by Washington, noting much smaller 
variance (from 1.5 to .7), AIC and SBC criteria (nearly 3096 
less) than for the ARMA time series in Table 19. Califor­
nia prices then, do not seem to be independently determined 
at least on the West Coast. 
Although there are no clear cut market boundaries 
drawn by this analysis, relative degrees of market interac­
tion as well as directions of "causality" can be inferred. 
Clearly, although Lancaster seems to be affected by prices 
from all other places, it is more strongly tied to the 
nearest locations in the upper Midwest. Also, Lancaster 
does not influence any other price series. 
Omaha and Illinois behave nearly identically, as one 
would expect, and are most directly affected by the price 
series from the Texas location. Each is also slightly more 
affected by prices in the Washington area, possibly due to 
the presence of IBP in all three locations. 
California and Washington seem to be closely related. 
However, Washington seems to be more closely tied to the 
Midwest and Texas areas than does California. 
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Mergers between some plants in the Midwest-Texas 
region might be potentially damaging for competition, as 
this area seems to be in the same relevant spatial market. 
Mergers between plants in the Midwest-Texas area and the 
coastal regions (i.e., Washington, California, Lancaster), 
are more difficult to assess. The largest packer in the 
Washington area is also the largest packer in the Midwest-
Texas area. Washington also behaves as if it were in the 
same relevant market area as the Midwest-Texas area 
although less distinctly than other areas. However, 
mergers between plants in Lancaster and California or 
Washington would probably not harm competition, due to 
these weaker links with the Midwest. 
Summary - Part I 
Packers and Stockyards data 
The data available to determine the relevant 
geographic market in any case situation may vary 
substantially in quality and quantity. At a minimum, with 
cattle origin and destination information, trade areas may 
be outlined by plotting geographic purchase areas for each 
plant and firm (Elzinga and Hogarty, 1973). Even more 
simply, interviews with packer buyers can usually provide a 
quick mapping of each firm's trade area for preliminary 
analysis. 
The trade area model cannot identify more indirect 
competition. If market forces are not visible through 
direct transactions, they will not be detected. It is, 
however, a good first approximation to discover where 
competition is probably occurring. The trade areas plotted 
showed three groupings, all connected by a central grouping 
of large plants. However, since the area was restricted to 
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Kansas and the panhandles of Texas and Oklahoma, nothing 
could be said about markets elsewhere. 
Factor analysis may provide a quick and more reliable 
method to delineate the relevant market with simple price 
time series. The variance and correlation properties of 
the price series are used to sort them according to common 
behavior. This method distinguishes between common 
properties giving rise to spurious correlation, and 
correlation arising from more local price behavior. 
Although factor analysis may not distinguish between all 
non-competing regions, it does give more information about 
markets than the trade area model. 
From the factor analysis summarized in Tables 1-4, two 
or three plants from the Packers and Stockyards data are 
identified as behaving differently. Further investigation 
is needed, however, to establish that this difference is 
due to independent price behavior, rather than other 
exogenous factors (e.g., strikes, plant closings, weather, 
etc.). Together with the trade areas, a better preliminary 
description of the market areas can be made. 
Finally, if the volume of trade by source of supply 
and destination can be obtained, along with the date of 
transaction price, the multivariate time series procedure 
may be used. The cross-elasticity model uses more 
information about the relative price and quantity movements 
than any of the other procedures. As a result, more 
information can be obtained. For example, cross-
elasticity parameters may be estimated between regions. 
This shows how sensitive quantity movements can be to 
relative price changes between the regions. The model also 
estimates the appropriate lag (if any) at which regions are 
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related through the cross-correlation function of the 
residuals. 
With this model, one may find a relevant market area 
where plants or areas exhibit significant cross-
elasticities. However, plant price data which doesn't 
clearly distinguish between the dates of the transaction 
and subsequent slaughter, or which deliveries are spot 
priced or forward contracted can create significant 
measurement errors in any price series used. 
In the analysis of the Packers and Stockyards data, 
despite its short-comings, one could tentatively conclude 
that most plants in the midwestern region were competing in 
the same relevant market .area, with two exceptions. These 
two exceptions may either not be directly competing or may 
be spurious results in light of the data set used. 
Livestock Meat Wool News data (LMWN) 
In Tables 7-10, the factors roughly parallel the 
geographic location of the plants, possibly suggesting 
different price behavior as a function of location. Again, 
further testing should be done to insure that the factors 
are detecting independent price behavior. In either case, 
however, more information about the market areas has been 
obtained. 
The price time series model can be used when 
sufficient dated transaction price information for each 
plant location or geographic supply area is available. 
This model basically relies on similarity of price 
movements to identify competitive regions. However, if 
prices are spuriously correlated or related at a lag, it 
may result in a bias in the estimated strength of 
geographic market arbitrage between regions, and fail to 
eliminate some regions as competitors. 
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This short-coming may be overcome for pairs of price 
series by properly filtering the input (or "independent") 
series as outlined by Box and Jenkins. Using the LMWN 
price series, the extent to which each location was 
affected by the price series from other locations could be 
examined using transfer functions. Lancaster was more 
affected by closer locations (e.g., Illinois, Omaha) than 
by distant locations such as California. The Texas-
Oklahoma location seemed to have more impact on all other 
price series than the other locations. The Midwestern 
locations also seemed more affected by the Texas-Oklahoma 
series than the series on either coast. Thus, this 
analysis suggests a strong relevant market in the Texas-
Oklahoma and Midwest areas, with the Texas location having 
more of an impact on prices in other areas than any other 
location. 
In conclusion, there are several approaches which can 
be used to determine the relevant geographic procurement 
market in case situations, each with varying strengths and 
weaknesses. The appropriate one to use in each case will 
be heavily influenced by the nature and quantity of the 
data, the time and resources available for the analysis, 
and the specific case situation and its complexity. In 
some cases where the detailed data are not adequate for the 
most complex models, combinations of the methods with less 
stringent data requirements may provide enough information 
on firm or plant relationships to make a reasonably well 
informed judgement on the appropriate relevant market. 
From the examples used, the Midwest-Texas region seems 
to constitute a relevant market area, with additional but 
weaker ties to the coastal regions. In particular, 
California seemed to exhibit somewhat independent price 
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behavior, while Washington was much more tied to Omaha and 
Texas. Lancaster prices seemed dependent on the Midwest 
prices, but was never used to determine prices at any other 
location. 
Implications for Future Studies 
1. Packer trade areas are easily plotted from lot origin 
data. New plants may be compared with plants in the old 
data sets. This quick preliminary look would tell who was 
directly competing, the relative size of each plant, and 
who would be probable indirect competitors. 
2. If some price information is available, a factor 
analysis can be run to give an idea as to which plants or 
locations are behaving "differently". With this 
information, hypotheses about the structure of the market 
may then be formulated more efficiently. 
3. With additional price information (i.e., 30 or more 
consecutive observations from several areas or plants), the 
transfer function procedure may be used. Although this 
test will not positively establish the competitive area, it 
will show relative strength of price dependence between all 
areas. 
4. Finally, cross-elasticity coefficients could be 
constructed between the competing plants or areas. These 
coefficients will indicate how the market share of one 
plant or region is affected by changes in price at the 
other plant or region. The appropriate market area then is 
delineated according to the relative significance and sign 
of the elasticity measure. 
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PART II: THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BEEF INDUSTRY 
The exodus of cattle from the upper midwest region, 
particularly Iowa, has been a topic of great concern in the 
central states. As the cattle numbers dwindle in Iowa, 
(although recent numbers show a slight turnaround), the 
beef packers have been closing their doors, resulting in 
even fewer market outlets for the Iowa cattle feeder. 
Producers are concerned about the lack of competition for 
their cattle, possibly resulting in lower overall prices 
for their product. The surviving packers have become 
bigger and more specialized. Smaller packers are concerned 
that they too are at a competitive disadvantage to the 
large packers. All market participants (i.e., producers, 
packers, merchandisers, etc.) must understand the 
underlying competitive organization of this industry to 
determine their most appropriate short and long term 
marketing and investment strategies. 
The objectives in this second part of the dissertation 
are to assess the beef industry's changing market 
structure, and to evaluate the competitive linkages and 
performance of the industry. The structure of the industry 
is described by estimating current levels of concentration, 
both in terms of capacity and shares of fed cattle 
procured. Also, the extent of capacity usage, existence of 
barriers-to-entry, pricing behavior, and merger activity 
are assessed to give a more accurate picture of the 
structure and conduct of the beef industry. Overall 
performance of the industry is then assessed, based on 
information drawn from industry financial reports, FTC Line 
of Business reports, as well as other public documents. 
The primary information assembled and analyzed in the 
following sections is* drawn from secondary data sources 
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(government and industry publications), prior publications, 
extensive case materials from the Monfort v. EXCEL case, 
and a survey of the eight largest beef packers. 
Additional information was obtained from news releases and 
follow-up calls to industry observers. 
Relevant Market 
Before one can analyze the competitive structure of an 
industry, the appropriate market must be defined for either 
input and/or output products, each in terms of specific 
product and location. important markets for the beef 
packer will include both tiie procurement market for its 
input (fed cattle) as well as the product market for the 
output (beef). 
The most important input "product" market for packers 
was defined to be fed cattle in the previous section. From 
production to processing, fed cattle and other cattle 
(i.e., grass-fed cattle, cows, bulls, etc.) are poor 
substitutes. Fed steers and heifers have been roughly 70 
percent of total cattle marketings since 1978 (see Table 
35). The cow and bull market has also been stable. Most 
industry sources indicated that their facilities were set 
up for a particular kind of cattle. For example, a 
slaughter plant might be designed to slaughter steers and 
heifers which fall into certain weight (and height) ranges. 
Other plants might be set up for Holstein cows. Rarely is 
one plant ready to accommodate both. 
Also, the packer is usually looking for a certain type 
of carcass, usually one that will be likely to fit the 
fabrication requirements for its primary customers. Fed 
cattle usually are fabricated into boxed beef products 
suitable for retail and food service customers, while non-
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Table 35. Composition of Commercial Cattle Slaughter 
1965-1984 (In thousand head)^ 
Steers & Heifers 
Year Fed Nonfed Cows Bulls/Staqs Total 
1965 18 851 4 920 8 074 502 32 347 
1966 20 551 5 101 7 556 519 33 737 
1967 21 847 4 796 6 757 469 33 869 
1968 23 668 3 972 6 843 543 35 026 
1969 24 911 2 824 6 920 582 35 237 
1970 25 725 2 606 6 116 578 35 025 
1971 . 26 127 2 450 6 375 633 35 585 
1972 27 728 1 414 5 992 645 35 779 
1973 26 083 680 6 248 676 33 687 
1974 23 994 4 484 7 514 820 36 812 
1975 21 260 6 997 11 557 1,097 40 991 
1976 25 125 5 912 10 619 998 42 654 
1977 25 969 5 120 9 864 903 41 856 
1978 27 850 2 434 8 470 798 39 552 
1979 25 566 1 553 5 930 629 33 678 
1980 24 004 2 745 6 334 724 33 807 
1981 23 818 3 717 6 643 775 34 953 
1982 24 902 2 769 7 354 818 35 843 
1983 25 752 2 492 7 597 808 36 649 
1984 25 741 2 431 8 621 789 37 582 
Percent of Total 
Steers & Heifers 
Year Fed Nonfed Cows Bulls/Staqs Total 
1965 58.2 15.2 25.0 1.6 32 347 
1966 60.9 15.1 22.4 1. 5 33 737 
1967 64.5 14. 2 20.0 1.4 33 869 
1968 6 7.6 11.3 19.5 1.6 3 5 026 
1969 70.7 8.0 19.6 1. 6 35 237 
1970 73.5 7.4 17.5 1.6 35 025 
1971 73.4 6.9 17.9 1.8 35 585 
1972 77.5 4.0 16.7 1. 8 3 5 779 
1973 77.5 2.0 18.5 2.0 33 687 
1974 65.2 12.2 20.4 2.2 36 812 
1975 52.0 17.1 28.2 2.7 40 991 
1976 58.9 13.9 24.9 2.3 42 654 
1977 62.0 12.2 23.6 2.2 41 856 
1978 70.4 6.2 21.4 2.0 39 552 
1979 75.9 4.6 17,6 1.9 33 678 
1980 71.0 8.1 18.7 2.2 3 3 807 
1981 68.2 10.6 19.0 2.2 34 953 
1982 69.5 7.7 20.5 2.3 35 843 
1983 70.3 6.8 20.7 2.2 36 649 
1984 68.5 6.5 22.9 2.1 37 582 
BAMI, Meat facts, 1985 Edition. 
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fed cattle are primarily used for grinding (hamburger-type 
products) or further processing (e.g., canned products 
containing beef, etc.) (Quail et al., 1986, p. 2). 
The focus of this study was the group of packers 
buying primarily fed cattle. These packers are the primary 
producers of boxed beef serving the "table-cut" market 
(e.g., steaks, roasts, and some hamburger) in retail and 
food service outlets. Those packers slaughtering primarily 
cows, bulls, and grass-fed cattle suitable for "processing 
beef" were determined to be a much smaller segment of the 
market with little competitive interplay with those packers 
slaughtering and processing fed cattle. 
In Part I of this dissertation, the focus was on the 
statistical problems in defining the location of the input 
market (i.e., fed cattle). Other studies, most notably 
Williams' study (reported in Committee on Small Business, 
1979) use packer trade areas in identifying a geographic 
market for fed cattle, with the primary focus on the 
subsequent structure analysis. Using these trade areas 
without analyzing broader competitive interactions can lead 
to serious under-estimation of the actual market for a 
given product. 
It is important not to over- or underestimate these 
input market regions. For example, defining an arbitrarily 
small region (i.e., four county area) will very likely 
cause concentration figures to be much higher than for a 
larger region. On the other hand, an arbitrarily large 
region may dilute concentration figures by including non-
competing firms. 
The results from Part I of this study suggest that 
locations in the nation's midsection behave as one 
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geographic market for fed cattle. Locations on either 
coast behave as different markets. 
The major output "product" market is boxed beef. The 
popularity of boxed beef today is substantial. In 1960, 
virtually no beef was fabricated or "boxed", but was sold 
in carcass form to other retailers or processors who did 
the further fabrication. In 1982, about 58?o of all steer 
and heifer carcasses were boxed (Nelson, 1984, p. 14). The 
percentage will probably continue to increase over the next 
few years, as more wholesalers and retailers come to rely 
on the boxed product. Packers generally agree that the 
output "geographic" market is national, since 
transportation and refrigeration technologies are very 
good. 
In Part II of this study, the focus of the analysis 
will be on the competitive interactions between packers and 
processors of fed cattle located primarily in the nation's 
midsection and their pricing and coordination linkages to 
their suppliers and customers. 
Structure 
Location and number of plants 
After World War II, most packers were located near 
the terminal markets in major metropolitan areas. Cattle, 
increasingly fed grains, were shipped long distances to 
cities for slaughter. Carcass beef was then sold to retail 
or wholesale distributors. Since refrigeration and 
transportation were relatively poor, the slaughter activity 
had to take place closer to its final destination (e.g., 
Kansas City, Chicago, Cincinnati) to minimize spoilage. 
In the last twenty years widespread irrigation of 
feed grains in western Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, 
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and eastern Colorado has given rise to phenomenal growth in 
cattle feeding in those areas. As cattle feeding developed 
in these regions, packers were faced with the decision to 
either build facilities in the same areas or pay increasing 
transportation costs. 
With improvements in transportation as well as 
refrigerated semi-trailer trucks, there was less need to 
locate packing plants near the product destination. The 
greater flexibility of the highway system over the railroad 
made it possible for packers to ship product from slaughter 
facilities located near the feedlots. Modern beef packers 
typically locate close to the source of their raw materials 
since it is a "weight-losing" production process (i.e., it 
is cheaper to process the product close to its origin, then 
transport the "lighter" product to distant markets). 
The packers also began to negotiate directly with 
the farmer or the feedlot, rather than purchasing through 
urban terminal markets. Currently, about 19.9% of fed 
cattle are sold through auction and terminal markets. This 
is down from 34.7% in 1970.(P&5A Resume, 1985, p. 13). 
Cattle feeding has declined in the traditional feed 
grain states (i.e., Iowa, Illinois, etc.). With this 
decline, a parallel decline in packer numbers occurred, 
particularly in the upper Midwest. Nationally, the most 
dramatic decrease has been among plants with annual 
capacities less than 50,000 head. The number of plants 
with greater capacities declined as well, but not nearly as 
fast. These plants (i.e., greater than 50,000 head annual 
capacity) increased their share of commercial beef 
slaughter from 73? o  (211 plants) in 1975 to 81.8% (135 
plants) in 1983 (AMI, 1986b, p. 15). The exception to this 
trend has been the very largest plant category, where 
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increases in plant numbers have occurred, particularly in 
Texas, Kansas, and Nebraska. 
In Iowa, the number of packing plants reporting 
steer and heifer slaughter fell from 20 in 1972 to 10 in 
1982 (Helmuth, 1984). Since 1982, large plants in Fort 
Dodge, Spencer, Oakland, Estherville, and Dubuque have 
closed. This leaves very few market outlets for fed cattle 
in Iowa. 
All states reporting steer and heifer slaughter 
between 1972 and 1982 had declines in the total number of 
slaughtering plants (see Table 36). The Southwest (i.e., 
Kansas, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Texas) lost 73% of plants 
(97 total) with less than 200,000 head capacity. The same 
region reported a net gain of 43% (5 plants total) with 
larger capacity. This is in contrast to the upper Midwest 
area (i.e., Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
South Dakota, and Wisconsin). This region lost 62 plants 
(or 48% of plants with less than 200,000 head) and gained 
only 1 larger capacity plant. The trend away from smaller 
plants and toward larger plants is more marked in the 
Southwestern states than the upper Midwest. 
Slaughter capacity 
Total capacity available (i..e., from plants with 
50,000 head or better capacity) was estimated for the U.S. 
for the area approximating the relevant market defined in 
part one of this dissertation and for both the upper 
Midwest and Southwest regions (see Figure 6 and Tables 37-
40). These estimates were compiled from court documents, 
industry surveys, and unpublished USDA sources. Figure 6 
shows the locations of the plants in operation in 1985 with 
estimates of plant capacity in 1984. Many of the small 
plants, particularly in California, Washington, Ohio, 
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Table 36. Steer and heifer slaughter plants by capacity 
available in the Upper Midwest and Soutnwest® 
Upper Midwestern States 
Plant over 50 ,000 _ under Plant 
Capacity 200,000 199 ,999 50, 000 total 
Year 72 82 85 72 82 85 72 82 72 82 
Iowa 10 8 3 9 1 1 8 4 27 13 
Illinois 0 1 1 6 4 4 21 11 27 16 
Minnesota 1 1 1 6 2 2 8 5 15 8 
Nebraska 7 8 8 11 8 8 20 8 38 24 
S. Dakota 0 1 1 2 0 0 5 5 7 6 
Wisconsin 0 1 1 2 0 1 9 6 11 9 
Total 18 20 15 36 15 16 71 39 125 76 
Southwestern States 
Plant over 50, 000- under Plant 
Capacity 200, 000 199, 999 50,000 total 
Year 72 82 85 72 82 85 72 82 72 82 
Colorado 5 5 5 5 0 0 10 4 20 9 
Kansas 3 5 7 6 2 0 18 6 27 13 
Oklahoma 1 1 1 1 0 0 24 13 26 14 
Texas 2 5 5 12 9 5 57 32 71 46 
Total 11 16 18 24 11 5 109 55 144 82 
^Packers and Stockyards Administration, USDA, 1985. 
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1985 Steer S Heifer Slaughter Plants 
(50,000+ head] based on 1984 capacity estimates 
National 
18 
19 
39 
Greater 
Iowa 
7 
9 
14 
Annual Kill 
Capacities 
V 500,000 and above 
• 200,000 - 499,000 
O 50,000 - 199,000 
Figura 6. 19B5 Steer.an^ 
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Table 37. 1985 Estimated slaughter capacities For 55 U.S. 
plants with annual slaughter capacity greater 
than 50,000 head* 
F irm Location Annual 
capacity share of 
IbP , Inc . Kinney Lo . , PCS" 
Amarillo, TX 
Dakota City, NE 
Emporia, Kb 
Geneseo, IL 
Pasco, WA 
West Point, NE 
Dennison, IA 
Luverne, MN 
Boise, ID 
TOTAL 
1,30U 
1,300 
1,000 
800 
800 
500 
500 
400 
400 
400 
7,400 18.63 
350 
800 
650 
200 
675 
1,150 
300 
400 
600 
600 . 
5,115 14.41 
1,100 
900 
750 
200 
700 
400 
400 
4,45U 11 . 20 
750 1.89 
500 
200 
/UU 1.76 
300 
50 
35U . 88 
350 .88 
300 .76 
270 . 68 
ConAgra 
Monrort of Colorado, Inc. 
Omaha, NE 
i ai' 
NE 
lA 
Grand Island, 
Greeley, CO 
E.A. Miller & Sons Packing Co 
Hyrum, UT 
Valley View Holdings 
SlPCO Des Moines, 
Dumas, TX 
Guymon, OK 
Hereford, TX 
Val-Agri, Inc. 
Amarillo. T x  
Garden City, KS 
TOTAL 
EXCEL Corporation 
Dodge City, KS 
Friona, TX 
Plainview, TX 
Cozad, NE 
E.A. Miller & Sons Packing Co. 
Schuyler, NE 
Sterling Colorado Beef Company 
Sterling, CO 
Ft Morgan, CO 
National Beef Packing Co, 
Liberal, KS 
Dubuque Packing Company 
LeMars, IA 
Mankato, KS 
TOTAL 
Packerland Packing Co. Inc. 
Green Bay, WI 
Hospers, IA 
TOTAL 
Hyplains Dressed Beef, Inc. 
Dodge City, KS 
Litvak Meat Company 
Denver, CO 
Pepper Packing Company 
Denver, CO 
TOTAL 
^Source: Industry estimates from interviews. 
107 
Table 37. (continued) 
Firm Location 
Annual 
capacité 
(in 000s 
share of 
capacity 
John Morrell & Co. 
Sioux Falls, SD 
Mover Packing 
Souderton, PA 
Duqdale of Nebraska, Inc. 
Norfolk, NE 
Sun Land Beef Packing 
Tolleson, AZ 
Tama Meat Packing Corp. 
Tama, IA 
Cornland Dressed Beef Co. 
Lexington, NÉ 
Beatrice Foods Co, 
Elburn, IL 
Beef Nebraska 
Omaha, NE 
Kenosha Packing Co. Inc. 
Hebron, IL 
Aurora Packing Co. Inc. 
North Aurora, IL 
Booker Custom Packing Co. Inc. 
Booker, TX 
Caldwell Packing Co. Inc. 
Windom, MN 
Gooch Packing Company, Inc. 
Abilene, TX 
Greater Omaha Packing Co. 
Omaha, NE 
Green Bay Dressed Beef Inc. 
Green Bay, WI 
Landy Packing Co. 
St. Cloud. MN 
Lincoln Meat Co. Inc. 
Chicago, IL 
Minden Beef Company 
Minden, NE 
Omaha Dressed Beef Co. Inc. 
Omaha, NE 
Union Packing Co. of Omaha Inc 
Omaha, NE 
55 plant TOTAL^ 
391 plant Total^ 
250 
250 
200 
200 
200 
150 
125 
125 
125 
100 
100 
100  
100  
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
50 
50 
22,920 
39,720 
.63 
.63 
.50 
.50 
. 50 
. 38 
.31 
. 31 
. 31 
. 25 
.25 
. 25 
.25 
.25 
. 25 
.25 
.25 
.25 
.13 
.13 
57.70 
^Hyrum, UT (E.A. Miller), Boise/Pasco (IBP), 
Souderton, PA (Moyer) and Tolleson, AZ (Sun Land) plants 
included here but not in the relevant market or regional 
capacity tables. 
^In 1985, 391 plants reported slaughtering steers and 
heifers to Packers and Stockyards Administration. They 
must report if they purchased over $500,000 in livestock 
for the year. This is roughly a threshold capacity of 
50,000 head per year. Industry capacity, then, is roughly 
39,720 (55 plant total + 336 plants at 50,000 each). 
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Table 38. 1985 Estimated slaughter capacities for 50 
central U.S. plants in the relevant market 
area with annual slaughter capacity greater 
than 50,000 heacja ° 
Firm Location 
Inc. Finney Co. , 
rillo, TX 
n44- w  Mr 
Annual 
capacity 
(in OOOsI 
share of 
capacity 
IBP,  
Ama
Dakota City, NE 
Emporia, KS 
Geneseo, IL 
West Point, NE 
Dennison, IA 
Luv/erne, MN 
TOTAL 
KS 
ConAgra Omaha, NE 
Mon fort o.f Colorado, Inc. 
Grand Island, NE 
Greeley, CO 
Valley View Holdings 
SIPCO Des Moines, IA 
Dumas, TX 
Guymon, OK 
Hereford, TX 
Val-Agri, Inc. 
Amarillo, TX 
Garden City, KS 
TOTAL 
EXCEL Corporation 
Dodge City, KS 
F riona, TX 
Plainview), TX 
Cozad, NE 
E.A. Miller & Sons Packing Co. 
Schuyler, NE 
Sterling Colorado Beef Company 
Sterling, CO 
Ft Morgan, CO 
TOTAL 
National Beef Packing Co. 
Liberal, KS 
Dubuque Packing Company 
1,300 
1 300 
1  0 0 0  
800 
800 
500 
400 
400 
6, 5UU 
350 
800 
650 
675 
1,150 
300 
400 
600 
6 0 0  
5,525 
1 , 1 0 0  
900 
750 
2 0 0  
700 
400 
400 
4,450 
lar s , IA 
Mankato, KS 
TOTAL 
750 
500 
2 0 0  
TUU 
Packerland Packing Co. Inc. 
Green Bay, WI 
Hospers, lA 
TOTAL 
300 
50 
•75tr 
24.74 
21.03 
16.94 
2.85 
2 . 6 6  
1.33 
^Source: Industry estimates from interviews. 
^The relevant market area was defined in part one of 
this dissertation to be the central portion of the U.S. 
excluding the coastal regions. 
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Table 38. continued 
Annual 
capacité 
(in 000s 
Firm Location share of 
capacity 
John Morrell & Co. 
Sioux Falls, SD 
Duqdale of Nebraska, Inc. 
Norfolk, NE 
Tama Meat Packing Corp. 
Tama, IA 
Cornland Dressed Beef Co. 
Lexington, NE 
Beatrice Foods Co. 
Elburn, IL 
Beef Nebraska 
Omaha, NE 
Kenosha Packing Co. Inc. 
Hebron, IL 
Aurora Packing Co. Inc. 
North Aurora, IL 
Booker Custom Packing Co. Inc. 
Booker, TX 
Caldwell Packing Co. Inc. 
Windom, MN 
Gooch Packing Company, Inc. 
Abilene, TX 
Greater Omaha Packing Co. 
Omaha, NE 
Green Bay Dressed Beef Inc. 
Green Bay, WI 
Landy Packing Co. 
St. Cloud, MN 
Lincoln Meat Co. Inc. 
Chicago, IL 
Minden Beef Company 
Minden, NE 
Omaha Dressed Beef Co. Inc. 
Omaha, NE 
Union Packing Co. of Omaha Inc 
Omaha, NE 
50 plant TOTAL 
150 plant Totaic 
250 
200 
200 
150 
125 
125 
125 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
50 
50 
21,370 
26, 370 
.95 
.76 
.76 
.57 
.48 
.48 
.48 
. 38 
. 38 
. 38 
. 38 
.38 
. 38 
. 38 
; 38 
. 38 
. 19 
.19 
81. 35 
cIn 1983. 100 plants with less than 50,000 capacity 
were in operation in this area, for a maximum additional 
capacity of 4,900,000. If all of these plants were in 
operation in 1985, then a generous estimate of area 
capacity is 26,3 70,000 (53 plant total + 98 plants at 
50,000 each). 
110 
Table 39. 1985 Estimated slaughter capacities for 29 
plants in the upper Midwest region with annual 
slaughter capacity greater than 50,000 head^ 
Firm Location 
IBH, inc. 
Geneseo, IL 
West Point, NE 
Dennison, lA 
Luverne, MM 
TOTAL 
Annual 
capacit> 
(in 000s: 
Dakota Lity, inL 1 ,  uuu  
800 
500 
400 
400 
3,1UU 
350 
regional 
share of 
capacity 
ConAgra Omaha, NE 
Valley View Holdings SIPCO Des noines, IA 675 TOTAL 1,U25 
EXCEL Corporation E.A. Miller & Sons Packing Co. 
Schuyler, NE 700 TOTAL —TTrtr 
Dubuque Packing Company 
LeMars,IA 500 
Packerland Packing Co. Inc. 
Green Bay, WI 300 
Hospers, IA 50 TOTAL —73TJ 
John Morrell & Co. 
Sioux Falls, SD 
Dugdale of Nebraska, Inc. 
Norfolk, NE 
Jama Meat Packing Corp. 
Tama, IA 
Cornland Dressed Beef Co. 
Lexington, NE 
Beatrice Foods Co. 
Elburn, IL 
Beef Nebraska 
Omaha, NE 
Kenosha Packing Co. Inc. 
Hebron, IL 
Aurora Packing Co. Inc. 
North Aurora, IL 
Caldwell Packing Co. Inc. 
Windom, MN 
Greater Omaha Packing Co. 
Omaha, NE 
Green Bay Dressed Beef Inc, 
Green Bay, WI 
Landy Packing Co. 
St. Cloud, MN 
250 
200 
200 
150 
125 
125 
125 
1 0 0  
100  
1 0 0  
100  
1 0 0  
31.00 
10.25 
7.00 
5.00 
3.50 
2.50 
2 . 0 0  
2 . 0 0  
1. 50 
1.25 
1.25 
1.25 
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 .  0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
^Source; Industry estimates from interviews. 
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Table 39. continued 
Annual regional 
share of 
capacity 
Firm Location 
(in 000s 
Lincoln Meat Co. Inc. 
Chicago, IL 
Minden Beef Company 
Minden, NE 
Omaha Dressed Beef Co. Inc. 
Omaha, NE 
Union Packing Co. of Omaha Inc 
Chicago, IL 
27 Plant Total 
74 Plant Area Total^ 
100 
100 
50 
50 
7,650 
10,000 
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
. 50 
.50 
76.5 ? 
^In 1983. 47 plants with less than 50,000 capacity 
were in operation in this area, for a maximum additional 
capacity of 2,350,000. If all of these plants were in 
operation in 1985, then a generous estimate of area 
capacity is 10,000,000. 
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Table 40. 1985 Estimated slaughter capacities for 23 
plants in the Southwest region with annual 
slaughter capacity greater than 50,000 head^ 
Firm Location 
Annual 
,capacity 
(in OOOsO 
share of 
capacity 
ConAgra 
Monfort of Colorado, Inc. 
Grand Island, NE 
Greeley, CO 
Valley View Holdings 
Dumas, TX 
Guymon, OK 
Hereford, TX 
Amarillo; TX 
Garden City, KS 
TOTAL 
EXCEL Corporation 
Dodge City, KS 
Friona, TX 
Plainuiew, TX 
Cozad, NE 
Sterling Colorado Beef Company 
Sterling, CO 
Ft Morgan, CO 
TOTAL 
IBP, Inc. 
Amarillo, TX 
Emporia, KS 
TOTAL 
Finney Co., KS 
National Beef Packing Company 
Liberal, KS 
Hyplains Dressed Beef, Inc. 
Dodge City, KS 
LitvaR Meat Company 
Denver, CO 
Pepper Packing Company 
Denver, CO 
Dubuque Packing Company 
Mankato, KS 
Booker Custom Packing Co. Inc. 
Booker , TX 
Gooch Packing Company, Inc. 
Abilene, TX 
23 Plant Total 
76 Plant Area Total^ 
800 
650 
400 
600 
600 
4,5UU 
1 , 1 0 0  
900 
750 
200 
400 
400 
750 
350 
300 
270 
200 
1 0 0  
1 0 0  
13,720 
16,370 
27.49 
J7T5TT 22.91 
1,300 
1,300 
800 
3,4UU 20.77 
4. 58 
2. 14 
1.83 
1 .65 
1.22 
.  6 1  
. 6 1  
84.0 ?, 
^Source: Industry estimates from interviews 
^In 1983, 53 plants with less than 50,000 capacity were 
in operation in this area, for a maximum additional 
capacity of 2,650,000. If all of these plants were in 
operation in 1985, then a generous estimate of area 
capacity is 16,370,000. 
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Pennsylvania, Florida, Alabama, and the coastal region of 
Texas were not included in Tables 37-40. Table 37 includes 
two plants which were not mapped in Figure 6 (Schuyler, NE 
in the top size class, Hereford, TX in the middle size 
class) but were brought back into operation late in 1985. 
Tables 38-40 show capacity concentration estimates based on 
three different relevant market definitions. Table 38 
reflects those plants in the Central U.S., the relevant 
market defined in the first part of this dissertation. 
Tables 39 and 40 include plants in the upper Midwest and 
Southwestern regional markets frequently suggested by some 
industry sources (i.e., cattle producers, some packers) to 
be relevant market areas. 
The plants (listed in Table 38) in the Central U.S. 
contain roughly 66% of the total estimated capacity in the 
U.S. Most plants outside this region are very small. The 
concentration of capacity is higher in this relevant market 
than nationally. The four-firm concentration ratio of 
capacity in the Central U.S. market is 65.6% while the 
national ratio is 46.1%. 
It is interesting to look at regional differences in 
structure, even though the two regions behave 
statistically as one market. Total capacity available in 
the Southwest is roughly 60% greater than the capacity in 
the upper Midwest region. 
The largest packer is also one of three multi-plant 
firms to have plants located in both regions.IB IBP, Inc. 
has roughly 19% of national capacity and 25% of capacity in 
IByhe other firms are ConAgra, which purchased Val-
Agri and in turn, Swift Independent, and EXCEL which has 
repurchased Spencer Beef from E. A. Miller & Sons after,a 
recent Supreme Court decision reversed the lower courts' 
decision to bar the merger. 
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the Central U.S. market.Regionally, it has 20% of 
estimated capacity in the Southwest and 31% of estimated 
capacity in the upper Midwest region. 
Until the merger activity of the first few months of 
1987, IBP was clearly the largest packer nationally and 
regionally. With EXCEL's purchase of the Spencer Beef 
plants as well as its recent acquisition of the Sterling 
plants, it was briefly the largest capacity packer in the 
Southwest. With acquisitions in the first half of 1987, 
however, ConAgra, a leading poultry and pork processor, 
became the number two beef packer in the national and 
Central U.S. markets, and the leading beef packer in the 
Southwest region. If the acquisitions pass Justice 
Department's scrutiny, ConAgra will be the first packer to 
seriously threaten IBP's dominance in beef packing. 
The four firm concentration of capacity, nationally, 
is about 46%. For the relevant market area, the four firm 
concentration of capacity is 65.6%. In the upper Midwest, 
the four firm concentration figure is about 53%. The 
comparable four-firm capacity for the Southwest, however, 
is about 76%. The top three firms in the Southwest are 
closer in terms of regional plant capacity than in the 
upper Midwest. As these firms become larger they also tend 
to acquire plants (or other firms with plants) in the 
Midwest region. 
If small packers (i.e., reporting to P&SA, $500,000 in 
purchases) were included in Table 37 and were assumed to 
have a maximum 50,000 head capacity, then total U.S. 
capacity would have been over 39 million head in 1985. 
^^Small plants included in the total capacity figure 
but not listed specifically are assumed to be 50,000 head 
capacity, even though they are probably smaller than that. 
This overstates total capacity and understates share of 
total capaci ty. 
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Total steer and heifer slaughter in 1985 was 27,023,000 
head or 68% of estimated national capacity (P&SA Resume, 
1985, Table 5). This might ordinarily suggest that the 
industry has a lot of unutilized capacity which would 
represent a potential deterrent to entry. 
Total steer and heifer slaughter for the relevant 
market area was 22,278,000 (P&SA Resume, 1985). Capacity 
for the relevant market would have been over 26 million if 
small packers are figured into the total as in Table 37. 
Percent utilization of capacity for the Central U.S. is 
84.5% which is higher than nationally or in other areas. 
Total steer and heifer slaughter in the Midwestern 
states was 8,906,000 and in the Southwestern states was 
13,372,000 (P&SA Resume, 1985). These represent 89.1% and 
81.7% of capacity for the respective areas. Each area 
utilizes capacity to a greater or lesser extent than the 
Central U.S. 
Since the two areas are in the midst of the highest 
production region nationally, one might expect utilization 
to be higher. If the capacity figures are correct, over­
capacity is less pronounced in the Midwest where plant 
sizes are typically smaller than in the Southwest. This 
may reflect the rapid expansion of capacity in the 
Southwest, where some plants may not have been fully 
utilized during the year. Also, one should keep in mind 
that some plants in the Midwest have been closed and could 
be brought back into production quickly, but have not been 
included in the capacity figures. 
Concentration 
The national share of total steers and heifers 
slaughtered by the top four firms increased from 2 9% in 
1972 to 50.6% in 1983. The next largest four had an 
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additional 12% of the market in 1983 and the next four 
firms (9th - 12th) had almost a 7% share (AMI, 1984b). 
This roughly parallels the capacity concentration figures 
from Table 37. Since the largest four, eight and 12 firms 
do not have disproportionately larger market shares of 
steer and heifer slaughter than share of capacity, these 
firms must be utilizing capacity approximately the same as 
smaller firms in the market. 
The total number of packers boxing beef is much 
smaller than the total number of packers slaughtering 
steers and heifers. Nearly all packer-boxed beef is 
produced by the top twenty slaughter firms. The share of 
packer-boxed beef production by the top four slaughtering 
firms in 1982 was 64.8%.20 These firms boxed over 80% of 
their total slaughter, selling the rest in carcass form. 
The smaller packers fabricated much less of their total 
slaughter (Helmuth, 1984). 
Most of these packers also bought carcasses from other 
packers for fabrication. The top four packers bought about 
6% of total boxing needs, while the smaller packers bought 
as much as 50?o of their needs (Marion, 1986, p. 6). Often, 
traded carcasses are either too heavy or light, or the 
Yield grade 4 or grade 5 carcasses that major packers don't 
want to fabricate. This may reflect a tendency for 
specialty processing on the part of smaller packers where 
they either specialize in the areas that big packers aren't 
interested in, or serve a very narrow range of customers 
with unique needs. For example, within 50 miles of large 
IBP and Ual-Agri plants in Southwestern Kansas, there are 
viable operations (i.e., National Beef (Liberal, KS), 
ZOBoxed beef from all sources accounts for 58% of 
steer and heifer slaughter. 
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Hyplains Dressed Beef (Dodge City, KS)) purchasing cattle 
and selling boxed beef products every day of the work week. 
These plants tend to market either specialty items (e.g., 
providing Prime cuts as a boxed beef product) or cater to 
buyers who are too small to deal in the carlot quantities 
that the largest packers prefer. 
While the market concentration has increased, there 
has been a significant change in the identities of the 
largest beef packers over the last thirty years. The 
largest packer, IBP, was a new entrant in 1960. Its 
closest rival for many years, EXCEL, a subsidiary of 
Cargill, was even newer. In the first half of 1987, a new 
entrant to the beef packing industry, ConAgra, has 
catapulted to the number two spot. Its acquisitions 
include Mon fort, the Hyrum, Utah operations of E.A. Miller, 
and Valley View Holdings, the last being less than five 
years in the business. In fact, of the pre-World War II 
Big Four (i.e., Swift, Cudahy, Armour, Wilson), the only 
firm to be consistently among the top four beef packers 
since the 1940s has been Swift.21 But Swift (now SIPCO) 
was recently purchased by Ual-Agri, now owned by ConAgra. 
Sheer size has not guaranteed longevity in the beef 
packing industry. The turnover among the top firms has 
been rapid in the last five, ten, or even twenty years. 
Although IBP has been the clear leader for most of the last 
twenty-five years, even that dominance is threatened (or 
perhaps shared) by a relative newcomer to the beef 
business. 
Z^After going through bankruptcy and selling a number 
of plants, Wilson is no longer among the top meat packers. 
Much of Armour has been purchased by ConAgra, and Cudahy 
has not been among the top ten for several years (P&SA 
Resume, 1985). 
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Vertical integration 
The trend over the past few years has been for larger 
plants to account for increasing shares of the fed cattle 
slaughter. IBP was the primary developer and marketer for 
boxed beef for a few years, followed into that market by 
many large competitors. The largest plants have fully 
integrated slaughter and boxing operations. Somewhat 
smaller integrated packers often must purchase carcasses in 
order to meet their boxing requirements. The majority of 
small slaughtering plants have no fabrication facility. 
Beef packing has been evolving toward larger, more 
specialized plants. Smaller, presumably less efficient 
plants are replaced or pushed out by the larger, more 
modern plants. Often, the newer, large plants also have 
lower labor costs (including wages, fringe benefits, etc.). 
Because of their size» they can also take advantage of 
other economies of size. For example, the largest packers 
(IBP, EXCEL) have their own distribution network, and do 
not have to rely on wholesalers to move their product. 
They may also have part of their transportation needs met 
by their own truck line. 
While most large packers have integrated slaughter 
operations with fabrication, very few packers own feedlots 
or custom feed cattle.22 Cargill, a large agricultural 
products firm, owns both EXCEL (number two beef packer) and 
Caprock (largest feedlot) but operates both as independent 
profit centers which are not in close proximity 
geographically. Both Monfort of Colorado and E.A. Miller 
own feedlots in conjunction with their packing 
Z^Less than 6 %  of commercial slaughter is custom fed 
by packers. 
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o p e r a t i o n s .23 These feedlots constitute a large percentage 
of the kill at the Greeley plant (Monfort) as well as the 
Hyrum plant (Miller). IBP attempted a joint contractual 
venture with Northwest Feeders for its Washington-Idaho 
plants, to insure a ready supply for its operations. The 
arrangement was unsuccessfully challenged in court. Only a 
few years later the venture was abandoned, perhaps because 
it was unnecessary since IBP had established itself as 
virtually the only beef packer in the area, and cattle 
feeding often was unprofitable during the joint venture 
period. 
Vertical integration will give the packer more of the 
gross margin between producer and retailer. This will be 
attractive if the packer can perform these functions 
profitably as is the case with the boxed beef. However, 
cattle feeding has often been unprofitable for extended 
periods of time, so the attractiveness has not been great 
for publicly traded corporations which typically prefer 
consistent earnings reports each quarter. Packers will 
probably functionally integrate forward by doing even more 
processing, in an attempt to develop a retail-ready 
product. EXCEL is test-marketing a branded product in Ohio 
a n d  N o r t h  C a r o l i n a  r e t a i l  s t o r e s  ( S t e i m e l ,  1 9 8 6 ,  p .  I V ) .  
Kenosha Beef is also undertaking a 5-store test in the 
Chicago area of a tray-ready product. 
Integration; diversification and conglomerates 
Some packers have become involved in slaughtering and 
processing other meat products. IBP owns four pork plants 
and has plans to build a fifth large plant in Southeastern 
Iowa. ConAgra has recently agreed to buy 50% of Valley 
Z^Both operations were recently purchased by ConAgra, 
a large agriculture conglomerate. 
120 
View Holdings, which in turn owns both Val-Agri and Swift, 
with an option to buy the remaining shares. Swift is one 
of the largest pork packers and the third largest lamb 
packer, with combined 1986 revenues of $3.5 billion. 
Monfort of Colorado is also a major lamb packer. EXCEL has 
bought a hog-slaughtering facility in Beardstown, Illinois 
from Oscar Mayer, and is negotiating the purchase of the 
O t t u m w a ,  I o w a  p o r k  p l a n t  f o r m e r l y  o p e r a t e d  b y  H o r m e l . 2 4  
Many of the large packers are, in turn, owned by 
conglomerates. IBP is owned by Occidental Petroleum, an 
energy conglomerate. ConAgra, primarily in agricultural 
products owns Swift and Val-Agri. ConAgra also purchased 
Monfort of Colorado's and E.A. Miller's beef packing plants 
and the cattle feeding operations. National Beef is owned 
by Union Holdings, with primary interest in gas and oil. 
EXCEL Corporation, is owned by Cargill, a major 
agribusiness. Spencer Beef (formerly owned by Land 
o'Lakes, a large agriculture cooperative) was the number 3 
or 4 packer in the late 1970s but didn't perform well 
financially. It was sold to EXCEL in 1984 but the merger 
was successfully blocked until the Supreme Court overturned 
the decision in December, 1986. Owned in the interim by E. 
A. Miller and Sons, EXCEL announced the acquisition of the 
Spencer plants March 23, 1987. 
Mergers of these types, particularly when similar 
production and marketing techniques are involved, can be 
very profitable for the firm. To some extent, further 
Z^it is interesting that EXCEL's parent company 
(Cargill) owns other companies related to the beef industry 
as well as the pork industry, but it was EXCEL who 
purchased the pork plant and not Cargill directly. This 
may suggest a closer horizontal link between beef and pork 
products than some of the other vertical links owned by 
Cargill (i.e., feedlot and packer-buyer). 
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economies of scope can be reached (i.e., through more 
effective utilization of transportation and distribution 
systems, better serving more diversified product line 
requirements of some customers, eliminating duplications in 
staff, getting more from specialized management expertise, 
etc.). If the product market is broadly defined as "red 
meat and poultry", the mergers between packers of different 
species could be viewed as horizontal mergers. 
Barriers to entry 
Existing firms in a market may not worry about 
competitive erosion of above-normal profits or their market 
share if it is difficult for new firms to enter the market. 
Barriers to entry may arise from several causes. Existing 
firms could engage in some form of limit pricing, where 
they set the market price for their product at a level 
where any entering firm (i.e., on a smaller scale, and 
presumably higher per unit costs) cannot project a profit 
potential. The per unit cost advantage for existing firms 
may have come from any number of sources, including 
technological advantages, labor advantages, informational 
advantages, size, etc. 
Existing firms may also deter entry by efforts to 
differentiate their products, possibly through advertising 
or research and development. For example the firm is 
trying to influence consumer tastes and preferences through 
advertising in such a way that the consumer will see the 
product as one which uniquely satisfies some need or want. 
If successful, this makes it more difficult for new 
entrants to survive since they are producing a product 
which the consumer does not yet recognize as being a 
substitute for the established product. Similarly, efforts 
to produce a truly unique product through research and 
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development also give the initial firm a competitive 
"edge", making it more difficult for new entrants to 
duplicate the product. 
Start-up costs One way to assess an industry's 
entry barriers is to look at average start-up costs for a 
"minimum-efficient" sized plant.' Determining that size may 
be somewhat difficult, but one viewpoint was provided in 
the testimony of David J. Neubauer, (President of Midwest 
A n i m a l  P r o d u c t s ,  O m a h a ,  N E )  i n  t h e  M o n f o r t  v .  E X C E L  c a s e .  
He indicated that a plant with roughly 1,200 head per day 
(300,000+ annual) capacity for slaughter and fabrication 
would ; 
1. allow full truckload shipments of product on a 
regular basis, 
2. permit specialization of workers, 
3. allow a wide variety of customers, and 
4. lower average costs for certain employee expenses 
(e.g., workmen's compensation, health insurance, 
etc.). 
A firm wanting to enter the beef slaughter industry 
has the option of building a new plant or purchasing an 
existing plant. Building a new plant is quite expensive, 
but the advantage is that it can often be more ideally 
located than a previously existing plant. Neubauer 
estimated that a fully equipped plant could be brought on­
line in 12-18 months for about $20 million. Additional 
working capital requirements are about $17 million.25 
Buying an existing plant and renovating it can be done for 
about one third the cost of a new plant. Also, the 
25packers and Stockyards regulations require packers 
to pay for live cattle within 24 hours of purchase. There 
may be quite a gap between purchase of the cattle and final 
payment for the boxed product. 
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renovated plant can be in operation much sooner. Most new 
entrants are opting to buy old plants, some which are still 
in operation. 
In 1951, Bain estimated that a fixed capital outlay of 
more than $10 million dollars was required before entry was 
deterred in any industry (Bain, 1968, p. 284). In current 
dollars, this would be well over the $20 million dollar 
outlay needed for new plant and equipment. It would not 
seem that start-up costs present a significant barrier to 
entry. 
This appears to be confirmed by the rate of entry in 
the beef slaughter-fabrication industry. From 1977 to 
1982, 255 firms left the market, while 108 firms entered 
(Helmuth, 1984). Among these were the de novo entries of 
Ual-Agri and Union Holdings, which are among the top 12 
packers nationally. 
Operating costs If existing plants have 
significantly lower operating costs than potential entrants 
would have, this may constitute a barrier to entry. Raw 
materials accounted for about 8 6% of the beef packer sales 
dollar. The next largest category was for labor at 6.3%, 
including wages, salaries, and benefits (see Table 41). 
A large plant may have significant advantages over 
their smaller competitors in many areas. One of these 
could be in the prices paid for cattle. If the packer was 
Z^Idle Wild foods (National Beef is a subsidiary) was 
recently purchased by Union Holdings, Ind., owned by a 
financier from New York (Rosen, April 6, 1986). Ual-Agri, 
a subsidiary of Valley View Holdings, Inc., principally 
owned by investor Edwin L. Cox Jr. of Dallas, purchased a 
niant owned by Farmland Foods in Garden City, Kansas in 
1983 and later, a plant from John Morrell and Co. in 
Amarillo, Texas. The company has expanded each plant, 
bringing its total capacity to around 6.000 head per day 
from these two plants. Early in 1986, che parent firm for 
Ual-Aqri purchased Swift Independent, which in turn was 
sold to ConAgra in 1987. 
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large enough, it might be able to control the market price 
for cattle in its relevant geographic market by 
intimidating competitors through occasional price wars. 
This could results in lower prices paid for cattle than in 
a more "competitive" market. 
The evidence is unclear as to whether any packer has a 
price advantage in the purchase of live cattle. A study by 
the USDA assessing live cattle futures market delivery 
points seemed to indicate significantly lower prices in 
areas where there were few packers (i.e., Joliet and 
Peoria, vs. Omaha, Great Plains, and Western Corn Belt) 
(USDA, 1984, p. 14). This seems to support a study by 
Quail et al., suggesting that packer concentration in an 
area does have a significant negative effect on fed cattle 
prices (Quail et al., 1986, p. 43). The relevant market 
areas used in the Quail study, however, were too small 
according to the results in part one of this dissertation, 
leading to over-estimates of concentration in many of the 
respective locations and corresponding measurement error in 
those results. Low prices in the "higher concentration 
areas" (i.e., the upper Midwest) could be a result of other 
factors, such as uneven quality of cattle, sparse cattle 
populations with higher procurement costs, and 
transportation cost disadvantages both from feedlot and to 
product markets. 
Labor represents the next largest variable cost to the 
packer. Historically, labor in the beef packing industry 
has been organized. Until the late 1970s, most packers 
were bound by a United Food and Commercial Workers master 
contract. The master contract was an industry-wide labor 
agreement where all parties would pattern their labor 
contracts after the first agreement reached. These 
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agreements eliminated competition based on wage cuts 
between packers. This arrangement also gave more stability 
to the industry,providing uninterrupted production to the 
packers (Heimstra, 1985, p. 70). 
When the new independent packers entered, however, 
they refused to follow the master agreements. Some were 
non-union; others were affiliated with different unions at 
their various plants. A packer under a master contract had 
a significantly higher risk involved in potential strikes, 
since a strike at one plant meant a strike at all plants. 
In contrast, a packer with plants under several contracts 
would only face one plant strike at a time, and be able to 
increase production at other plants to make up for lost 
production. Also, the older plants' labor forces had more 
fringe benefits under the master contract as well as 
generally higher wages. The new packers now had a 
significant cost advantage for labor as.well as having 
newer, more efficient on-line slaughter facilities.27 . 
The two-tiered industry wage rates became intolerable, 
leading many firms to either close, or somehow force wages 
to a more competitive level. By the early 1980s, most beef 
(and pork) packers had either freed themselves from the 
master contract, closed, or had been purchased by other 
firms (Heimstra, 1985, p. 75). However, some are still 
undergoing painful labor disputes as wage differences 
persist, even though there is no current "master contract" 
in the beef industry. The current high labor cost 
operations always have a strong incentive to get their 
costs back in line with their competitors, or be in a 
27one industry source estimated their total labor 
costs, including fringes, with the master contract was $18-
19 per hour, reduced Co $12-13 after the contract was 
broken. 
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Table 41. Breakdown of Cattle Packers' Sales Dollar 
1982-843 
Item 1982 1983 1984 
Total Sales 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Cost of Livestock 86.5 86. 3 85.7 
Gross Margin 13.7 l4.J 
Operating Expenses 
Wages and Salaries 
Employee Benefits 
Retirement Expense 
Payroll Taxes 
Insurance and Hospitalization 
Vacation, Holiday & Sick leave 
All Other 
5.1 5.0 
.1 .1 
.4 .4 
.4 .5 
•2 . .2 
(Small ) . 1 
4.9 
.1 
.4 
. 5 
. 9 
. 1 
Total 1.3 1.4 1.3 
Interest 
Depreciation 
Rents 
Taxes 
Supplies & Containers 
All Other 
. 3 
. 5 
. 3 
. 1 
1.8 
2.6 
. 2 
. 5 
. 2 
. 1 
1.9 
3.3 
. 2 
. 5 
. 3 
. 1 
1.7 
4.3 
Total Operating Expenses 12.0 12.7 13.4 
Income before taxes 
Income taxes 
1.5 
. 7 
1.0 
.4 
1.1 
.4 
Net Income .8 . 6 . 7 
^Source: AMI Annual Financial Review, 1983-05 > 
19B4-1986a. 
distinctly unfavorable competitive position in the fed 
cattle and wholesale beef markets. IBP has had a violent 
strike in Dakota City plant every time their contract 
expired since 1969 (Erb, 1987). Other packers were 
watching the 1987 lock-out at Dakota City carefully, since 
the outcome will undoubtedly affect their labor situation 
as well. 
According to packers interviewed, the difference in 
labor costs between the top beef packers is growing 
smaller. But when significant differences exist, there 
127 
continues to be effects by more cost-efficient firms to 
seize significant market share or put profit pressures on 
the higher cost -firms. 
Product differentiation If firms in an industry 
are producing a homogeneous product and are not colluding, 
there is no way any one firm can arbitrarily restrict 
output and raise price without the other firms increasing 
their market shares at its expense. However, if each firm 
can differentiate its product in some way (e.g., packaging, 
promotion, service, etc.) then those firms begin to have 
more control ov.er their product price. One of the most 
common ways firms try to differentiate their otherwise 
homogeneous product is through advertising, either at the 
retail or wholesale levels. 
The food manufacturing industries accounted for over 
2 5 ? o  of all advertising and promotion expenditures in the 
U.S. in 1980, as shown in Table 42. Relatively little 
advertising is done by food producers (or producer 
organizations). Advertising expenditures vary by type of 
food product, and generally are very low for red meat 
products (i.e., .6?o of sales, vs 3.2?o for all food 
manufacturers) (Hayenga and Lawrence, 1986, p. 4). 
Within the red meat industry, branded advertising for 
beef packers is much lower than for pork (see Table 43). 
This is to be expected since the product leaving the beef 
packing plant is usually homogeneous and unbranded, while 
the typical pork plant produces more heavily processed 
(i.e., differentiated) products. However, generic 
advertising for beef is over three times the advertising 
for unbranded pork, but had been very low until 1986. 
Expenditures increased to approximately $28 million per 
year under the mandatory check-off from beef producers 
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Table 42. Total advertising expenditures of selected 
manufacturing industries, census years 1963-
1982 (millions of dollars)^ 
Principle Enterprise 
Industry or Firms 1963 
lotal nanur. 
1967 
B,2b6 
'•111 
170 
72 
1,929 
321 
140 
520 
Year 
1972 
1U,4M 
2,532 
398 
207 
105 
2,476 
392 
143 
567 
1977 
1/,4U8 
"'VA 
290 
154 
3,479 
838 
272 
815 
1982 
24,yys 
6,564 
1,478 
472 
235 
4,816 
''IVi 
1,262 
Food and Kindred 
products 1,637 
Tobacco 317 
Apparel and other 
fabricated 
textiles 126 
Furniture and 
fixtures 62 
Chemicals and 
allied products 1,360 
Petroleum and 
coal 222 
Primary metals 106 
Motor vehicles 205 
^Source: Hayenga and Lawrence, "Advertising and 
Promotion of Meat Products", paper prepared for the 
National Livestock and Meat Board, 1986. 
Table 43. Six Media Advertising Expenditures by Leading 
National Advertisers: 1980-84 (OOOs;^ ° 
Branded Pork 
Generic Pork 
Branded Beef 
Generic Beef 
Branded Seafood 
Generic Seafood 
Branded Poultry 
Generic Poultry 
Processed Red Meat 
Other Meat Products 
Miscellaneous 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
19 
•m 
19 
1 
,921 
,844 
24 
1 
, 840 
,404 
25 
1 
, 672 
,331 
34 
1 
,420 
,283 
6 8 , 598 
640 
11 
4 
,013 
,144 
12 
4 
,134 
, 967 
8 
4 
,494 
,539 
18 ,700 
416 
15 ,137 
169 
14 22 
1 
, 721 
,792 
16 ,527 
100 
21 , 908 
69 
24 ,239 
0 
29 41 ,293 
173 
51 , 796 
258 
28 , 908 22 ,016 20 ,992 24 ,669 40 ,147 
16 ,681 
356 
17 
1 
,934 
,012 
15 
1 
,219 
,365 
13 
'Vi\ 
3 
1 
, 189 
,269 
^Source: Hayenga and Lawrence, "Advertising and 
Promotion of Meat Products", paper prepared for the 
National Livestock and Meat Board, 1986. 
bfor all product lines. 
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which became effective in late 1986. Beef packers have 
been relatively less aggressive (and successful) in efforts 
to differentiate their product through brand promotion. 
The most successful effort to differentiate products 
through additional processing of beef products at the 
slaughter location has been in the production of boxed 
beef. This process made economic sense with the advent of 
better transportation systems, refrigeration methods and 
packaging materials. In this way, much of the carcass did 
not have to be shipped to the wholesale or retail butcher 
shop. Also, with better packaging, the shelf-life of the 
product could be extended by sealing the product in plastic 
wrap, and then boxing it for delivery. The sanitary 
benefits are obvious in contrast to swinging sides of beef, 
hanging on open rails in semi-trailer trucks. 
Further processing, as in retail-ready cuts or other 
beef products, is just beginning on an experimental basis, 
primarily because many retailers are searching for a way to 
reduce their relatively high-wage meat departments and make 
more effective use of the back-room space now allocated to 
meat processing and packaging. The economic advantage of 
using lower wage processors on an assembly line basis at 
the packing plant can be significant (particularly with 
better use of by-products, etc.), but the added packaging 
cost and the ability to custom tailor products to local 
customers' demand preferences are tradeoffs. When and if 
retail-ready beef does become a reasonable product for 
wholesale and retail outlets, the market for the product 
must be developed. It took considerable marketing effort 
to introduce boxed beef and it will probably take 
considerable effort to persuade wholesalers and retailers, 
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and their unions to make such a large change in the 
processing and merchandising system. 
Mandatory beef check-off programs by producers will 
sharply increase generic advertising for beef in 1987-88 
but it will still remain a relatively small proportion of 
total advertising expenditures for beef. Until there is 
more branded product development at the packer level in the 
beef industry, advertising expenditures will probably 
remain low. However, efforts by packers to produce a 
retail-ready product seem likely to result in more packer-
branding, and advertising expenditures are likely to change 
accordingly, laying the growndwork for the beef industry to 
behave competitively more like the packaged goods 
industries found extensively represented in other areas of 
the supermarket. 
Research and technology The major changes in 
technology after World War II in the industry were: 
refrigeration enabling packers to locate away from densely 
populated areas and closer to the feedlots, expanded roads 
and highways allowing faster transportation of beef 
products from distant areas, and the adaptation of the 
"assembly line" technique to the beef slaughter plant 
reducing per unit costs, and enabling plants to further 
process the beef products on-site more economically than 
before. These new technologies were equally available to 
all market participants. However, some were slower than 
others to take full advantage of the new techniques. 
Probably one of the more revolutionary developments in 
the industry was the introduction of boxed beef. Although 
the idea and technology had been around for some time, a 
market for pre-fabricated beef had not been developed. 
Until the early 1960s, almost all beef left the packing 
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house "on-the-rail" (i.e., in carcass form). When Iowa 
Beef Processors entered the industry in 1960, they began to 
cut the carcass into smaller pieces and vacuum-pack it into 
boxes. This extended the shelf-life of the product, and 
saved transportation costs. More product was transported 
per truck with much less waste. 
Although the idea finally caught on in the industry, 
it took quite a marketing effort on the part of IBP to 
convince wholesale and retail establishments to adopt the 
new product. The wholesale and retail industry was 
reluctant to try boxed beef for several reasons. Boxed 
beef was resisted by organized labor since there was less 
need for skilled meat-cutters. Also, if these 
establishments went to a "pre-fabricated" beef product, 
that would mean that their present fabrication facilities 
would be idle. Also, if they became dependent on this 
product, it would be very difficult to switch back to 
breaking their own carcasses. However, the cost savings in 
terms of transportation (fat and bone not shipped), 
increased shelf-life, and labor convinced many that boxed 
beef was an attractive product. 
Some industry observers believe that the significant 
future innovations in the beef packing industry will be in 
the form of a further processed product, possibly retail-
ready cuts. Retailers are now searching for ways to better 
utilize space allocated to meat processing in the back-room 
of the grocery store, and minimize labor costs by 
eliminating highly skilled meat cutters at wages typically 
well above wages paid by meat packers. Thus, the time may 
be ripe for beef packers to do more processing. However, 
the technology will have to be developed for a satisfactory 
shelf appearance and some entirely new further processed 
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beef products (e.g., taking their cue from poultry or pork; 
frankfurters, hams, etc.) will also have to be developed. 
Companies like Hormel are now beginning to market 
microwaVable meat products in packages that require no 
refrigeration. Microwavable hamburgers with buns are now 
entering the market. It seems that we are seeing the tip 
of the iceberg that could radically change the competitive 
structure of the meat industries, especially beef, over the 
next decade. 
Market information In a perfectly competitive 
market where many buyers and sellers gather, information is 
perfectly available, and is reflected in the market price. 
When cattle were traded at terminal markets, market 
information was readily and immediately available to all 
parties. Now, very little trading is done in a central 
market. Instead, most is done directly between the packer 
and feedlot. Market information is no longer equally 
available to all parties. 
Cattle feeders rely on reported market information to 
determine slaughter prices. Primary sources include live 
cattle quotations from USDA reporters passed on to the 
media, direct market news reports, dressed beef quotations 
from several services (including USDA), bids from packer 
buyers, prices received by neighbors, and extension outlook 
information (Petritz et al., 1981, p. 244). 
Not all of these sources are accurate barometers of 
market price. The three major wholesale market information 
sources (The Yellow Sheet, the Meat Sheet, and the USDA 
direct market reports) are based on polls of wholesale 
market participants. The reported prices then serve as a 
basis for a large volume of beef traded on a formula basis 
(i.e., contract terms have been negotiated, but price is 
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determined by, say, the Yellow Sheet, at some specific 
future date). These reported prices feed back to the 
producer/packer level since the packer often bases 
decisions regarding price and volume of cattle to purchase 
on the reported prices in the wholesale market. 
The reliability of the reported prices, at least in 
part, depends on the relative volume of trades which are 
negotiated (i.e., the usual offer-and-acceptance trade 
where price is established immediately) rather than 
formula. Also, since much of the wholesale price reporting 
depends on carcass trades, the relative volume of product 
sold in that form also becomes important. 
In 1965, the National Commission on Food Marketing 
found that 41% of dressed beef was sold on formula basis. 
By 1976, Williams found that 70-75% was sold on formula 
basis nationally. Hayenga (1979) and the USDA Meat Pricing 
report (1978) found that 70% of carlot steer and heifer 
carcasses were formula priced in 1977 (Nelson, 1979). 
However, currently, steer and heifer carcass trades 
represent an increasingly small portion of the total 
wholesale beef market. In 1979, about 5 0% of all beef 
traded in boxed form. Currently, boxed beef accounts for 
more than 80% of all beef received at retail (Monfort v. 
EXCEL (1984)). According to industry sources, 70% or more 
of the boxed beef leaving the packer involved individually 
negotiated transactions, not formula pricing. 
With the thinly traded carcass market serving as a 
basis in both the wholesale boxed as well as the fed cattle 
markets, it is not surprising some packers have become 
overtly concerned with the quality of reported prices and 
the equity of formula priced trades. However, the reported 
prices still serve as a guide for packers on which to base 
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price and quantity decisions in the fed cattle market. 
Perhaps more importantly the reported prices are sometimes 
the best information source available for feedlot 
operators. 
Packer buyers have their own companies' information 
systems in addition to the other publicly available 
sources. For large packers, their own internal price 
information is often better and more quickly available than 
the publicly available sources. Similarly, large feedlot 
operations may have very good information in their own 
files. The advantage in having good price information in a 
relatively volatile market can obviously make or break a 
feeding operation. When smaller feeders are forced to rely 
on the market news services, they not only are at a 
bargaining disadvantage to the packers, but also at a 
competitive disadvantage with larger feedlots. 
Cattle feedlot size, structure and location 
Typically, packers have been following cattle 
supplies. As cattle feeders moved south and west, packers 
followed. The trend throughout the country has been to 
fewer and larger feedlots. So-called "farmer" feedlots 
with less than 1,000 head one-time capacity have declined 
rapidly, while the number of larger commercial operations, 
has actually increased. Iowa, for example, has experienced 
an average loss in the total number of feedlots of about 3% 
per year since 1965. However, the number of Iowa feedlots 
with over 1,000 head capacity has increased from 61 in 1965 
to 504 in 1984 (Hayenga et al., 1984, p. 8) (AMI, 1985b, p. 
8 )  .  
Feedlot numbers in the top thirteen cattle producing 
states also have declined, with an average 19% decline 
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every five years from 1965 to 1983.28 The number of large 
feedlots (i.e., greater than 1,000 head coracity) has grown 
from 1,468 in 1965 to 1,762 in 1984. Small feedlots have 
declined dramatically, from 149,804 in 1965 to 57,835 in 
1984 (Hayenga et al., 1984, p. 11) (AMI, 1985b, p. 8). 
There has been a shift in the share of marketings 
between regions, although total fed cattle marketed in the 
thirteen-state area has remained fairly constant. In the 
upper Midwest (i.e., Iowa, Illinois, Minnesota), the share 
of fed cattle produced has fallen from 30% in 1970 to 18% 
in 1983. The share of fed cattle from the Southwest (i.e., 
Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, Texas) rose from 48% in 1970 to 
6 5% in 1983 (Hayenga et al., 1984, p. 4). 
Although there are many cattle feeders (i.e., both 
farm and commercial), it seems that large commercial 
feedlots are producing an increasingly large share of fed 
cattle. In 1985, the largest .3% of all feedlots (i.e., 
16,000 or larger capacity) marketed 48.9% of all fed 
cattle. Commercial feeders (i.e., 1,000 or larger) in Iowa 
accounted for half of the state's the fed cattle, and 
nationwide, they accounted for about 81% of total fed 
cattle (AMI, 1985b, p. 12). 
Although feedlots have become more concentrated, the 
ownership of cattle on feed is much less so. Many of the 
large feedlots custom-feed cattle for many different 
clients.29 in 1974, 30-35% of all fed cattle were custom 
Z^Most commercial fed cattle are produced from 
feedlots in thirteen states (Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska. 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington) in the 
Midwest-High Plains area. These states produced 87.5% of 
all commercial fed cattle in 1984 (AMI, 1985b, p. 9). 
Z^Some industry observers feel that the cattle feeding 
industry is attracting too much investment from outside 
(i.e., bankers, retailers, doctors, lawyers, etc owned 2 6% 
of custom fed cattle in 1972 (Petritz et al., 1981, 
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fed. The practice of custom feeding has probably increased 
with the growth in commercial feedlots to substantially 
more than 35?o of all fed cattle, possibly up to 7 0% in the 
Southwest (Reimund et al., April 1981, p. 25). However, 
recent studies indicate that custom feeding is increasing 
even in typical "farmer-feeder" states such as Iowa, partly 
as a consequence of the farm financial crisis which has 
left many feedlots empty and many cattle feeders 
undercapitalized and underemployed (ISU College of 
Agriculture Beef Task Force, 1985, p. 10). 
Structure of beef wholesale and retail markets 
According to industry sources, roughly 60% of all 
boxed beef goes through to retail outlets, and 40% to HRI. 
The retail food industry has attracted a good deal of 
antitrust attention throughout its history. Studies have 
indicated that there are substantial barriers to entry 
(Marion, 1984), concentration levels are very high locally, 
and performance has generally been poor (Committee on Small 
Business, part 7, 1980). On a national level, there is 
little concentration, but individual retail chains often 
purchase very large volumes, which give at least the 
appearance of market leverage to their suppliers, although 
not necessarily true market power. 
Retailers do not seem to be at a disadvantage in the 
purchase of beef products from packers. In fact, if 
countervailing power is not in balance, packers may be 
somewhat at a disadvantage, since some of the largest 
retailers have had (or could easily have) fabrication 
facilities of their own. Several retail chains have had 
p. 156)) due to certain tax-deferral possibilities in both 
state and federal tax laws. However, due to changes in the 
federal tax law in the coming years, this alleged'"over­
investment" may diminish. 
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their own fabrication facilities, but most have found it 
unsatisfactory, and more economical to shift back to buying 
further processed boxed beef from packers. 
Packers have attempted to limit the proportion of 
their sales going to any one customer. In this way, they 
are not as dependent on a particular buyer. However, as 
the size of the packer decreases, the ability to limit the 
portion of sales going to the largest customer decreases. 
Smaller packers tend to be much more dependent on a few 
buyers than larger packers (Petritz et al., 1981, p. 301). 
And with excess packing plant capacity, large buyers may be 
able to get very good deals in exchange for large orders. 
Summary - industry structure 
There are fewer beef slaughter plants in all areas of 
the country. Larger slaughter plants are increasing their 
share of commercial slaughter, while small plants are 
declining dramatically. The large plants are also locating 
near concentrated populations of fed cattle. This trend 
has had a significant impact on the industry, particularly 
Iowa, where there is a preponderance of smaller "farmer-
feeders" and relatively few "concentrated populations of 
fed cattle". 
Available slaughter capacity in the Southwest is about 
60% greater than in the upper Midwest area. The largest 
packer holds over 30% of that capacity in the upper Midwest 
and over 20% in the Southwest. Currently, about 84.5?o of 
available capacity is being used in the relevant market 
area, which could be a deterrent to new entry in the beef 
slaughter industry, particularly in areas where cattle 
supplies are declining. 
Slaughter plants are becoming larger and the industry 
is becoming more concentrated primarily due to internal 
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growth by IBP, and mergers or acquisitions by Valley View 
Holdings, ConAgra, and Cargill. The market share held by 
the top four firms exceeds 50%. Boxed beef production is 
even more concentrated than slaughter. 
The largest plants usually have fabrication facilities 
as well. Further vertical integration appears likely if 
packers find a cost-effective way to market retail-ready 
cuts of beef. If this happens, packers will be primarily 
shifting processing from retail or HRI fabrication 
facilities to the packing plant. Integration into feeding 
activities is minimal, at least in part due to restrictions 
by the Packers and Stockyards Administration, but probably 
because cattle feeding returns are often low and very 
sporadic.30 
There is some horizontal integration into similar 
products; IBP in pork, EXCEL in pork, ConAgra in poultry, 
beef, pork and lamb (from Monfort and Val-Agri (Swift) . 
purchases). Also, many of the major packers are owned or 
affiliated with large conglomerates, though some have been 
spun-off.31 In short, the direction of integration 
(vertical, horizontal, etc.) seems to be towards 
packing/processing industries that are more concentrated 
and possibly less competitive in the future. Also, the 
largest packers seem to be diversifying into other red meat 
industries, especially pork, and to a lesser extent lamb. 
Start-up costs and operating costs do not seem to 
present undue barriers to entry. Many have entered or 
^OSeveral plants or parent companies own feedlots 
(e.g.. National, Monfort/E. A. Miller (now ConAgra), 
Cargill) and at one time, IBP had a joint venture with 
Northwest Feeders. 
3^IBP is owned by Occidental, EXCEL is owned by 
Cargill, Val-Agri and Swift are owned by Valley View 
Holdings and National Beef is owned by Union Holdings. 
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expanded facilities in the last decade. Technology is 
freely available to all industry participants. Also, 
attempts to differentiate packer product have not been 
successful. Beef at the retail level remains a "commodity" 
business, with no strong brand franchises. For a long time 
the USDA grade "choice" was a great standard of quality 
which put large and small packers on essentially an equal 
footing competitively. But that standard is declining in 
importance as more consumers are becoming more concerned 
with fat content of beef products, which the USDA consumer 
grading system doesn't reflect, and many retailers are now 
successfully promoting their own store brands (e.g., 
Safeway lean) or fat-trim specifications (e.g., 1/4 inch 
trim). 
Information availability was not a problem when 
packers and producers met at the terminal markets. 
However, since most trades are now conducted directly 
between parties, there is an unequal distribution of 
information about the market. The packer can afford to 
have specialized buyers with better knowledge about the 
market than the small feedlot operator. However, large 
specialized feedlots probably are almost as well informed 
as the packer buyers. As feedlots increase in size, 
however, this inequity may diminish somewhat. 
A clear-cut case of oligopolistic or monopolistic 
market structure cannot be made against the beef slaughter 
industry. There are no obvious barriers to entry, and in 
fact there has been new entry and some turnover in the top 
ranks. However, recent merger activity has led to 
concentration levels that are fairly high and increasing 
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for packers in both fed cattle procurement and in boxed 
beef production. Packers have much better market 
information than their market counterparts, particularly 
smaller cattle feeders. Overcapacity continues to be very 
sizeable. The potential for competitive problems exists 
primarily in the cattle feeding/procurement market in areas 
where few packers are present now. However, cattle feeding 
in some areas may have declined to the point where enough 
cattle are not available to justify an adequate number of 
efficient-sized plants for workable, "adequate" levels of 
competition. 
Conduct 
Mergers 
Out of the top ten beef packers in the last 5 years, 
there have been four new entries and several mergers (or 
attempts to merge). One of the most notable acquisitions 
was made by EXCEL Corporation (number 2 in size) of three 
Land 0'Lakes plants (i.e., Spencer Beef, then number 4 in 
size). The Justice Department elected not to challenge 
this merger, but the Federal court found in favor of 
Monfort's challenge that the acquisition would endanger 
competition in their regional market. Based on a twelve 
state regional procurement market and a national boxed beef 
sales market, the four largest packers would possess 68.4% 
of efficient capacity and 57.5?o of fed cattle slaughter 
after the merger, an increase from 60.5% and 52% 
respectively. Also, the court found that entry barriers 
were significant (i.e., in terms of start-up capital) and 
that there were no new technological breakthroughs likely 
in the near future. From this, the court found that 
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Monfort would probably suffer injury from the lessening of 
competition after the merger. 
This "twelve state" relevant market area coincides 
almost identically with the relevant market described in 
the first part of this dissertation. Table 38 lists 
estimated capacities of plants from 10 of these twelve 
states, omitting New Mexico and Missouri, neither of which 
have major beef packing operations. From this table, the 
top four firms have 65.6% of the capacity in the market. 
This figure is very close to the court's projection of 
68.4%. 
Although the court's relevant market definition is 
supported by this thesis, the finding of substantial 
barriers-to-entry is not. In the last three years there 
has been substantial entry into the beef industry, 
particularly in the top firms. Two of the top four firms 
in 1984 are now part of the number two firm in the 
industry, a new entrant itself. 
Monfort's claim was upheld through the Court of 
Appeals, but a December 9, 1986 Supreme Court decision 
reversed the lower courts in EXCEL's favor. The pivotal 
issue was that Monfort had not shown actual damages, but 
only that there was a threat of "tougher competition" 
(Wermiel, 1986). If actual damages would be incurred in 
the future due to monopolistic practices, such as predatory 
pricing, then a new suit would have to be brought to seek 
compensation at that time. 
A second merger occurred when the parent company of 
Ual-Agri purchased Swift Independent. This merger involved 
Ual-Agri, with two plants in the Southwest and Swift 
Independent, with three plants in the Midwest and 
Southwest. The resulting company had four plants in the 
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Southwest and one in the Midwest and 9.5% national market 
share of capacity. 
Early in 1987, ConAgra (a large diversified food 
company with a large poultry production/processing business 
and an Armour pork processing subsidiary) announced plans 
to purchase the Utah feeding and slaughter facilities of 
E.A. Miller and Sons as well as those of Monfort of 
Colorado. This gave ConAgra a substantial market share in 
beef slaughter capacity (5.1% nationally), and was enough 
to give them the number two ranking for red meat production 
(AMI, 1986b). A few months later, ConAgra announced that 
it had purchased 50% of Valley View Holdings (i.e., Val-
Agri) with an option to buy the rest of the company at a 
later date. ConAgra currently has more than 14% of fed 
beef slaughter capacity. 
The merger activity going on in the beef packing 
industry does not seem to be predatory on the part of the 
large firms. In some cases, acquisitions are probably 
attempts by firms to reorganize unprofitable enterprises. 
The new owner can renegotiate wage rates, improve 
management teams, improve facilities, etc. (Nelson, 1985, 
p. 5). For example, industry sources indicated that 
Spencer Beef was being sold to EXCEL because Land 0'Lakes 
could not run the three plants profitably. Val-Agri's 
purchase of two plants was immediately followed by 
extensive renovation and expansion of capacity for each. 
Another motive behind the mergers might simply be to 
become more competitive with IBP. EXCEL now has plants 
strategically located in regions which will allow it access 
to Northeast markets as well as the South and West Coast 
markets. ConAgra also is challenging IBP with its 
acquisition of the Swift plants in the Midwest area 
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(through Val-Agri) as well as substantial capacity in the 
Southwest. 
Pricing behavior 
Farm level Nearly all fed cattle are purchased 
directly by the packers or their agents for delivery within 
3 to 7 days. The most common type of contract in the 
Southwest is the live-weight contract (83.2% of all steers 
and heifers purchased in the region in 1984), where the 
price is based on the live-weight of the animal, usually 
less a standard 4% "pencil-shrink" since the cattle are 
typically weighed at the feedlot. However, fewer cattle 
are bought on a live-weight basis (and even then, usually 
weighed at the plant) in the upper Midwest (55% in 1984) 
(P&SA Resume, 1985). The buyer frequently gives a bid 
based on the carcass weight and/or quality (i.e., choice, 
good, etc.). This difference in contract type is partly 
due to the size and "expertise" of the feeding operation. 
In the Southwest area, commercial feeders will have 
production records on every animal, and estimating the 
animal's value "on-the-hoof" is much easier since they 
market fed cattle frequently. Also, packers then have 
recent cut-out data to help determine the likely grade and 
yield of cattle from the feedlot, and the appropriate price 
to quote. 
The typical feedlot in the upper Midwest will feed 
less than 1,000 head per year, marketing their animals 
perhaps once or twice in that year. Feeding practices and 
the animal's genetics may vary from widely among feeders 
and among individual lots. Also, occasional mud problems 
in feedlots create extra weight which in turn creates a 
problem in pricing on a live-weight basis. According to 
some industry sources, very few of these feeders really 
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know the value of their animals, let alone keep detailed 
records on them. The packers give these feeders a "carcass 
weight" bid to minimize their risk of overpaying for the 
animal. 
There has been some forward contracting with feedlot 
operators on the part of the large packers (e.g., EXCEL, 
IBP, Val-Agri, etc.). The packer will negotiate terms with 
the seller, tying price to the prevailing future delivery 
contract price, and allowing delivery during some time 
frame (e.g., a two to four week time period 3 to 4 months 
into the future). Although this is potentially a good risk 
management tool, it is used mainly by the larger packers 
and feeders. EXCEL, the industry leader in this, area, 
often has 40 to 50 percent of its daily needs purchased a 
few days prior to slaughter and expects to increase that 
t o t a l  t o  a r o u n d  7 0  p e r c e n t  ( S t e i m e l ,  1 9 8 6 ,  p .  I V ) .  
Wholesale level Boxed beef is one of many products 
sold over the telephone by the packer to wholesale and 
retail customers on the basis of description. This 
product can be priced in basically two ways: formula and 
negotiated. In the formula priced transaction, buyer and 
seller negotiate all terms except price, and tie the price 
to a reported price (e.g., Yellow Sheet) on a given date 
closer to shipment. 
In contrast, negotiated prices are negotiated on 
individual shipments between buyer and seller. However, a 
bid is usually offered based on a reported price for that 
day (or previous day). Although many other factors are 
considered by both parties, the reported price does serve 
as a starting point. Most boxed beef is sold on a 
negotiated basis, while carcasses, and some boxed beef sold 
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as a carcass unit, are usually traded on a formula basis 
(Nelson, 1984, p. 15). 
The practice of formula pricing a large percent of 
beef carcasses based on reported prices has been the 
subject of much controversy. The reported prices are based 
on carcass trades which constitute a very small part of the 
beef market. Some critics maintain that there is a huge 
potential for price manipulation on the part of some 
packers, since the market is so thinly traded. This market 
is getting even thinner as more packers elect to fabricate 
their own choice yield-grade 3 or better steer and heifer 
carcasses, rather than selling them to another fabricator. 
While there are some longer term formula priced contracts 
between producers and retailers or other processors, there 
is little indication that pricing and coordination linkages 
are inhibiting competition at any stage of the marketing 
channel. 
Product differentiation 
The packer can distinguish its product by adding more 
value to the product before it leaves the plant. In the 
pork industry, 60% of all product is processed, cured, and 
branded before leaving the packer. The poultry industry 
has also developed more processed products sold at retail 
under packer labels. However, the beef industry has failed 
to do likewise. 
Currently, the two major beef products leaving the 
packer are carcass beef and boxed beef. Carcass beef is 
generic in nature; a carcass produced at IBP is virtually 
identical to one produced by any other packer. Boxed beef 
is nearly generic also. Although there is some brand 
recognition for wholesalers (i.e., CattlePak is the IBP 
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label for about 30 ?o of its boxed product), virtually no 
packer label remains on beef products at the retail level. 
Summary - industry conduct 
There have been several mergers in the beef industry 
over the last twenty years. However, the mergers have not 
followed any particular pattern. Conglomerates purchased 
beef packers while other conglomerates sold theirs (e.g., 
buying: Occidental and IBP, Cargill and EXCEL, vs. 
selling: Land 0'Lakes and Spencer Beef, Esmark and Swift). 
Small packers sometimes purchased larger packers (e.g., 
Ual-Agri and Swift, E.A. Miller and Spencer). Some large 
packers purchased pork operations (e.g., IBP, EXCEL, Val-
Agri ) . 
Although IBP continues to be the largest packer, it 
has not been the most active merging packer. Since 1967, 
with few exceptions, additional IBP beef packing plants 
have been built, not purchased. Large packers themselves 
are not immune to takeovers by smaller packers. 
If any packer does acquire a substantial market share 
through merger, there are no significant barriers to entry 
to assure its continued "market dominance". This is 
evidently the case in the beef industry where it seems 
there is at least one new face in the top ranks every few 
yeaTs. 
The inability of the beef packer to effectively 
differentiate its product at the retail level probably 
indicates less market leverage than packers in other meat 
industries (i.e., pork, poultry, etc.). However, it is 
interesting to note that the largest packers (i.e., IBP, 
EXCEL, Val-Agri (formerly Swift)) are also integrated into 
the pork industry. Whether this will have any adverse 
effects on the performance in the beef industry depends in 
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part on the extent to which consumers will view beef and 
pork as substitutes. Since many previous studies have 
shown beef and pork to be weak competitors in the retail 
market, and to be in different strategic groups, at least, 
any adverse competitive effects from such product line 
diversification are probably negligible. 
If any packer could sustain a dominant market 
position, it may be able to influence either the input 
price or the output price (or both). Given the relative 
market position of the wholesaler and retailer and the 
inability of the beef packer to differentiate its product, 
the packer is probably not in a position to influence the 
output price significantly. However, most packers are 
relatively better informed than the cattle producers and 
have a potential advantage in this respect. It would seem 
the primary area for potential market dominance would be 
between the packer and the feedlot operator under certain 
conditions (i.e., when feedlot owners are at an information 
disadvantage to packers). Even this situation could change 
with a better public information network. Recently, some 
terminal markets began to report boxed beef trades. This 
may give the small operator better market information than 
news reports based solely on carcass trades. 
Performance 
This section of the study will focus largely on the 
beef packer's profitability and, to some extent, on the 
extent of resource (mi s)a 1location currently observed. 
Much of the financial information available is not reported 
separately for the beef slaughter and processing firms, or 
that part of the diversified corporate enterprise, but is 
reported more generally for the entire company, or for meat 
1 4 8  
packing. And even among those pieces of information 
reported for beef packers, there are significant 
differences between packers (e.g., steer and heifer 
slaughter vs. Holstein processing, cow/bull slaughter, calf 
slaughter). Thus, the information that is available is a 
bit sketchy from corporate or other sources. 
Financial performance 
Income to sales The beef packing industry is a 
high volume, low margin industry. Net income as a percent 
of sales was .8, .7, and .6 from 1982 to 1984 respectively 
(AMI, 1985a, p. 12). For pork, net income as a percent of 
sales for the same period was 1.1, .6, and 1.23. Pork 
exhibited more volatility in those years but the margin of 
income as a percent of sales seems to be much higher. 
However, looking at financial figures for national 
versus regional and local meat packers in Table 44, income 
as percent of sales for the national packer is generally 
much less than for regional and local packers respectively. 
High volume, thin margin sales are more characteristic of 
the national packer. The smaller packer (i.e., regional, 
local) is probably catering to smaller specialty or niche 
markets which the large packer cannot service. 
For the broader FTC classification 20.01 (i.e., Meat 
Packing, sausages and other prepared meats), the ratio of 
income to sales was 1.8% in 1977. This figure is 
considerably higher than the income to sales ratios for 
packers. This is probably due to the broader 
classification, which includes processing. 
The income-to-sales ratio for four major packers are 
summarized in Table 45 for the years 1981-1983. The 
percentages are generally lower for the two largest packers 
(IBP and Swift) with the exception of Idle Wild Foods 
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Table 44. Earnings Ratios for national, regional and a 
local packers^ 
IN et income -to-baies 
1977 1982 1983 1984 
National Packers 
Regional Packers 
Local Packers 
.94 
.78 
.93 
.56 
1.17 
1.48 
.67 
1.17 
1.32 
Meat Packing Industry . 86 .81 .85 
Total Manufacturing 3.49 4.06 4.61 
1977 FTC Line of Business 
20.01 Meat Packing 1.8 
Net Income-to-Assets 
T7T7 T9WZ TTFT 
National Packers 
Regional Packers 
Local Packers 
Meat Packing Industry 
Total Manufacturing 
1977 FTC Line of Business 
20.01 Meat Packing 
5 
5, 
5 
5, 
4, 
79 
6 2  
81 
70 
40 
3.20 
8.09 
8.64 
5.01 
5.07 
3.99 
8 . 1 6  
6 . 8 6  
5.37 
5.81 
9.1 
1982 
Current Ratio 
r9Fr 
National Packers 
Regional Packers 
Local Packers 
Meat Packing Industry 
Total Manufacturing 
1.87 
1.63 
2,56 
1 . 6 8  
1 . 8 2  
2.70 
not available 
not available 
1.83 
1. 78 
3.03 
^Source: AMI Meat facts, 1985 and 1984, FTC Statistical 
report; Annual Line of business Report 1977, 19851 
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Table 45. Selected financial ratios for four beef packers^ 
Year 1983 1982 1981 
Net income to sales 
IBP, Inc. and subsidiaries^ 
Swift Independent .87 
Monfort of Colorado, Inc. 1.22 
Idle Wild Foods, Inc. .70 
1.29 
1.02 
i:l7 
1.15 
.67 
1.96 
1.34 
Net income to assets 
IBP, Inc. and subsidiaries - 10.0 9.9 
Swift Independent 7.6 9.8 4.0 
Monfort of Colorado, Inc. 8.1 10.5 10.6 
Idle Wild Foods, Inc. 3.4 8.3 8.4 
Current ratio (current assets ; current liabilities) 
IBP, Inc. and subsidiaries 
Swift Independent 
2. 9 2 .6 
2. 7 2. 4 3 .0 
Monfort of Colorado, Inc. 1. 3 1. 2 .98 
Idle Wild Foods, Inc. 1. 7 2. 1 1 .8 
^Source: 10-K reports filed with FTC. 
biBP was required to report separate reports until 
1982 after its acquisition by Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation in 1980. All of these firms are wholly owned 
subsidiaries of other firms at this time. Monfort and 
Swift Independent are both owned by ConAgra and idle Wild 
Foods is owned by Union Holdings or New Jersey. The 
detailed operations of the parent company are not 
necessarily reported separately to the FÎC. 
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(i.e., National Beef) in 1983. Each of these packers is 
involved in other industries related to meat packing; IBP 
is involved in pork, Swift is a major sheep and pork 
processor, Monfort is a major sheep processor and feedlot 
operator. Idle Wild is involved in beef feedlot operations 
as well as food processing in the east coast region. 
Overall income-to-sales ratio is much less for meat 
packing than for all manufacturing. Evidently, meat 
packing is a higher volume/thinner margin industry than 
most other manufacturing industries. This would be 
consistent with the notion that the meat packing industry 
is not able to restrict output and/or raise price above the 
competitive level for sustained periods. 
Income to assets The ratio of income to assets in 
1984 was about 5.08% for beef packing and 4.85% for pork 
(AMI, 1985a, p. 12). This ratio provides a measure of the 
income generating power of the company's capital stock. 
National meat packers' average ratio was 3.99% while 
regional and local meat packers' ratios were higher (8.16% 
and 6.86% respectively) (AMI, 1985a, p. 11). For the 
sample of packers in Table 45, the ratio of income to 
assets is higher than for the national, regional or local 
packer, but very close to the 1977 FTC figure for meat 
packers and processors. This may indicate that these top 
firms are more involved in processing (i.e., boxed beef, 
other meat divisions, etc.) than other packers. 
Current ratio The current ratio (current assets to 
current liabilities) also varies somewhat in the national, 
regional, and local classification. For national and 
regional packers, the average ratio has hovered about 1.7 
to 1.8. However, for local packers, the ratio has varied 
from 2.7 to 3.0 (AMI, 1986a, p. 15). This probably 
152 
reflects thé fact that smaller, less diversified firms may 
run a greater risk of a cash flow bind, making it necessary 
for small packers to remain much more flexible and liquid 
thart their larger counterparts. 
Interestingly, the sample of packers in Table 10 seem 
to run counter to this average trend. It is possible, 
however, that IBP found it necessary to maintain a greater 
cash flow since it was beginning to invest in the pork 
industry. Swift is also diversified in terms of number of 
species slaughtered. During the periods surveyed, it was 
also beginning as a newly spun-off company, requiring 
perhaps more liquidity than other firms. 
Consumer loss 
If there is significant market power in an industry, 
then presumably the participants have the ability to raise 
prices above (and restrict output below) the competitive 
level (see Figure 7). If (Pm, Qm) is the monopoly 
price/quantity in this market, and (P^, Qq) is the 
competitive price/quantity in the market, fewer consumers 
will be satisfied at higher prices under the monopoly 
scenario than with the competitive market price. At a 
competitive market equilibrium price, each factor of 
production is being paid the value of its marginal product, 
and resources are allocated efficiently. 
However, at a monopoly price, resources are not 
necessarily allocated efficiently. The total loss to 
consumers from monopoly pricing is the area Pm^CPc. The 
monopoly overcharges (i.e., monopoly profits and internal 
inefficiencies) are described by PmMRPc- The actual loss 
of consumer surplus, or allocative inefficiency introduced 
by this market structure is measured by the triangle MCR in 
Figure 7. 
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Price 
12 
10 
8 
Pm -Nil 
6 
4 
2 ! 
Figure 7 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 Quantity 
Equilibrium price and quantity demanded 
under perfect competition and monopoly 
According to a 1978 study of U.S. food manufacturing 
by Parker and Connor, the allocative inefficiency (i.e., 
triangle MCR) was a very small proportion (less than 5%) of 
the total consumer loss (i.e., PmMCPc) due to monopoly in 
the food manufacturing industry. However, the monopoly 
overcharges were quite large, making the estimated total 
consumer loss more than $55 per capita in 1975. Some of 
the major sources of this loss cited were excessive 
advertising and promotion expenses and chronic excess 
capacity (Parker and Connor, 1978, p. 16). Only a small 
portion of these losses are due to meat packing, however. 
Parker and Connor estimated that the manufacturers' brand 
price elevation due to market power to be only .2 -.3?o of 
the value of the product in meat packing vs. 11.7-13.5?6 in 
total food and tobacco, and virtually all of that was due 
to the highly advertised processed pork products (Connor et 
al., 1985, p. 291). 
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If packers were exercising monopsony power, one would 
expect live cattle prices to be lower than in a competitive 
market. Also, the spread between live cattle prices and 
wholesale prices should be larger if packers had 
considerable price leverage in either market. In a 1980 
study by Clement Ward using prices published by the USDA 
for a 23-state market area, there was no evidence that live 
cattle prices were significantly lower when packer 
concentrations were high. Also, marketing margins between 
farm and wholesale levels were unchanged with high 
concentrations in beef packing (Ward, 1980b, p. 15). 
A 1986 study by Schroeter applied Appelbaum's 
technique for estimating the degree of monopsony conduct in 
both national and regional cattle markets. No tendency 
toward greater monopsony in the market for cattle in either 
national or regional areas was found. 
Quail et al. investigated the impact of packer buyer 
concentration on live cattle prices (1986). Using relevant 
geographic markets defined by Willard Williams in 1979, 
they found that fed cattle prices are negatively related to 
packer concentration, and plant size, and the presence of 
IBP in an area. 
In the first part of this dissertation the relevant 
market area was found to be much larger than the fragmented 
market areas used in the Quail study. Focusing on smaller 
parts of the wliole market area will very likely give 
statistically significant but potentially erroneous 
results. For example, looking at Tables 39 and 40, where 
capacity concentration is divided by region, the four-firm 
concentration of capacity is very different. However, 
neither of these regions is independent of each other in 
terms of price determination. 
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Over-capacity can be another symptom of resource 
misallocation. The beef slaughter industry, particularly 
in the upper Midwest, has significantly more capacity than 
needed. However, the cattle feeding industry in this 
region has been declining for several years. Not only have 
the cattle moved to other regions, but consumer demand for 
beef has also declined. In 1977, per capita consumption of 
retail beef was 94.4 pounds. This was 20% more than per 
capita consumption in 1984 at 78.6 pounds (AMI, 1986b, 
p .  2 6 ) .  
Given these two circumstances happening 
simultaneously, it is not surprising that excess capacity 
has been a continuing problem, especially in the Midwest. 
The apparent mis-allocation of capital resources may be at 
least partly due to factors beyond the packers' control and 
not necessarily to monopsonistic control on the part of 
packers. 
Summary - industry performance 
From any angle, the beef packing industry is not one 
of the most profitable businesses. It is characterized by 
high volume and low profit margins. There is rapid 
turnover in the identities of the top packers. Although 
some of the largest packers have large market shares, it is 
not evident that they are able to exert monopoly power. 
Although the persistent over-capacity in the Midwest 
region continues to concern industry observers, there is no 
evidence that remaining packers are using it to forestall 
entry in the beef packing industry. In fact, that often is 
the vehicle for low cost entry by new firms. Generally 
poor market conditions (i.e., lagging demand, low 
profitability, high risk, etc.) are probably more effective 
deterrents to entry, and new entrants keep moving into the 
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industry, or existing firms keep expanding depsite the 
seeming size and potential market power of IBP. 
Summary - Part II 
A clear-cut case of oligopolistic or monopolistic 
market structure cannot be made against the beef slaughter 
industry. There are no obvious barriers to entry, and in 
fact there has been new entry and turnover in the top 
ranks. However, recent merger activity has led to high 
concentration levels for packers in both fed cattle 
procurement and in boxed beef production. Packers have 
much better market information than their market 
counterparts, particularly smaller cattle feeders. 
Overcapacity continues to be very sizeable. The potential 
for competitive problems exists primarily in the cattle 
feeding/procurement market in areas where few packers are 
present now. However, cattle feeding in some areas may 
have declined to the point where enough cattle are not 
available to justify an adequate number of efficient-sized 
plants for workable, "adequate" levels of competition. 
Given the relatively advantageous market position of 
the wholesaler and retailer and the inability of the beef 
packer to differentiate its product, the packer is probably 
not in a position to influence the output price 
significantly. It would seem the primary area for 
potential market dominance would be between the packer and 
the feedlot operator under certain conditions (i.e., when 
feedlot owners are at an information disadvantage to 
packers). Even this situation could change with a better 
public information network. Recently, some terminal 
markets began to report boxed beef trades. This may give 
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the small operator better market information than news 
reports based solely on carcass trades. 
The beef packing industry is a a high volume, low 
profit margin business. There has been rapid turnover in 
the identities of the top packers. It is not evident that 
any packer has been able to exert monopoly power. 
It seems that the beef packing industry, despite high 
concentration levels and persistent over-capacity, is a 
relatively competitive industry. However, high 
concentration levels and over-capacity are persistent 
signals that there is a potential for monopsony in this 
industry. With the current flurry of merger activity in 
the industry, and the likelihood of branded, retail-ready 
products becoming prevalent in the next decade, the 
competitive character of the industry could change rapidly. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main objective of the first part of this 
dissertation was to find the relevant procurement market in 
which beef slaughter firms were competing. On the premise 
that prices in a single market area will respond to market 
stimulus in another part of that market, four increasingly 
sophisticated techniques were explored to define a market 
area for fed cattle procurement. 
The first technique was to map the geographic trading 
area of several plants. Information obtained from the USDA 
was used to make these mappings. However, since the 
available sample data was drawn exclusively from plants in 
the Southwest area, the mapping possible in this study was 
not very comprehensive. 
The second technique was designed to sort plants 
according to similar fed cattle procurement price behavior 
using factor analysis. The USDA information was used, as 
well as another USDA data set (i.e., Livestock Meat Wool 
News) compiled from fed cattle prices reported from ten 
different locations over a period of years. With the 
former data set, the sample limitations were again a 
problem. With the latter data set, the sorting process 
worked very well. The price behaviors varied by geographic 
location. 
The third technique used the Box-Jenkins method to 
analyze the regional cattle price time series. Causality 
tests were made with pairs of regional price series to 
determine whether or not the prices in the respective 
regions were independently determined. The only data 
suitable for this technique was the LMWN set. It was found 
that regions in the central portion of the U.S. had price 
series which seemed to be dependent on each other. Prices 
159 
reported in regions close to either coast had little impact 
on prices determined in the central area. 
The last technique was also the most demanding in 
terms of information required. Not only would price time 
series of sufficient length be required, but simultaneous 
quantity time series would also be needed from each region. 
This information would extend the price time series 
analysis to a system of interrelated transfer functions. 
The results would then point to regions where prices were 
independently determined. 
The USDA data set had both price and quantity 
information on a daily basis. However, a continuous time 
series of sufficient length was not available. A thorough 
test of this technique was not feasible. 
After exploring four techniques with two different 
data sets, the relevant market was found to be those states 
in the central part of the U.S. Areas along the coast 
seemed to behave sufficiently differently that they should 
be considered separate geographic markets for cattle. 
However, the geographic area in the Pacific Northwest 
region behaved somewhat more similarly to the central 
region than the other coastal areas, probably due to the 
presence of IBP in both areas and their arbitraging cattle 
purchases among their various plant areas." 
The main objective of the second portion of this 
dissertation was to analyze the structure, conduct and 
performance of the industry in the context of the relevant 
market defined in the first part. 
After defining the market and its boundaries, the 
organization of the beef industry (in particular the beef 
slaughter industry) was examined. The industry has a few 
large packers, located in the central part of the country. 
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Although many small packers exist, they tend to be niche, 
or specialty, packers, catering to local tastes and 
preferences. The beef slaughter industry is a relatively 
low-profit, high-risk operation, with no apparent ability 
to raise wholesale prices or restrict output. 
Neither can a hard and fast case of undue monopsony 
power can be made against beef slaughtering plants. 
However, it would be foolish to dismiss the possibility 
that such a situation could not arise quickly in the 
industry. The industry is currently changing very rapidly. 
In the last six months there has been a flurry of merger 
and outside acquisition activity which changed the faces of 
more than one "top ten" firm. The introduction of more 
tray-ready beef products may change the industry as 
dramatically and as quickly as the revolution begun by IBP 
over twenty-five years ago. 
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APPENDIX A: THE ARMA PROCESS 
Certain problems may occur within the individual time 
series. For example, price in the present period may be 
functionally related to previous prices. There may also be 
a trend in the average price level. These problems must be 
overcome in order to use some statistical procedures with 
the time series. 
The first systematic way to deal with these problems 
was outlined by Box and Jenkins.Briefly, the method 
follows four steps: 
1. Model identification 
2. Model fitting 
3. Checking the model fit and possibly adjusting the 
model, refitting rechecking, etc. 
4. Forecasting. 
In the identification step, the time series is plotted 
against its mean. If the average value seems to be 
increasing over time, or if the variance of values from the 
mean seems to change over time, then a transformation of 
the data may be in order. This is done by taking a first 
difference in the first case, and a transformation of the 
data in the latter case (usually a log transformation). 
After the time series is "conditioned", auto-correlation 
and partial auto-correlation functions are computed. With 
these statistical tools, initial auto-regressive or moving-
average terms (or both) are hypothesized at appropriate 
lags. 
With the hypothesized model from the identification 
step, the second step is to fit the model using standard 
Good introductory texts are Forecastinq and Time 
Series by Bowerman and O'Connell and "TTn int roauct ion t o 
bhort Term Forecasting Using the Box-Jenkins Methodology by 
\I. A. Mabert. ^ 
162 
statistical packages such as TSERIES, SAS, etc. These 
packages will give the parameter estimates in addition to 
other statistics concerning the model (e.g., Durbin-
Watson, error variance, t-statistics on the parameter 
estimates). 
The third step, checking the model, involves 
determining whether the hypothesized parameters are 
statistically significant and linearly independent. Also, 
the model should explain a good portion of the variance in 
the time series with as few estimated parameters as 
possible. In practice, several models are usually fit and 
checked before a satisfactory ARMA model is found (ARMA: 
^uto-^egressive Roving ^verage model). 
The final step involves forecasting future periods, 
based on the satisfactory ARMA\ model. For this 
application, however, the forecasting step is not 
necessary. 
The ARMA model has specific procedural requirements on 
the quantity and type of data used. Price time series data 
must be collected for every firm (or smaller reporting 
region). The number of observations per day should be 
large enough to provide statistics with large sample 
properties (i.e., thirty or more). Enough purchase prices 
per firm, per time period must be available to take 
advantage of time series methodology. For the beef packing 
industry, this calls for a large sample of purchase prices 
on each of thirty to sixty consecutive business days for 
each plant. If there is a recurring seasonal pattern 
(which probably isn't a major problem in the fed beef 
cattle market), the series would have to be long enough to 
repeat the pattern five times or more. 
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Some care should be given to the choice of the 
appropriate time unit for each series. For instance, in 
the beef slaughter industry, prices for cattle slaughtered 
that day may have been established anywhere from one to 
seven or more days in advance of delivery. Although prices 
recorded by the date of purchase (when transaction price is 
established, not when check is written) are preferred, 
prices are recorded on the day of slaughter. The average 
lag between purchase and slaughter dates also varies with 
market conditions. The daily observation, then is a moving 
average of prices previously established. 
In general the univariate model for the price time 
series analysis can be written: 
cpp(B)Pt = •&q(B)*at 
where: 
1. B is the back-shift operator on a time series. For 
example B*Pt is equivalent to Pt-1> B^ap^ is P^-Z' 
2. cpp(B) represents the polynomial of order p of auto-
regressive coefficients: 
cpp(B) = ( 1 - cpi * B - cp2 * b2 - . . . - cpp * BP ) 
and 
cpq(B)*Pt = Pt - 9l*Pt-l - 92*Pt-2 " " 9p*Pt-p ) -
3. &q(B) represents a .polynomial of order q of moving-
average coefficients: 
&q(B) = (1 - * B - &2 * 8% - ... - &q * BP ) 
and 
&q(B)*at = at - &l*at-l " &2*at-2 " ••• " ^ p*at-p)-
4. P{. is the stationary price time series in period t. 
5. a^ - is the residual term associated with the price 
observation in period t (i.e., P^- - predicted P). 
at is a "white noise" process (i.e., it is distributed 
i.i.d. (0,a^ ) for all t). 
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Expanding and rewriting, Pt may be expressed as a 
function of past values of P and a : 
Pt = 91*Pt-l + 92*Pt-2 + ••• + 9p*Pt-p 
- &l*8t-l " &2*8t-2 ~ ••• ~ &p*8t-p •*" ®t. 
If the time series is stationary, three conditions 
will hold : 
1) P^ has a constant mean, 
2) Pj- has a finite variance and 
3) the covariance between any two observations k time 
periods apart will be constant for all P^-
Once the researcher is satisfied that the series is 
stationary, a sample autocorrelation function (ACF) is 
constructed. This function is defined as the correlation 
(r^) between observations k periods apart (i.e., Pg and P^, 
or P2 and P(< + 2)* Condition 3 requires constant variance 
over time, since the covariance between two observations 0 
time periods apart Co v ( P|-, P^ _o ) is equivalent to Var(Pt). 
Then r|< is defined as the ratio of the covariance of 
observations separated by k periods to the common variance 
C ° ^ ( P t- 2_P t + k 1 
r u = , 
Uar (Pt ) 
A plot of the values of r(^ from 0 to n (usually 
three to five seasons, for example 12 to 20 for quarterly 
observations) is made. These plots indicate significant 
autocorrelations at particular lags. A useful feature of 
many commercial software packages is the simultaneous plot 
of the confidence intervals for each correlation r . 
Significant autocorrelation indicates that the residual 
from series Pt is not random. Determining the appropriate 
order of the autoregressive and/or moving average model is 
not straightforward. If significant "spikes" occur at 
period one only, this may indicate a moving-average model 
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of order one is appropriate. Similarly if significant 
"spikes" occur at period one and two, and then "cut off", 
a moving average model of order two may be appropriate. 
The ACF may exhibit an oscillating pattern of spikes, or a 
dampening pattern, approaching zero after a series of 
decreasing spikes. The ACF by itself is not sufficient to 
diagnose an auto-regressive or a mixed auto-regressive 
moving average (ARMA) process. Another function, the PACF 
(partial autocorrelation function) is used with the ACF to 
better determine the order of the ARMA process. The PACF 
measures the correlation between observations separated by 
two time periods after adjusting for observations separated 
by one time period. Formally stated, the PACF consists of 
values of A|^(< such that: 
r2 for k=l 
rk fk-j for k = 2,3,...,K 
k — 1 
1 ^ rj 
where A^j = Ak_i,j - A^k * Ak-l,k-j for j = 1,2, .. . ,k-1 
Using only values of A^k, a plot of these calculations is 
made and is used in conjunction with the ACF to hypothesize 
the appropriate model for the time series. 
Fitting the appropriate model is more of an art than a 
hard scientific fact. Patterns in both the ACF and PACF 
will indicate a family of ARMA models which the researcher 
will methodically test and evaluate.^3 
Akk 
^^For a discussion of this process, see Mabert, ^  
Introduction to Short Term Forecasting Using the Box-
Jenkins Mecnodoloqy, ur anger, Cl CJl JTl and r. Newbold. 
Forecastinq Economic Time Series or any introductory time 
series text which deals with Box-Jenkins procedures. 
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APPENDIX B: STANDARDIZED PRICES 
In order to use prices across a wide range of cattle, 
an index had to be constructed to "normalize" some of the 
more important characteristics. The characteristics having 
the most impact on price per hundred-weight were contract 
type, sex, and quality (as captured by the percent 
fabricated variable). The linear relationship is expressed 
as : 
Pcwt = 4.167*FAB + 
63.722*Fh + 65.298*Lh + 62.466*Ch + 
64.622*Fg + 67.072*Ls + 66.467*Cg . 
where : 
1. FAB represents the percent fabricated into boxed 
beef by the plant 
2. F represents a contract type used by three of the 
fifteen plants, but not clearly specified as live 
weight or contract basis. 
3. L represents any contract based on live weight 
4. C represents any contract based on carcass weight 
5. s or h represents the sex of the animal (steer or 
heifer). 
The coefficients of the last six dummy variables can 
be loosely interpreted as the intercept term for the lot 
having those characteristics. For example, a lot of steers 
purchased with a live weight contract would have a value 
estimated by 
Pcwt = 4.167*FAB + 67.072. 
If no cattle were fabricated from this lot, $67.07 
would be the expected price per hundred weight. If 80 
percent were fabricated, then the expected price would be 
$4.167 * (.80) + $67.072 = $70.41. 
167 
APPENDIX C: SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
ON RELEVANT MARKET FOR FED CATTLE 
If a new data set is drawn, the sampling scheme across 
plants will need to be more balanced between plants in the 
Southwest and Corn Belt areas. Also, consistency should be 
stressed in the gathering of information. Since some 
useful information is provided in the old data set, the new 
set should complement the old. For example, it should 
1. reflect most heavily the under-represented areas 
(5-6 plants in Nebraska, Iowa, Illinois, 
Colorado) while collecting minimal new 
information in the old areas (2-3 plants in 
Kansas and Texas), 
2. Have uniform sampling scheme across plants; same 
time period (e.g., March - April), same percent 
of daily lots collected, etc. (preferably 
collected by the same persons), 
3. include purchase date if possible, 
4. include kill lot origin, 
5. include percent fabricated, or restrict species 
and contract type (If the information is gathered 
by the packer over a period of time, percent 
fabricated per lot could be part of the requested 
data.), 
6. include sex of the lot (if not restricted by 
point 5 ) , 
7. include slaughter date, plant identification, and 
similar identifiers for each lot. 
8. span at least thirty consecutive business days 
across all plants. 
9. if a true elasticity measure is desired, the data 
should include the total number of cattle bought 
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per day in each area, possibly by crop reporting 
district, or some smaller lot origin area. This 
will allow a true market share variable, which 
would give more reliable cross-elasticity 
coefficients. However, these elasticity measures 
may not be worth the high collection costs. A 
relative market share figure for the largest 
plants may be adequate. 
With a more comprehensive data set, a study of plant 
by plant combinations can be made. Serious omissions in 
the first set made this impossible. 
The new set, then, would have observations including 
1. purchase date, 
2. origin of the lot, 
3. price paid to producer, 
4. weight of lot, 
5. contract type, 
6. number of head in the lot, 
7. sex of the lot, 
8. percent fabricated in the lot, if gathered by 
packer, 
9. number of head marketed in every district 
mentioned as a lot origin, daily if possible, but 
at least weekly. 
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